Does time pass. by Markosian, Ned,
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1990
Does time pass.
Ned, Markosian
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Markosian, Ned,, "Does time pass." (1990). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2065.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2065

DOES TIME PASS?
A Dissertation Presented
By
NED MARKOS IAN
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
September 1990
Department of Philosophy
(C) Copyright by Ned Markosian 1990
A.11 Rights Reserved
DOES TIME PASS?
A Dissertation Presented
by
NED MARKOSIAN
Approved as to style and content by:
eth B. Matthews, Chairperson of Committee
7^/ 7-^/^
Fred Feldman, Memb.
c
Edmund L. Gettier, III, Member
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am indebted to Mr. David Cowles for many helpful
discussions of the topics discussed in this dissertation,
including, especially, discussions that occurred during a
mind-bending seminar on fatalism in the Spring of 1988.
I am extremely grateful to Professor Fred Feldman (who
conducted that seminar)
,
for numerous discussions of a wide
range of philosophical topics, and for a great deal of
careful and penetrating criticism on earlier drafts of the
dissertation
.
Like most students at UMass, I am indebted to Professor
Edmund Gettier for many helpful lessons, especially on
matters pertaining to modal logic, modal realism, modal
actualism, and their temporal analogues.
I owe a special debt to Professor Robert Grimm of
Oberlin College for introducing me to philosophy in general
and to many of the topics discussed here.
I am thankful to Professor Angelika Kratzer for
agreeing to serve as the outside member of my committee on
very short notice, and for helpful comments on the
penultimate draft of the dissertation.
iv
I am greatly indebted to the director of my
dissertation, Professor Gareth B. Matthews, for patiently
overseeing my project, and also for many enormously helpful
comments and discussions at each stage of that project.
I am also indebted to Mr. R. Cranston Pauli, who was
another major contributor to the fatalism seminar mentioned
above, for many helpful discussions of the topics discussed
here
.
I am very grateful to Professor Thomas Ryckman of
Lawrence University for extremely helpful discussions of the
penultimate draft of the dissertation, including,
especially, discussions of tense logical matters.
Finally, I am thankful to Professor Linda Wetzel for
many helpful discussions, especially of matters involving
types and tokens.
v
ABSTRACT
DOES TIME PASS?
SEPTEMBER, 1990
NED MARKOSIAN, B.A., OBERLIN COLLEGE
M • A
. , UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Gareth 3. Matthews
My topic is the question 'Does time pass?'
. Although
much has been written in attempts to answer this question,
not enough attention has been paid to the asking of the
question itself. As a result, it has not been clear exactly
what is at issue in this matter, and, consequently, it has
not been clear just what are the different views available
to one who wishes to give an answer to the question. I hope
to ameliorate this situation.
The aims of my essay are: (i) to state the issues
involved in the controversy over temporal passage in a
fruitful way; (ii) to formulate what I see as the leading
candidates among the possible responses to those issues; and
(iii) to consider the best arguments relevant to the choice
among these alternative views.
Roughly one-quarter of the essay is devoted to
linguistic questions about time and tense. Another quarter
is devoted to metaphysical matters involving the status of
such putative properties as pastness, presentness and
futurity. What emerge are not just two but, rather, five
vi
distinct views about whether or not time passes: one view,
which I call the 4D view, to the effect that time does not
pass, and four different views, which I call the 3D views,
to the effect that time does pass. Each of these five views
consists of a package of linguistic and metaphysical
components
.
Once I have formulated these five different views, I
present, for each of the five views, a formal language, with
semantics, that would be appropriate for that view. Next,
various arguments that have been suggested in the literature
against the claim that time passes are considered as
arguments against the 3D views; each such argument is found
to be defective. Similarly, various arguments that have been
suggested in the literature against the claim that time does
not pass are considered as arguments against the 4D view;
each of these arguments is also found to be defective.
Finally, I explain why I prefer a certain one of the 3D
views over its four rivals, and I consider some possible
objections to that view.
vii
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 'Does Time Pass?'
My topic is the old question, 'Does time really pass?'
.
This is a strange question in at least two respects. For one
thing, the question does not have about it the air of an
inquiry into some deep and controversial matter. Non-
philosophers (and even some philosophers) tend to respond,
immediately upon hearing about this question, that it is one
of the easiest questions they have ever heard. "Of course
time passes," they generally say. "Everyone knows that. Next
question, please."
The apparent simplicity of the task of providing an
answer to the question makes the second strange aspect of it
all the more strange. It turns out that philosophers have
been debating the matter since antiquity, and that it has
been more or less hotly debated, without any sign of a
settlement, at least since the turn of the present century.
It's odd that such a simple-sounding question should become
a topic of considerable philosophical discussion. But it
has
.
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Of course, no one has tried to deny that we all have
the feeling that time passes. Questions have been raised,
however, about what we should make of this feeling. Does it
correspond to a fact in the world, or is it somehow
misleading, or just plain illusory?
Those who have maintained that time does not pass have
generally held that the feeling of time's passage is largely
illusory. Many of them have claimed that time is more or
less space-like. Some have even held that time is exactly
similar to any one dimension of space. Thus, it is useful at
least to begin our consideration of the debate between those
who say that time passes and those who say that it doesn't
by considering the following thesis.
Space-time (SPT) : Among the four dimensions of
the world, there is nothing special about
time; time is essentially similar to each of
the dimensions of space.
SPT is a thesis that non-passage theorists have
generally affirmed; passage theorists have generally denied
it. The non-passage theorists typically think that, in
virtue of the fact that time is roughly space-like, there is
no sense in which it is correct to say that time moves or
passes. 1 The passage theorists, on the other hand, generally
1 As will be seen in Chapter 3, there are stronger and
weaker versions of this thesis. The stronger versions say
that time is a dimension of space, no different in any way
from any of the other three dimensions. The weaker versions
allow that there are some differences between time and the
dimensions of space - there may be an intrinsic direction to
time, for example - but claim that time is essentially like
the dimensions of space - i.e., is no different in kind from
2
think that, among the dimensions of the world, time is very
special indeed: it is the only dimension that may properly
be said to flow or pass. We shall see, in Chapters 2-4, how
this basic disagreement can be spelled out and amplified in
terms of various other issues.
The main aim of this essay is to cast some light on the
nature of the controversy over whether time passes. My
primary thesis is that the controversy has not been settled
in part because it has not been understood just what is at
stake in the issue. The question 'Does time pass?' is not a
simple, yes-or-no question; in fact there are no less than
five different views that one may hold in response to the
question. This is because the question, when properly
understood, involves a host of related issues, so that to
give an appropriate answer to the question is to provide a
package consisting of a response to each of these relevant
issues; and, as it happens, there are five distinct packages
that constitute reasonable, internally consistent
collections of responses to the relevant issues. Thus there
are five distinct ways of answering the question 'Does time
pass?'
.
My secondary thesis is that, once the issues involved
in the controversy over temporal passage have been spelled
out in a fruitful way, and once the views that constitute
the leading candidates among the possible responses to those
them - in that there is no important sense in which we can
^ruly say both that time passes and that space does not.
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issues have been formulated, it can be shown that there are
no good arguments against any one of those views. This does
not mean, however, that I do not have a preference for one
of the views over the others. I do have such a preference;
but I do not think that there is any good argument that can
prove the view that I prefer.
The essay is divided as follows. Chapter 2 is devoted
to certain linguistic matters that have been central to the
debate over the passage of time; here the main question is
whether we could somehow eliminate the phenomenon of tense
from our language. Roughly speaking, those who have said
that time passes have said that our language could not be
made tenseless, and those who have said that time does not
pass have said that our language could be made tenseless.
Chapter 3 is devoted to certain metaphysical matters
that have been central to the debate. The main question that
has been discussed in this regard is a question about the
status of such putative properties as pastness
,
presentness
and futurity. Those who have said that time does not pass
have claimed that these are not genuine properties, and
those who have said that time does pass have claimed that
they are genuine properties.
By the end of Chapter 3 I have arrived at the five
different packages of views alluded to above. There is one
package, which I call the 4D view, that amounts to a way of
saying that time does not pass, and there are four different
packages, which I call the 3D views, that amount to ways of
4
saying that time does pass. In Chapter 4 I consider, in the
case of each of these packages, a formal language, with a
semantics, that would be well-suited to that package. The
main purpose of doing so is to make clearer the differences
among the relevant packages.
In Chapter 5 I turn to a consideration of what I take
to be the best arguments that can be formulated against the
passage views. I conclude that none of these is a good
argument; for each of the passage views, and for each of the
relevant arguments, there is some premise of that argument
that ought to be rejected by one who holds that view.
In Chapter 6 I consider what I take to be the best
arguments that can be formulated against the non-passage
view. I conclude that none of these arguments works, either;
for in the case of each of these arguments, there is some
premise of that argument that ought to rejected by a
proponent of the non-passage view.
Finally, in Chapter 7, I explain the reasons I have for
preferring the view I happen to favor, and I also show how
some objections to that view can be met.
5
1.2 Defining 'Time'
One might think that the best way to begin a discussion
of the question of whether time passes would be to give a
rigorous definition of the word 'time'
. Unless we are armed
with such a definition, it is natural to suppose, we cannot
even begin to make sense of the question about time's
passage. With the required definition in hand, however, the
matter is likely to be cleared up easily, according to this
way of thinking; we will then only need to examine the
analysans that has resulted from our bit of conceptual
analysis, in order to see if it involves the notion of
passage in any relevant sense. If it does, then we should
say that time passes; if it does not, then we should say
that time does not pass. Thus, it seems, the entire project
will be greatly simplified by our first arriving at a
definition of 'time'
.
But it would be a mistake to think in this way. It
would be a mistake for reasons that have to do with the
difficulties inherent in the project of providing the kind
of conceptual analysis that would count as a rigorous
definition of 'time' . Those difficulties have been well
documented ever since Augustine pointed them out in a famous
passage in his Confessions . 2 He there says, roughly, that in
pre-philosophical moments he is not aware of any problem
2 Augustine, Confessions, Book XI, Chapter 14.
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with understanding the concept expressed by the word 'time'
;
but that as soon as he tries to provide a definition of the
term, he finds that he cannot do it. Somehow, the concept
eludes him whenever he thinks hard about it.
There are, I think, two main reasons for the inevitable
failure of any attempt to define the word 'time'
. The first
reason is simply that the word has too many different, but
relevant, senses. Consider how the word 'time' is used in
each of the following sentences: 'There is still plenty of
time'; 'The time is exactly twelve noon'; 'We all had a good
time'; 'Time waits for no-one'; 'All of this was during the
time when I lived in Paris'; 'He got there in the nick of
time'; 'Time flies like an arrow'; 'Time is asymmetrical';
and 'Ridiculous the waste sad time stretching before and
after'
.
The point is that there is no one sense attached to
the word 'time' as it appears in all of these sentences. So
no single definition would supply a definiens that could be
substituted uniformly for the word 'time' in each of these
sentences
.
3
The second reason for the failure of attempts at
defining the word 'time' is that the concepts involved are
too promiscuous - they tend to be incorporated into the
definiens of any plausible definition. The consequence of
this is that the resulting definitions are circular. 4
3 Cf. Waismann, "Analytic-Synthetic," p. 56.
4 Cf. Gale, The Language of Time, pp. 4-5; and Newton-Smith,
The Structure of Time, p. 3.
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Aristotle's proposed definition of 'time', for example, is
this: "time is the number of movement in respect of the
before and after." 5 This is circular because 'movement',
'before' and 'after' are all temporally infected; i.e., the
concepts expressed by these terms are all inextricably
linked with concepts expressed by 'time'
,
and it is just
these latter concepts that we are trying to analyze. Similar
remarks apply to Plato's definition, according to which time
is "an eternal moving image of the eternity which remains
forever one;"
6
Plotinus's definition of time as "the Life of
the Soul in movement as it passes from one stage of act or
experience to another;" and modern dictionary definitions
such as "the measured or measurable period during which an
action, process, or condition exists or continues," and "a
continuum which lacks spatial dimensions and in which events
succeed one another from past through present to future."
8
Because such difficulties arise in connection with
attempts to give analytic definitions of the word 'time' , it
has been fashionable, ever since Wittgenstein, to point out
the inappropriateness of such attempts. 8 Writers such as
s Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, Chapter 11, 220a 25.
6 Plato, Timaeus, 37c, 38c.
7 Plotinus, "Time and Eternity," p. 32.
8 Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary.
9 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, pp. 42fr.,
and Blue Book, pp. 6, 26ff.; Waismann, Analytic-Synthetic,
and Introduction to Mathematical Thinking, pp. 116ff.;
Bouwsma, "The Mystery of Time;" and Gale, The Language of
Time, pp. 5ff.
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Waismann, Bouwsma and Gale have suggested that, rather than
try to define 'time' in one fell swoop, we should instead
examine various other temporal expressions, and the grammar
governing those expressions, in order to understand time
itself. This kind of examination, it has been suggested,
will result in the clarification of certain temporal
concepts, without ever yielding an analysis of some one
thing that is the referent of the expression 'the concept of
time'
. Moreover, these writers have suggested, this is the
most we can hope for; to ask the further question, 'What is
time?', is to ask the wrong question altogether. For this
question makes it appear as if a helpful and informative
answer of the form "Time is " can be given,
when in fact none can.
I think that the approach suggested by Wittgenstein et
alia is basically right. So I will not here try to give a
definition of the word 'time' . Rather, I will define certain
temporal expressions, which will then feature prominently in
the discussion that follows. This does not mean that I think
we must give up on the task of considering the question
'Does time pass?'. It's just that the question, stated in
this way, and without further explanation, is not
sufficiently clear. We can make sense of the question,
however, by reformulating it in terms of several different,
related questions concerning notions captured by temporal
expressions that can be manageably defined.
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1.3 The Event-series and the Time-series
In what follows, I will use the terms 'thing'
,
'event'
and 'process' as if their meanings were already understood;
i.e., these terms will be taken as primitives. The kind of
events that I have in mind are instantaneous, concrete
events. That is, they have no extension, or duration, and
they are one-time occurrences, as opposed to event-types,
which may recur (in the sense that a single event-type may
have two or more tokens) . Roughly, then, the idea is that
each process is made up of a continuous (or at least dense)
series of events.
I shall refer to all of these - things, events and
processes - as things in time. As will be seen in Chapter 3,
the question of the relationship between events and
processes, on the one hand, and things, on the other hand,
is an important question. For there are some - e.g., Arthur
Prior - who say that events and processes are just
constructions out of things. This is an issue on which I
wish to remain neutral, at least at the outset of my
discussion
.
Another important, and controversial, question concerns
the matter of how we should characterize the entities that
will count as things: are these enduring, three-dimensional
10
continuants, or extended, four-dimensional space-time
objects? Much more will be said about this issue later, but
for now it is important to note that there is such an issue,
3-^d- that acceptance of talk about things does not commit us
one way or the other with regard to this issue. A similar
issue arises concerning the status of different events and
processes: are the events and processes occurring now the
only real ones, or do all of them, including the ones
occurring now as well as the ones that have already finished
occurring and the ones that have yet to occur, have the same
ontological status? This too is a matter that I do not wish
to pre-judge.
I think it is fair, however, to agree to talk about the
set of all events, i.e., the ones occurring now as well as
the ones that have occurred and the ones that will occur,
while leaving open the question of how such talk is to be
analyzed. And all parties to these disputes agree that,
insofar as we can talk about the set of all events, there is
an ordering to that set. I.e., the events form a series,
ordered by the binary relation earlier than or simultaneous
with. This relation, too, ought to be taken as primitive;
but we can say some things by way of characterizing it. To
begin with, we can define the binary relation earlier than
in terms of the relation earlier than or simultaneous with,
as follows: e is earlier than e' =df e is earlier than or
simultaneous with e' , and it's not the case that e' is
earlier than or simultaneous with e. Then we can say the
11
following things about the relation earlier than: (i)
earlier than is an ordering relation (i.e., there are at
least two distinct events, e and e'
,
such that e is earlier
than e' but not vice versa); (ii) earlier than is
irreflexive (i.e., no event is earlier than itself); (iii)
earlier than is asymmetric (i.e., if some event, e is
earlier than some other event, e'
,
then e' is not earlier
than e) ; and (iv) earlier than is transitive (i.e., if some
event, e, is earlier than some other event, e'
,
and e' is
earlier than some third event, e'
'
,
then e is earlier than
e'
'
)
. Moreover, the binary relations later than and
simultaneous with can be defined in terms of the relation
earlier than, as follows: if some event, e, is earlier than
some event, e'
,
then e' is later than e; and if two distinct
events, e and e'
,
are such that e is not earlier than e'
,
and e' is not earlier than e, then e is simultaneous with
e' .
Of course, it is a further question whether there is
some monadic property, pastness
,
such that it (and its
brethren, presentness and futurity) also order the series of
events, but in such a way that these monadic properties are
not analysable in terms of earlier than, etc. This, too, is
an issue that I wish to leave unresolved at the outset of my
discussion
.
The series of events ordered by the relation earlier
than will, in what follows, be called the event-series . I
stipulated above that our talk about events is not to be
12
taken as committing us to any view about their ontological
status; in particular, I specified that events may or may
not be just constructions out of things. One result of this
stipulation is that the event-series may or not turn out to
be reducible to the series of things ordered by the relation
sarlier than. In any case, however, I shall here indulge in
talk about the event-series, leaving aside, for the moment,
questions about how such talk is to be analyzed.
I shall also, in what follows, use the expressions
'moment'
,
'instant'
,
'period of time' and 'interval of time'
as if their meanings, too, were already understood. The
first two of these expressions will used as if they are a
pair of synonyms, and so will the latter two. In addition,
the word 'time' will be used equivocally, so that sometimes
it is meant to be synonymous with 'instant' and 'moment',
while other times it is meant to be synonymous with 'period
of time' and 'interval of time' . The kinds of instants I
have in mind here are, like their event counterparts,
instantaneous. And in a way that parallels the above
thinking about the relationship between events and
processes, the rough idea here is that each period of time
is made up of a continuous (or at least dense) series of
instants. Following Newton-Smith, 10 I shall refer to
instants and intervals of time alike as temporal items.
It is clear that, just as with the set of events, the
set of instants is ordered by the relation earlier than. I
10 Newton-Smith, The Structure of Time, p. 3.
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shall call the series of instants that is ordered by this
relation the time-series
.
And as with the event-series,
questions arise concerning the possibility that there is
some monadic property - pastness - such that it (and its
brethren, presentness and futurity) also order the time-
series .
1.4 Temporal Platonism and Temporal Reductionism
Prima facie, at least, we can distinguish between
things in time and the event-series, on the one hand, and
temporal items and the time-series, on the other hand. But
once again there is an important controversy involved here.
Some writers have held that temporal items and the time-
series exist independently of the existence of things in
time and the event-series. On this view, the time-series
should be thought of as a container in which the things in
time are situated, so that even if the world had been devoid
of things in time, the time-series would still have existed.
Other writers, however, have said that the existence of
temporal items and the time-series depends on the existence
of things in time and the event-series; if there were no
14
things in time, then, according to this view, there would be
no time-series
.
11
The former view, which is often associated with Newton,
I will call "temporal Platonism", following Newton-Smith.
The latter view, which is often associated with Leibniz, I
will follow Newton-Smith in calling "temporal reductionism"
.
In addition to their ontological theses, temporal Platonism
and temporal reductionism each has linguistic and
topological components. For according to temporal
reductionism, talk about the time-series can be analyzed in
terms of talk about the event-series. Platonists, of course,
deny this. And according to temporal Platonism, since the
time-series would have existed even if there were no events
at all, it follows that the topological features of the
time-series (e.g., having a beginning, if the time-series
has a beginning, or not having a beginning, if it doesn't;
being linear, if the time-series is linear, or not being
linear, if it isn't; being closed, if the time-series is
closed, or being open, if it is open) are not contingent
upon the topological features of the event-series. Hence,
according to temporal Platonism, but not according to
temporal reductionism, the topological character of the
time-series is a matter of necessity.
11 The most famous discussion of this issue occurs in The
Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence; the issue is also the main
topic of Newton-Smith's The Structure of Time.
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For the purposes of this essay, these two views will be
understood as involving the following tenents: 12
Temporal Platonism: (i) Temporal items and the
time-series are ontologically independent of
things in time and the event-series; (ii)
temporal relations among things in time hold
in virtue of the temporal relations holding
among the times at which those things occur;
(iii) talk about temporal items and the time-
series is not reducible to talk about things
in time and the event-series; and (iv) the
time-series possesses whatever topological
properties it possesses as a matter of
necessity
.
Temporal Reductionism: (i) temporal items and
the time-series are ontologically dependent on
things in time and the event-series; (ii)
temporal relations among times hold in virtue
of the temporal relations holding among the
things in time that occur at those times;
(iii) talk about temporal items and the time-
series is reducible to talk about things in
time and the event-series; and (iv) the
possession by the time-series of whatever
topological properties it possesses is a
contingent matter.
In what follows I take it that the dispute between temporal
Platonism and temporal reductionism remains undecided, so
that it would be inappropriate, in the absence of
independent arguments for either one, to assume either
temporal Platonism or temporal reductionism.
12 These characterizations of temporal Platonism and
temporal reductionism are based on those given by Newton-
Smith; see The Structure of Time, pp. 9-10 and pp. 214ff.
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CHAPTER 2: LINGUISTIC MATTERS
2.1 Introduction
I said in Chapter 1 that a useful way of approaching
the debate over the passage of time is to consider the
following thesis:
SPT : Among the four dimensions of the world,
there is nothing special about time; time is
essentially similar to each of the dimensions
of space.
Those who say that time does not pass generally want to
affirm something SPT; they think that time is roughly space-
like, and that, in virtue of this, there is no sense in
which it is correct to say that time moves or passes. But
those, on the other hand, who say that time does pass
generally want to deny SPT. These people think that, among
the dimensions of the world, time is very special indeed: it
is the only dimension that may properly be said to flow or
pass
.
Of course, SPT is, as it stands, far from clear. It
needs to be fleshed out. What it would mean to say that time
17
is special; what is involved in the claim that time is
essentially similar to any of the dimensions of space;
exactly how the differences between time and space, if any,
may be said to entail that time passes, in some relevant
sense; and, in particular, just what this relevant sense
could be, are all matters that require considerable
discussion
.
I will turn to such metaphysical matters in the
following chapter. But first, in this chapter, I will take
up some linguistic issues that have been considered central
to the debate over the passage of time. There are two main
reasons why I will discuss these linguistic issues before
the metaphysical issues. The first reason is historical:
many of the writers who have taken up the issue of whether
or not time passes have begun their discussions by focussing
on linguistic matters. This is true both of such non-passage
theorists as Goodman, Quine, Smart and Mellor, and of such
passage theorists as Prior, Gale, Schlesinger and Smith . 1
The general idea that each of these people has entertained,
some of them with more conviction than others, is that the
metaphysical issues involved in the question of whether or
not time passes - including, especially, questions that stem
from a consideration of SPT - can all be settled simply by
1 See in this regard Goodman, The Structure of Appearance ,
Chapter XI; Quine, Word and Object, pp . 170ff.; Smart, "The
River of Time;" Mellor, Real Time; Prior, Time and Modality,
Past
,
Present and Future, and Papers on Time and Tense;
Gale, The Language of Time; Schlesinger, Aspects of Time and
"How Time Flies;" and Smith, "Problems with the New
Tenseless Theory of Time," and "Sentences About Time."
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settling the relevant linguistic issues. Consequently, these
writers have turned, in some cases almost immediately, from
discussions of those metaphysical issues to discussions of
linguistic matters.
The second reason for my adopting this order of topics
is philosophical. It turns out, not surprisingly, that all
of these linguistically minded debaters were onto something.
It does appear that a settling of the appropriate linguistic
issues would settle, once and for all, the metaphysical
debate over the passage of time. Let me explain.
At the center of the linguistic issues involved here is
the undisputed fact that in our ordinary language (which is
to say, for our purposes, in English)
,
time is accorded a
special status that no other dimension of the world enjoys.
We have numerous tense distinctions in English - the past
tense, the present tense, the future tense, the past
perfect, and so on - but we do not have spatial distinctions
along these lines built into our language.
Prima facie, at least, this seems to be a datum that
may be used in an argument against SPT. For it may be
claimed by the passage theorist that our language is
necessarily this way; it could not have been otherwise, and
still have provided us with the means for accurately
describing all of the objective features of the world that
we are in fact able to describe. If our language had been
otherwise, the claim may go, if, that is, time had been
treated just like space in our ordinary language, then we
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would not be able to capture in our descriptions of the
world all of the objective features of the world that we are
in fact able to capture. This can be explained only by the
fact that important features of our language correspond to
important features of the world; i.e., by the fact that
language mirrors reality. Hence, the argument would go, it
follows from time's essentially special status in our
language that time also has an essentially special status in
reality: time passes.
This somewhat plausible argument may be formulated as
follows
.
The Linguistic Argument Against SPT
(1) Time's special treatment in our ordinary
language is necessary; time could not be
treated in ordinary language in just the way
space is, without our thereby losing some of
our ability to describe accurately objective
features of the world.
(2) If (1) , then there is something special
about time; it is not just like space.
(3)
There is something special about time; it
is not just like space.
But, of course, just what inferences we ought to draw
from our main linguistic datum - the fact of time's special
treatment in our ordinary language - is a controversial
matter. Non-passage theorists have drawn their own
conclusions. While they have admitted that time does get
special treatment in ordinary language, they claim that
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things need not be this way. They try to show that we could
3- language in which time is treated as on a par with
space; a language, that is, with no tense distinctions and
no tensed verbs. And they argue that the fact that we could
do this shows that there is, in reality, no objective
difference between time and space; time, like space, does
not pass.
Here, then, is another rather plausible argument; this
one may be formulated as follows.
The Linguistic Argument For SPT
(1) Time's special treatment in our ordinary
language is not necessary; time could be
treated in ordinary language in just the way
space is, without our thereby losing some of
our ability to describe accurately objective
features of the world.
(2) If (1) , then there is nothing special
about time; it is just like space.
(3)
There is nothing special about time; it is
just like space.
Arguments such as these have appeared convincing to
many. But those who have wanted to reject either of these
arguments have generally not challenged the second premise
of that argument - the one that makes the connection between
the seemingly linguistic first premise and the seemingly
metaphysical conclusion. It is the first premises that have
been controversial- Thus, almost all of the action has
centered on the (apparently) linguistic theses in question.
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In what follows, I will refer to the first premise of
The Linguistic Argument Against SPT as "the linguistic
thesis of passage," or "LP." Similarly, i will refer to the
first premise of The Linguistic Argument for SPT as "the
linguistic thesis of non-passage," or "LNP . " What is at
issue is whether either one of these rival linguistic theses
can be proven. In light of the above arguments, it appears
that if either LP or LNP could be proven, then we would have
a sound argument for the corresponding metaphysical thesis
(i.e., either SPT or its negation). In that case, all that
would remain would be the task of spelling out a somewhat
sketchy metaphysical thesis that we nevertheless know to be
true. So our immediate concern is to determine whether
time's special treatment in our ordinary language is somehow
necessary
.
The most obvious way in which time is accorded special
treatment in ordinary language is in the existence of verbal
tenses. We have sentences like 'It is raining', 'It was
raining' and 'It will be raining'
,
but it seems that there
is nothing analogous in the case of space.
The matter is not quite so simple, however. It's true
that the phenomenon of tenses is generally the focus of
discussions of LP and LNP, but it's also true that in these
discussions 'tense' is usually taken to refer to a
phenomenon more general than that of mere verbal tense. This
more general phenomenon is taken to be one that is
manifested by any sentence that may have different truth-
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values at different times. And the question of whether we
can treat matters temporal in our ordinary language in the
way we treat matters spatial is generally taken to boil down
to the question of whether we can do without such sentences.
As James Plecha has recently remarked,
It is commonly believed that if language can
be detensed, if, roughly, sentences which
change their truth values can be translated by
sentences which do not, then ours is a four-
dimensional block universe and there is no
absolute present. [ "Tenselessness and the
Absolute Present," p. 529.]
Thus, questions about LP and LNP take us to the
question of whether language can be detensed - whether
sentences that may change their truth-values can be
translated by sentences that may not. This is the main
question that I will address in this chapter. First it will
be necessary to spell out the question and some related
issues in a clear and useful way. Once this has been done,
it will be seen that there are available to proponents of LP
and LNP, respectively, different semantical views about the
relations among propositions, truth and time. Hence, LP and
LNP will each be shown to involve what amounts to a package
of different but related linguistic views.
Since LP and LNP are packages of linguistic views that
are supposed to be used in arguments supporting the
metaphysical theses corresponding to them, I will consider
whether there are any arguments that can support these
linguistic packages. After looking at what I take to be the
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best of such arguments that are available, I will conclude
that, while there may arguments with key metaphysical
premises that could be taken to support each of these
linguistic packages, there are no good arguments with purely
linguistic premises that can be appealed to in support of
either LP or LNP
.
This means that one cannot appeal to LP in any argument
designed to prove the metaphysical theses of the passage
view (such as The Linguistic Argument Against SPT) without
begging the question, since LP itself cannot be defended
without appeal to those same metaphysical theses. But
similarly, one cannot appeal to LNP in any argument designed
to prove the metaphysical theses of the non-passage view
(such as The Linguistic Argument For SPT) without begging
the question, because LNP cannot be defended without appeal
to those metaphysical theses.
In short, I will conclude that the metaphysical issues
involved in the question of whether time passes cannot, as
has been supposed, be decided by first deciding the
linguistic issues involved. Rather, it must be the other way
around: the metaphysical issues must be decided first, and
this will lead to a resolving of the linguistic issues.
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2.2 Some Term.q
In the debate over the possibility of detensing
language, a good deal of the discussion has focussed on
alleged similarities and differences among sentences like
the following:
( 1 ) It's raining
.
(2) Rain falls on Wednesday, February 17.
1988.
(3) The falling of rain is simultaneous with
this token.
(4) The Battle of Hastings took place nine
hundred and twenty-two years ago.
(5) The date of the Battle of Hastings is
1066.
(6) The Battle of Hastings occurs nine hundred
and twenty-two years before this token.
Varous claims have been made concerning the classes of
sentences represented by ( 1 ) — ( 6 )
.
It has been suggested, for
example, that (1) and (4) represent an entirely different
class of sentences than do (2), (3), (5) and (6), because
sentences of the former kind, but not sentences of the.
latter kind, can change their truth-values; 2 but it has also
been suggested that this is false because sentences like (1)
and (4) do not properly express any propositions at all,
unless they express propositions like those expressed by the
other sentences. 3 What has normally been taken to be at
2 Cf., for example, Gale, The Language of Time, Chapter IV.
3 Cf
. ,
for example, Goodman, The Structure of Appearance,
pp. 287ff.
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stake here is whether sentences like (1) and (4) can in some
important sense be translated by sentences like the others -
whether, in the popular jargon, language can be detensed.
But this issue, which has long been at the center of the
debate concerning language and the passage of time, is an
elusive one, partly because it is not immediately clear how
we ought to understand the expressions 'tensed language' and
tenseless language'
,
or the notion of detensing language
.
I
will try to get clear on these and related issues below; but
in order to do so, it will first be necessary to establish a
minimal framework within which to discuss such matters.
In what follows I will accept, without argument, a
certain general account of the way language works. Although
I have never seen all of the components of this account laid
out in a single philosophical work, the view may, I think,
be appropriately thought of as the received view. For
reasons that will be obvious I will refer to the account in
question as the three-tiered picture of language.
On the lowest level of the three-tiered picture are
what I will call utterances
.
These are simply concrete
events or processes that typically consist in some person
using his or her mouth to make a noise or noises. Some
utterances are meaningful; that is, they involve coherent
strings of sounds that are (in principle, at least)
understandable to members of the speaker's linguistic
community. Such utterances are generally used to perform
linguistic acts; i.e., they are used for the purpose of
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expressing a proposition, or asking a question, or issuing a
command, etc. It is convenient to pick out just the
utterances that, by themselves, are used to perform
linguistic acts. For this purpose we can say that if some
utterance is used to perform a linguistic act, but no proper
part of the utterance is used to perform a linguistic act
all by itself, then the utterance is a sentence. A
To characterize sentences in the above way is,
unfortunately, to fail to do justice to the chameleon-like
character of language. Making noises is not, after all, the
only method by which we acomplish linguistic acts - often we
do so by waving our hands, raising our eyebrows, or writing
things down. We can capture at least the last kind of these
cases simply by agreeing to broaden our conception of what
counts as a sentence so as to include insciptions as well as
utterances. Roughly, an inscription is any recognizable mark
or series of marks on some surface. 5 As with utterances,
some insciptions are meaningful and some are not. Meaningful
inscriptions are the ones that are used to perform
linguistic acts. Among these are some insciptions that are
used to perform linguistic acts, but are such that no proper
4 Cf. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, p. 194.
5 This is actually too narrow as it stands. On this
definition, a bunch of hanging strips that spelled out some
message would not count as an inscription, and neither would
a piece of paper with some letters cut out of it. So the
definition is in need of revision. Nevertheless, it is
enough to give us a rough idea of what an inscription is,
and that is sufficient for our present purposes.
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part of them is used to perform a linguistic act all by
itself; these, too, will be called sentences
.
As characterized here, sentences, whether of the noisy
variety (i.e., utterances) or of the quiet variety
(inscriptions), are all individual, concrete events, or
individual, concrete processes. (Some processes, of course,
are rather dull. Most inscriptions are like this; they
consist of some thing's staying the same for a long time.
They are processes nonetheless, if we allow ourselves to use
the word 'event' in such a way that a thing's remaining the
same from one instant to the next can count as an event; for
then a thing's remaining the same for some length of time
will count as a process.) It is natural, however, to think
of sentences as falling into certain groups; for example, of
the following three sentences, it seems natural to group
together the first two, but exclude the third one from such
a grouping:
(7) The redcoats are coming.
(8) The redcoats are coming.
(9) A tree grows in Brooklyn.
For (7) and (8) have much in common, but there are many
differences between these two and (9). We can make use of a
distinction originally fromulated by Peirce 6 in order to
capture what we feel is the important difference between (7)
and (8), on the one hand, and (9), on the other hand: (7),
6 Peirce, The Simplest Mathematics
,
(vol. IV of his
Collected Papers), p. 423.
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(8) and (9) are three distinct sentence tokens
,
we can say,
but (7) and (8) are of the same sentence type
,
while (9) is
of a different sentence-type.
Ever since Peirce introduced the notion of the
distinction between tokens and types, the notion has
featured prominently in philosophy in general and in
philosophy of language in particular. In a recent textbook
in philosophy of language, the distinction between types and
tokens is explained as follows:
Tokens are datable, placeable parts of the
physical world. Thus, Nana and her successor,
Lulu, are cat tokens. The obvious examples of
word tokens are inscriptions on a page or
sounds in the air. Types, on the other hand,
are kinds of tokens. Any token can be grouped
into many different types. Thus, Nana and Lulu
are tokens of the type cat, female, pet of
Devi tt, and so on. And prior to this sentence,
this paragraph contains two tokens of the
inscription type 'Nana' and eleven of the
inscription type four-lettered
.
Inscription
types and sound types are identifiable by
their overt physical characteristics and so we
might call them "physical" types. Word tokens
are also grouped semantically. Suppose that an
inscription type 'Liebknecht' is used in a
book on German history to refer to two
different people, father and son; the type is •
ambiguous . Sometimes we will group the tokens
that refer to the father in one type and those
that refer to the son in another. We thus get
"semantic" types. Tokens that are in different
media cannot be of the same physical type but
may be of the same semantic type; for natural
languages are medium-independent. A spoken and
written token of 'Liebknecht' might supply an
example of tokens of the same semantic type
from different media. [Michael Devitt and Kim
Sterelny, Language and Reality, p. 59.]
29
There is some controversy over whether types should be
taken to be universals, in some Platonic sense of
universal', or simply sets of tokens. Nominalists are
generally not happy with the former approach, but, as it
turns out, there are problems with the latter approach. 7 For
our purposes here it is important to be able to talk about
types and tokens, and to distinguish between them. The issue
of whether types are universals or sets, or something else,
is an important and interesting issue, but it is not one
that is relevant to the discussion that follows; nothing I
turns on this issue. In what follows, then, I will
help myself to talk about expression, word and sentence
tokens, with the uncontroversial understanding that these
are "dateable, placeable parts of the physical world." I
will also avail myself of talk about expression, word and
sentence types, without thereby intending to presuppose some
account of what types are. All that I presuppose about types
is that there are such things, and that we have a rough idea
of some of their salient features.
One such problem is the problem of unexemplified types.
There is only one such type (the empty set)
,
if types are to
be identified with sets of their actual tokens. So maybe
types should be identified with sets of actual and merely
possible tokens. Another problem has to do with the
characterization of the sets in question: is it physical
similarity that determines which tokens are members of a
given physical type? Consideration of a few examples shows
that it will be very difficult to get the desired results
here. For some discussion of these issues, see Goodman, The
Structure of Appearance, pp. 287ff.; Quine, Word and Object,
pp . 194-195, and Philosophy of Logic, pp. 55ff. For a
thorough discussion of some of the issues involved in trying
to define types in set-theoretical terms, see Wetzel,
"Expressions Versus Numbers."
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For the sake of convenience I will adopt an ad hoc
convention for the purpose of distinguishing between mention
of an expression type and mention of an expression token. I
will use single quotes when I want to refer to an expression
type, and slash marks when 1 want to refer to a token. Thus,
an expression token consisting of a single quote followed by
some expression followed by another single quote will refer
to the expression type represented by the expression token
inside the single quotes; and an expression token consisting
of a slash mark followed by some expression followed by
another slash mark will refer to the expression token inside
the slash marks. In addition, I will sometimes use proper
names for expression tokens inside of single quotes as a way
of referring to the expression type represented by the token
named; thus,
'
( 1 )
'
is to be read as shorthand for
the expression type represented by (1)
.
Types are the entities that occupy the second level of
the three-tiered picture of language. They differ from
tokens in that they are abstract objects (for whether they
are universals or sets they are abstract) . On the third
level of the three-tiered picture are another kind of
abstract objects: meanings. I have said that a sentence is
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used to perform a linguistic act if it expresses a
proposition, or asks a question, or issues a command, etc.
Propositions, questions, commands and the like are what I
mean by 'meanings'
. For the sake of convenience I will,
whenever possible, restrict my discussion in what follows to
just the sentences that express propositions, which I will
follow custom in calling declarative sentences
.
There are many important questions about types, tokens
and meanings that I do not wish to raise here. The purpose
of the above sketch of a general account of language is
simply to provide a basis for making some distinctions that
are relevant to issues about time and language. To begin
with, there is a distinction between two different kinds of
sentence type: those that are tensed, and those that are
tenseless. It is natural to say, for example, that '(1)' is
a tensed sentence type while ' (2 )
'
is a tenseless sentence
type, and that the crucial difference between the two is
that the former, but not the latter, can have different
tokens that express things with different truth-values. That
is, it may be the case that at one time a sentence that is a
token of '(1)' expresses something true, while at another
time a different token of the same type expresses something
false; but it seems that such a thing cannot happen in the
case of ' (2 ) '
.
This is not all there is to the matter of tensed and
tenseless sentence types, however; for we do not want to say
that the sentence types represented by
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(10) Washington slept here on February 14th
1777
and
(11) I was born on November 13th, 1969
are tensed sentence types. After all, the relevant
characteristic of '(10)' is that whether or not a given
token of it expresses something true depends partly on where
the token is located; and similarly the relevant
characteristic of ' (11) ' is that whether or not a given
token of it expresses something true depends on who is the
inscriber of that token. What we are after is a way of
characterizing exactly those sentence types whose tokens may
express things with different truth-values solely in virtue
of the different times at which they occur. The relevant
distinction can, I think, be captured by the following pair
of definitions. 8
(Dl) 5 is a tensed sentence type =df it is
possible that a token of S at one time
expresses a proposition with one truth-value
and another token of S, at another time,
expresses a proposition with another truth-
value, even if the non-temporal indexicals in
the two tokens of S (if any) refer to the same
places, people and things.
8 For similar definitions see Sosa, "The Status of Becoming:
What is Happening Now?" p. 27; Gale, The Language of Time,
pp . 40ff .
,
especially p. 49; Goodman, The Structure of
Appearance, p. 290; and Quine, Philosophy of Logic, p. 14.
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(D2) 5 is a tenseless sentence type =df it is
not possible that a token of S at one time
expresses a proposition with one truth—value
and another token of S, at another time,
expresses a proposition with another truth-
value, if the non-temporal indexicals in the
two tokens of S (if any) refer to the same
places, people and things.
This is still not all there is to the matter of tensed
and tenseless sentence types, however, for if it were then
we should have to say that 'Two plus two equals four' is
tensed, and so, for that matter, is every other sentence
type. This is because the rules of language may change.
Consider the audible sentence type that corresponds to
'Ah key ess oon ah may sa' . According to Linda Wetzel, this
sentence type (or else something very close to it) has a
peculiar property: it may be used by speakers of Spanish to
say that there is a table here, and it may be used by
Yiddish speakers to say that a cow eats without a knife (or
something like that) . This property alone is enough to make
the sentence type a tensed one, according to the above
definition; but this is not the intended result.
A similar problem arises in cases involving word types
such as the audible word type that corresponds to 'shot'
;
the type has one meaning in English and another in French.
Again, problems of this kind can arise when people use
expressions in non-standard ways; when, for example, Ernie
says to Bert prior to the meeting, "If I say, 'My it's hot
in here, ' that means I want you to vote in favor of the
motion." Indeed, there is nothing to prevent a group of
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people from one day deciding to use tokens of 'Two plus two
equals four' to express the proposition that the moon is
made of Swiss cheese; and, hence, it turns out that that
sentence type is a tensed one, according to (Dl)
In order to get around such difficulties, in a way that
leaves out nothing that is important to the spirit of our
inquiry, we can, adopting a suggestion from Goodman, 9
stipulate that when discussing tensed types, tenseless
types, and related matters, we mean to confine the
discussion to expressions all occurring within an
appropriately limited discourse. I.e., we will be
considering only types whose tokens are expressions all of
which occur in the context of a group of people speaking,
and writing, a single language, using expression types
sincerely and in a uniform way.
2 . 3 The Issue
It is now possible to state more explicitly what is at
issue between the passage theorists who have been concerned
with language and the non-passage theorists who have been
concerned with language. As it is often characterized, the
9 Goodman, The Structure of Appearance
, p. 290; see also
Quine, Philosophy of Logic, p. 14.
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issue is whether, and to what extent, language is
irreducibly tensed. What is at stake in the issue is whether
all, some or none of what is expressible in tensed language
can be expressed in tenseless language. The difference
between tensed and tenseless language, as the terms are
normally understood, is the difference between utterances
and inscriptions that are tokens of tensed sentence types,
on the one hand, and utterances and inscriptions that are
tokens of tenseless sentence types, on the other hand. As I
see it, then, the issue can best be understood in terms of
the question, Can we, in principle at least, do without
tensed sentence types? I.e., can we express all of the
things that we normally express, using tokens of both tensed
and tenseless sentence types, if we restrict ourselves to
using only tokens of tenseless sentence types?
The two sides to this dispute, then, are represented by
the following two theses:
The tenseless view of language (TL)
:
We could
eliminate tensed sentence types from our
language without thereby losing some of our
ability to describe accurately objective
features of the world.
The tensed view of language (TD)
:
We could not
eliminate tensed sentence types from our
language without thereby losing some of our
ability to describe accurately objective
features of the world.
But in order to get a handle on this issue, we shall first
have to address a further question, namely, What kinds of
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propositions are expressed by tokens of tensed and tenseless
sentence types, respectively?
Take, for example, the tensed sentence type 'It is
• Consider two different utterances of this sentence
type, occurring at two different times, tl and t2
. Call
these two utterances "ul" and "u2", respectively. The
question is this: Do ul and u2 express the same proposition,
or two different propositions? I.e., is it that ul expresses
the proposition that it is raining, and u2 expresses the
same proposition? Is this a proposition that can be true at
one time and then false at another time? Are propositions in
general such that they can have different truth-values at
different times? If so then language, presumably, cannot be
detensed
.
Or is it that ul expresses the proposition that it is
raining at tl, while u2 expresses the proposition that it is
raining at t2? And are these latter two propositions such
that it is impossible for either of them to true at one time
and false at another? Indeed, is it that these propositions
are such that it is inappropriate to speak of their having
truth-values at times? Are all propositions in fact this
way? If this is the case then language, presumably, can be
detensed.
Such are the issues on which our question about
eliminating tensed sentence types will turn. In order to
address the latter question properly, then, it will first be
necessary to consider these other issues about the nature of
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propositions, and the nature of their relationships with
truth and time. I turn to such matters in the next section.
2-lA—Three Ways of Thinking About Propositions. Truth and
Time
In addition to the distinction between tensed and
tenseless sentence types there is also, it seems, a sense in
which we can distinguish between what might be called tensed
propositions, on the one hand, and what might be called
tenseless propositions, on the other hand. Prior has
remarked that
Prima facie, we may divide propositions, or
ostensible propositions, into two sorts. There
are those, such as 'Socrates is sitting down'
or 'Socrates was sitting down'
,
of which it
obviously makes sense to ask ' When are they
true?'
,
though the answer may in some cases be
'Always' or 'Never' . And there are, on the
other hand, those of which it does not so
obviously make sense to ask this question; one
sub-species of these would be exemplified by
'Two and two are four' , and another by 'The
date of the Battle of Hastings is 1066'
.
[ Worlds , Times and Selves, p. 67.]
Propositions of the first kind, if there are any, are
propositions to which we may sensibly ascribe truth-values
at times. It is natural to think, for example, that we can
sensibly ascribe to the proposition that Socrates is sitting
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down the truth-value true at some time, t, and that we can
also sensibly ascribe to the same proposition the truth-
value false at some other time, t'
.
Propositions of the second kind, if there are any, are
propositions to which we may not sensibly ascribe truth-
values at times. For example, it might be said that we
cannot sensibly ascribe to the proposition that two and two
are four the truth-value true at the time t, even though we
can sensibly ascribe to that proposition a truth-value - we
can say that the proposition is true simplici ter. For it
seems natural to say, with regard to such propositions,
which could not in any case have different truth-values at
different times, that time therefore does not enter into the
ascriptions to them of truth-values.
What is really revealed by the apparent distinction
between propositions that can be said to be true or false at
times, on the one hand, and propositions that can only be
said to true or false simplici ter, on the other hand, is a
distinction between different ways of thinking about
propositions, truth and time, and the connections among
these. And these different ways of thinking about
propositions, truth and time, of which there are three,
really represent three different ways of doing semantics.
Let me explain.
According to one way of doing semantics, which I will
call the tensed view of propositions, the bearers of truth
and falsity - i.e., propositions - are thought to have
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truth-values at times. On this way of thinking, the most
basic assignments of truth-values to propositions will have
the form "P is v at t", where the term in place of 'P'
refers to some proposition, the term in place of 'v' refers
to some truth-value, and the term in place of 't' refers to
some time. This locution, indeed, will be thought of, by
those holding the tensed view of propositions, as the
fundamental semantical locution. It captures what adherents
of this view take to be the fundamental semantical relation:
the three-place relation that relates a proposition to a
truth-value at a time.
Here I must digress. I have already been speaking of
propositions as if they are genuine entities. Some people
have objected to this ontological extravagance. 10 In this
essay, I hereby confess, I will be assuming, without
argument, that there are such things. And, to make matters
worse, I will also be appealing to a controversial thesis
about the nature of propositions: that they are ordered
sets. 11 For the latter thesis, however, I offer the
following argument: I think that there are sets; ordered
sets can be constructed out of sets, so I think that there
are ordered sets too; certain ordered sets have certain
characteristics that make them ideal for playing the role of
10 See, for example, Quine and Ullian, The Web of Belief ,
pp. 10-12.
11 As far as I can tell, this view goes back to Russell's
Principles of Mathematics .
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propositions; 12 therefore, since I have these entities in my
ontology anyway, and since they are ideally suited to the
role of propositions, I believe that they are propositions.
In what follows, then, I will help myself to the
assumption that there are propositions, and that these are
ordered sets. Doing so will make certain issues about time
and semantics considerably easier to discuss. Moreover, the
assumption will neither help nor hurt any of the parties to
our dispute about the passage of time. It will simply make
it possible to spell out each of the relevant views in a
clearer fashion than would otherwise be possible.
If we take propositions to be ordered sets, then the
tensed view of propositions tells us that the sentence
(12) The Orioles are in first place in their
division
.
expresses the proposition <beinq-in-first-place-in-thei r-
division
, the Orioles>, and that this proposition, like all
propositions, has truth-values at times. It happens to be
false as I write this, but it has been true in the past, and
will be again, no doubt, in the future.
12 This is a weak point in the argument. There are various
puzzles that are generally believed to afflict the view that
propositions are ordered sets (see, for example, Frege, "On
Sense and Meaning;" Kripke, "A Puzzle About Belief;" Kaplan,
"Dthat," "On the Logic of Demonstratives," and
Demonstratives ; Salmon, Frege's Puzzle; and Ryckman,
"Belief, Linguistic Behavior, and Propositional Content").
Whether these puzzles are fatal to the view that
propositions are ordered sets is another question, but one
that is beyond the scope of this essay. I will assume that
they are not.
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In general, according to the tensed view of
propositions, any basic assignment of truth-values to
propositions must involve times. A complete assignment,
i.e., one that picks out a unique possible world, must
consist of a function from ordered pairs - each one itself
consisting of a proposition and a time, in such a way that
each proposition is matched with every time - to truth-
values .
I have said "the fundamental semantical locution, " "the
fundamental semantical relation" and "any basic assignment
of truth-values." This is because it is open to one who
holds the tensed view of propositions to allow that there
may be a derivative semantical locution: one that captures a
derivative semantical relation by making non-basic
assignments of truth-values. For example, such a one might
say that if the proposition expressed by (12) is true at
time t 1, then it is permissible to say that the makeshift
proposition <beinq-in-first-place-in-their-division-at-tl .
the Orioles> is true simpliciter; provided, that is, it is
understood that this latter way of talking - in which a
truth-value is assigned to a proposition, not at a time,
but, rather, simpliciter - is just a construction out of the
more fundamental way of talking - in which a truth-value is
assigned to a proposition at a time. Such a person might dub
propositions of the first kind (which are said to have
truth-values at times) tensed propositions, while calling
propositions of the second kind (which may be said to have
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truth values simplicite r) tenseless propositions
. He or she
will say that talk of the latter is always to be analyzed in
terms of talk of the former, which is to be taken as
primitive
.
The second way of doing semantics, which I will call
the tenseless view of propositions, is essentially the
inverse of the tensed view of propositions. It involves
thinking of propositions as having truth-values simpliciter,
not at times. According to this view, the most basic
assignments of truth-values to propositions will have the
form "P is v", where the term in place of 'P' refers to some
proposition and the term in place of 'v' refers to some
truth-value. This is the locution that, according to
adherents of the tenseless view of propositions, should be
thought of as the fundamental semantical locution; it
captures what they take to be the fundamental semantical
relation: the two-place relation that relates a proposition
to a truth-value.
Of course, proponents of this view will have to say
that there is a time element built into each proposition.
Thus, for example, the tenseless view of propositions tells
us that (12) now expresses the tenseless proposition cbeinq-
in-first-place-in-their-division-on-27- Julv-1 989 , the
Orioles>. This proposition, according to the view in
question, is simply false. Other, related propositions, with
earlier and later times built into them, such as <being-in-
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first-place- in-their-division-on- 2 7- September- 1 97
n
. the
Orioles>, are true.
In general, according to the tenseless view of
propositions, although propositions themselves involve
times, no basic assignment of truth-values to propositions
will involve times. In order to achieve a complete
assignment, specifying a unique possible world, all that is
required is a function that takes each proposition to a
truth-value
.
Of course, it is open to one who holds this view to say
that we may speak derivatively of propositions as having
truth-values at times - we simply have to extract the time
element from the real proposition and incorporate it into
the ascription of a truth-value to a makeshift proposition.
For example, from the truth of the above proposition, which
is basic, we derive the truth on 27 September 1970 of the
makeshift proposition <beinq-in-first-olace-in-their-
division , the Orioles>. A proponent of the tenseless view of
propositions might agree to refer to the first proposition
as a tenseless proposition and the second proposition as a
tensed proposition. He or she will say that it is the
tenseless propositions that are primitive, and the tensed
ones that are derivative.
Finally, there is a third option, which I will call the
mixed view of propositions. According to this view, there
are some propositions for which the most fundamental
semantical relation is a three-place relation that relates a
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proposition to a truth value at a time, and there are also
some propositions for which the fundamental semantical
relation is a two-place relation that relates a proposition
to a truth-value. Propositions of the first kind, which
might be called tensed propositions, need not have any time
element built into them; propositions of the second kind,
which could be called tenseless propositions, will each have
to have some time element in them. Thus, one who holds this
view will countenance, as unanalysable, talk of the
proposition <being- in- first-place- in-their-divi si on
. the
Orioles>, which proposition has truth-values truth-values at
times, and is, in particular, true on 27 September 1970. But
such a one will also countenance, as unanalysable, talk of
the proposition <beinq-in-first-place-in-their-division-on-
2 7- September- 1970 . the Orioles>, which proposition has a
truth-value simpliciter .
Here, then are the three relevant views on the
relationships among propositions, truth and time:
The tensed view of propositions (TDVP)
:
Propositions have truth-values at times; the
most fundamental semantical locution is "P is
v at t", where the term in place of 'P' refers
to some proposition, the term in place of 'v'
refers to some truth-value, and the term in
place of ' t ' refers to some time.
The tenseless view of propositions (TLVP)
:
Propositions have truth-values simpliciter;
the most fundamental semantical locution is "P
is v", where the term in place of 'P' refers
to some proposition and the term in place of
'v' refers to some truth-value.
The mixed view of propositions (MVP) : Some
propositions have truth-values at times; the
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most fundamental semantical locution for these
propositions is "P is v at t", where the term
in place of 'P' refers to some proposition,
the term in place of 'v' refers to some truth-
value, and the term in place of 't' refers to
some time; but some other propositions have
truth-values simplici ter; the most fundamental
semantical locution for these propositions is
"P is v", where the term in place of 'P'
refers to some proposition and the term in
place of 'v' refers to some truth-value.
2.5 Are Tensed Sentence Types Eliminable?
It is important to distinguish among several different
variations of TL. These different theses represent different
ways of trying to carry out the relevant elimination. The
first and perhaps most natural of these is a thesis
involving type-for-type translations of tensed sentence
types by tenseless sentence types. The thesis may be
formulated as follows:
TLa: For every tensed sentence-type, T, there
is some tenseless sentence type, T' , such that
every token of T could be replaced, without
loss of meaning, by a token of T' .
It is not difficult to find an account that at least
appears to be an attempt at filling out TLa . In a famous
passage in his essay, "The River of Time,
"
Smart writes
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When we say that the boat 'was upstream, is
level, will be downstream'
,
we are saying that
occasions on which the boat is upstream areQ&rlier then this utterance, that the occasion
on which it is level is simultaneous with this
utterance, and that occasions on which it is
downstream are later than this utterance. That
is, a language could be devised in which
temporal copulae did not exist, but in which
we used the words 'earlier than', 'later
than'
,
or 'simultaneous with' in combination
with a non-temporal copula and the expression
'this utterance'
. This language would not
contain words like 'past', 'present', and
'future'
. For example, 'is past' would be
translated by 'is earlier than this
utterance'. ["The River of Time," p. 224.]
This passage has been much discussed in the literature
on questions about the passage of time, and the detensing of
language. The account proposed here by Smart is widely
referred to as "the token reflexive analysis" of tensed
language. Unfortunately, whatever Smart has in mind here, he
does not have in mind a proposal for detensing language, in
the sense in which I am using the expression 'detensing
language' . For it is clear enough that sentence types like
'The boat's being level is simultaneous with this utterance'
are themselves tensed sentence types; for they can have
different tokens with different truth-values. I take this as
evidence that Smart's proposal in this passage is not meant
to be one by which we can eliminate tensed sentence types by
systematically replacing them with tenseless sentence types
involving expressions like 'earlier than' and 'this
utterance ' . I think that part of what Smart has in mind
instead is the analysis of talk that appears to involve the
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attribution of properties such as pastness, presentness and
futurity to events. I will discuss the question of the
status of such putative properties in more detail in Chapter
3 below.
If the analysis proposed here by Smart is not meant to
incorporate a type - for -type translation scheme that reveals
the eliminability of tensed sentence types, then what would
such a translation scheme - i.e., one suitable for filling
out the claim made in TLa - look like?
I don't know exactly what such a translation scheme
would look like, or even what a rough proposal along the
appropriate lines would be like. But I think it can be
easily shown that any such scheme or proposal is doomed to
failure. Consider some tensed sentence type, S, and its
proposed tenseless translation, S' . Let S be one of the many
tensed sentence-types that not only can have different
tokens that express propositions with different truth-
values, but in fact does have different tokens that express
propositions with different truth-values. Let ul and u2 be
tokens of S expressing propositions that are true and false,
respectively. Then ul' and u2' are the tokens of S' that are
meant to translate ul and u2, respectively; i.e., ul' is the
utterance that would result from the tokening of S' in the
context of ul, and u2' is the utterance that would result
from the tokening of S' in the context of u2 . But the
propositions that would be expressed by ul' and u2' are
either both true or else both false, since ul' and u2' are
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tokens of the same tenseless sentence type. Hence S and S'
are such that there is some context - either the context of
ul and ul', or else the context of u2 and u2' - in which a
token of S would express a proposition with one truth-value,
and a token of S '
,
which is meant to replace the token of S
without loss of meaning, would express a proposition with a
different truth-value.
It is not at all obvious what we should say about the
meanings of sentence types in general. Is it appropriate to
say that sentence types have meanings? If so, how are we to
characterize these meanings? There will be some discussion
below of these issues. Similarly, it is not at all obvious
what we should take to be the criteria for one sentence
type's being a good translation of another, or under what
circumstances we should say that one utterance could replace
another without loss of meaning. More will be said about
this, too, below.
But no matter what we say about these matters, it does
seem clear that in the case we are considering, S' cannot be
said to be a good translation of S, nor can a token of S’
that would express a proposition with one truth-value be
said to be capable of replacing a token of S in some context
without loss of meaning, if the token of S expresses a
proposition with a different truth-value.
This is bad news for TLa, but it is not necessarily bad
news for the claim that tensed sentence types can be
eliminated. All that the above shows is that the elimination
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a type-for-typecannot be carried out by means of
translation scheme. An approach that will fare much better
than TLa, and that is perhaps closer to what Smart had in
mind when writing the above passage, is the following:
TLb : For every utterance, u, there is sometenseless sentence-type, T, such that a token
of T in the context of u would have had the
same meaning as u.
Consider Tom's uttering, in Amherst at tl, a token of
It s raining'
. TLb implies that there is some tenseless
sentence type, T, such that a token of T in this context
(i.e., one uttered by Tom in Amherst at tl) would have
expressed the same proposition as Tom's utterance of a token
of 'It's raining'
.
Is there such a tenseless sentence type, i.e., one that
Tom could have tokened in the place of his actual utterance
in order to express the same proposition as the one he in
fact expressed? This is an easy question to answer. If the
tenseless view of propositions is true, then the answer is
'Yes'; if the tensed view of propositions is true, then the
answer is 'No'
.
For suppose the tenseless view of propositions is true.
Then the proposition expressed by Tom's actual utterance is
the tenseless proposition <be inq- rainy- at -t
1
. Amherst>. This
proposition could have been expressed by Tom in the same
context by his uttering a token of 'It rains in Amherst at
tl'
.
This latter sentence type is a tenseless one - if it
can ever be used to express a true proposition, then it can
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always be used to express a true proposition. Hence, there
is some tenseless sentence type that would have served Tom
just as well in this context as 'It's raining'.
But, on the other hand, if the tensed view of
propositions is true, then the proposition expressed by
Tom's token of 'It's raining' is the proposition cbeinq-
rainy
,
Amherst>. This is a tensed proposition with different
truth-values at different times. Because of this, and for
the reasons mentioned above, it is a proposition that can
never be expressed by an utterance that is a token of a
tenseless sentence type. Certainly 'It rains in Amherst at
tl' can't be tokened in order to express the proposition
<beinq-rainv , Amherst>, since any token of this sentence
type will express a proposition that is either always true
or always false, whereas the proposition expressed by Tom's
utterance is, according to the tensed view of propositions,
one that is sometimes true and sometimes false.
But just as it is clear that the existence of
propositions with different truth-values at different times
entails that TLb is false, and that tensed sentence-types
are thus ineliminable , so it is also clear that if there
exist no tensed propositions (i.e., if the tenseless view of
propositions is true), then TLb is true. For consider any
utterance that is a token of a tensed sentence-type. The
proposition expressed by this utterance is a tenseless
proposition, according to the tenseless view of
propositions . But there is a sort of algorithm for
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constructing, out of any tenseless proposition, a tenseless
sentence type that may be used on any occasion to express
that proposition. This is the case in virtue of the fact
that, as I mentioned above, it is a consequence of the
tenseless view of propositions that there must be some time
element or other built into each proposition. The algorithm
is this: a) take the time element that is contained in the
proposition; b) combine it with the property or relation
that is contained in the proposition, if it is not already
so combined, thereby getting something like the property
red-at-t
4
, or the relation loves at t2 ; c)
find a predicate that expresses this property or relation
(e.g., 'is red at t4', or 'loves so-and-so at t2' )
;
and d)
make a sentence with the appropriate subject (s) and
object (s), a tenseless copula, and this predicate. The
sentence type represented by the resulting sentence is the
required tenseless sentence type.
At this point the debate has reached an impasse.
Supporters of LP, who say that tensed sentence types are
ineliminable, will base their claim on an appeal to the
tensed view of propositions. Supporters of LNP , who say that
tensed sentence types are eliminable, will base their claim
on an appeal to the tenseless view of propositions. It is
not at all clear what sort of arguments, if any, would count
in favor of one or the other of these semantical views. Are
there any such arguments?
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sentence token may be said to have, on the other hand.
Sentence tokens, we can say (or anyway tokens of declarative
sentence types)
,
express propositions, which are their
meanings
. Sentence types, on the other hand, can not be said
to have propositions as their meanings, since different
tokens of a single sentence type may express different
propositions. This does not mean that sentence types must be
without meanings, however. The meaning of a (declarative)
sentence type, we can say, is something like a function from
contexts to propositions. The meaning of 'It's raining', for
example, is a function that goes from different contexts to
different propositions. The meaning of 'The date of the
Battle of Hastings is 1066'
,
on the other hand, is a
function that goes from different contexts to a single
proposition. That, according to one who holds the tenseless
view of propositions, is the difference between tensed and
tenseless sentence types. On this view, then, our intuition
according to which sentence types may be said to have
meanings, as well as our intuition according to which
different tokens of a single sentence type may be said to
have some meaning in common, can both be preserved.
In fact, it is the tensed view of propositions that
might be in a precarious position here. For in light of the
distinction between the kind of meaning that a sentence type
may have (i.e., a function from contexts to propositions,
hereafter referred to as the sense of the sentence type) and
the kind of meaning that a sentence token may have (i.e.,
54
the proposition expressed by that token)
,
it seems that an
argument can be developed against the tensed view of
propositions. The argument is based on close analogies
between tensed sentence types and what might be called
personally indexed and spatially indexed sentence types.
Consider the sentence type 'Washington slept here'
.
This is what I call a spatially indexed sentence type; it
may have different tokens that have different truth-values
in virtue of the fact that they occur at different places.
It is very natural to treat this sentence type in a way
analogous to the way the tenseless view of propositions
treats tensed sentence types: the sense of the sentence type
is a function from contexts to propositions. In this case
the crucial element of the contexts involved will be their
locations in space - the function goes from contexts
including Valley Forge to the proposition that Washington
slept in Valley Forge, and it goes from contexts including
Amherst to the proposition that Washington slept in Amherst.
In keeping with the analogy to tensed sentence types, we can
say that propositions have truth-values simpliciter , and
merely add that propositions have spatial elements built
into them, just as propositions have temporal elements built
into them.
Consider the sentence type 'I'm Wayne Gretzky'. This is
what I call a personally indexed sentence type; it may have
different tokens that have different truth-values in virtue
of the fact that they are uttered by different people. It is
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also very natural to treat this sentence type in a way
analogous to the way the tenseless view of propositions
treats tensed sentence types: the sense of the sentence type
is a function from contexts to propositions. But in this
case, the crucial element of the contexts involved will be
the people uttering the tokens - the function goes from any
context in which I am the utterer to the proposition that
Ned Markosian is Gretzky, and it goes from any context in
which Gretzky is the utterer to the proposition that Gretzky
is Gretzky. Again, we can continue to say that propositions
have truth-values simplici ter, merely adding that some
propositions, at least, are about people . 13
It does indeed seem that there are close analogies to
tensed sentence types here. But one who holds the tensed
view of propositions must be wary of taking such analogies
too seriously. If such a one is willing to accept such
analogies wholeheartedly, then he or she may well be forced
to admit that we should treat spatially indexed sentence
types and personally indexed sentence types in the manner of
tensed sentence types, and this, it seems, will lead to
saying that some propositions, at least, are the kinds of
things that can have different truth-values at different
places, or else different truth-values at different people.
But these latter claims, a proponent of the tenseless view
of propositions might well argue, are absurdities.
13 For discussions of these and related issues, see
Casteneda, "Indicators and Quasi-indicators," and Perry,
"The Problem of the Essential Indexical."
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The argument from analogy may be formulated as
follows
.
14
The Argument From Analogy
(1) The analogies among tensed, spatially
indexed, and personally indexed sentence types
are so close that we ought, in our semantical
analyses, to treat all of these kinds of
sentence types in the same manner.
(2) Treating tensed, spatially indexed, and
personally indexed sentence types in the same
manner semantically means saying either (a)
all propositions have truth-values
simplici ter, or else (b) propositions can have
different truth-values at different times, and
they can have different truth-values at
different places, and they can have different
truth-values at different people.
(3) Alternative (b) is untenable; it would be
ridiculous to say that propositions can have
different truth-values at different places, or
that propositions can have different truth-
values at different people.
(4)
We must say that all propositions have
truth-values simpliciter .
It seems to me that there are two effective responses
to this argument available to one who holds the tensed view
of propositions, and that these two responses are mutually
compatible, so that it is possible for such a one to make
them both. The first of these responses is simply to bite
the bullet and embrace the idea that some propositions can
14 Cf. Quine, Word and Object , p. 173, for what appears to
be a passage suggesting at least the personal part of this
argument
.
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have different truth-values at different places, as well as
the idea that some propositions can have different truth-
values at different people, thereby rejecting premise (3) of
the argument. A response of this kind will require a
complication in our semantics, as it will be necessary to
say that the most fundamental semantical ascriptions of
truth-values are of the form "P is v at t at s at r"
,
where
the terms in place of 'P'
,
'v'
,
't'
,
's' and 'r' refer to a
proposition, a truth-value, a time, a place and a person,
respectively. Still, complicated though such an account may
be, there is nothing incoherent about it, as far as I can
tell. Nor are there, as far as I know, any convincing
arguments against it. So I think the rejection of premise
(3) of this argument is a move that one who holds the tensed
view of propositions ought not to be afraid of making. 15
The other response available to such a person, however,
is a response that is considerably more plausible. This
second response involves rejecting premise (1). People who
hold that tensed sentence types are ineliminable, and that
language cannot be detensed, are the people who hold various
metaphysical views that move them to say that time passes.
Exactly what these metaphysical views are, or might be, is a
complicated question that will be taken up in the next
chapter. In general, all the people who say that time passes
believe, or should believe, that there are crucial
15 For discussions of some of these issues see Kaplan,
"Dthat," "On the Logic of Demonstratives," and
Demonstratives ; and Lewis, "General Semantics."
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disanalogies of some kind between time and the dimensions of
space. They believe that it makes sense to say that time
passes, for example, but not to say that space passes. Hence
it makes sense for these people to point to these alleged
differences between time and space as reasons for rejecting
premise (1) of The Argument From Analogy. That is, one who
holds metaphysical views according to which there are
profound differences between time and space can point to
these differences as reasons for maintaining that we ought
not to treat spatially indexed and personally indexed
sentence types in the manner in which we treat tensed
sentence types.
Of course, the appropriate rejoinder for the would-be
detenser of language to make at this point is that time and
space are essentially analogous, metaphysically speaking
(whatever he or she means by that)
,
so that we have good
reasons for treating them analogously when it comes to
semantics. Here we have again reached an impasse. The two
sides disagree on a semantical issue, and they each claim to
have good metaphysical reasons for holding their semantical
views. The matter cannot be decided without venturing
outside of the realm of linguistics.
We have seen that The Argument From Analogy fails to
show that the tenseless view of propositions is the correct
view. If it had been successfull, it would have constituted
an excellent reason for maintaining that TLb is true, and
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that tensed sentence types are therefore eliminable. From
this it would have followed that LNP is true. But The
Argument From Analogy results in an impasse. Are there any
arguments or counter-examples that can show that LNP is
false, and, hence, that LP is true? I think that there are
not. But is worth seeing why some of the alleged counter-
examples that have been proposed in fact fail. The best
attempt at such a counter-example is one that is presented
by Gale in his The Language of Time (in the following
passage Gale uses the term 'A-sentence' to mean roughly what
I mean by 'tensed sentence type' ; similarly, he uses 'B-
sentence' to mean roughly what I mean by 'tenseless sentence
type' ) :
Joe is a scout for a machine-gun company. He
is strategically stationed so that he can
survey the battlefield, and when the enemy
approaches within 100 yards of their position
he must inform the company of this fact. The
company commander will then collate this piece
of information with other information, such as
whether enemy fighter planes are then overhead
and could spot their position if they fired,
and decide whether or not to give the company
the order to open fire.
The crucial question concerns whether Joe can
alert the company commander of the fact that
the enemy is now within a 100-yard range
through the use if a B-sentence. There is no
question of Joe being able to inform the
commander of this fact by the use of an A-
sentence, such as 'The enemy is now within 100
yards'... [Gale, The Language of Time , p. 56.]
The issue may be stated in terms that fit into our
discussion of TLb in the following way. Suppose that at tl
the enemy advances within one hundred yards of the company.
Suppose that Joe does his job: he utters, at tl, a token of
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The enemy is now within one hundred yards'
. His utterance
is a token of a tensed sentence type. Is there some
tenseless sentence type that Joe could have tokened at tl in
place of what he in fact said, in order to alert the
commander of he enemy's approach? TLb says that there is.
Gale says that there isn't. 16
Suppose Joe uttered, in place of his tl token of 'The
enemy is now within one hundred yards', a token of 'The
enemy is within one hundred yards at tl'
.
According to the
tenseless view of propositions, both utterances in question
would express the same proposition: <beina-within-nnp-
hundred-yards-at-t
1
. the enemy>. This is, naturally, a
tenseless proposition, with a t rut h—va lue simp11 ciier. Since
it is the only proposition expressed by Joe's actual
utterance (the tl token of 'The enemy is now within one
hundred yards'), and since it is exactly the proposition
that would be expressed by a tl token of 'The enemy is
within one hundred yards at tl', the detenser will argue,
the case is not a counter-example to TLb.
Of course, the tenser, who believes the tensed view of
propositions, has a different story to tell about the
propositions that would be expressed by these two
utterances. Gale will say that the proposition expressed by
Joe's actual utterance is the tensed proposition cbeing-
16 Prior has a similar example and accompanying argument. He
presents these in his paper "Thank Goodness That's Over." I
think that Prior'
s
example and argument are equally
interesting and plausible. I also think that the remarks I
make below about Gale's example apply, mutatis mutandis, to
Prior's example.
61
within-one
-hundred- yards
. the enemy>. He will say that this
proposition, like any tensed proposition, cannot be
expressed by a token of a tenseless sentence type.
It seems that we have again reached an impasse. One
side presents what it takes to be a counter-example to TLb,
making, in the process, an appeal to the tensed view of
propositions. The other side defends TLb against the alleged
counter-example, and in so doing makes an appeal to the
tenseless view of propositions.
But is that all there is to the matter? Can't the
tenser present a stronger case by making the very plausible
claim that something is lost in the translation to a
tenseless sentence type? Gale points out that a tl token of
'The enemy is within one hundred yards at tl' might fail
disastrously to convey the requisite information. Perhaps
the commander doesn't know the time. He hears Joe's token of
the tenseless sentence type, but this doesn't let him know
when the enemy is in range, since he doesn't know when it is
tl. Thus a token of a tensed sentence type has been
eliminated, but the result is that a crucial piece of
information has been left out. Men die. Battles are lost.
Empires fall. All in the name of preserving a misguided
linguistic thesis.
As a first response to this, the detenser can say the
following. Regardless of whether the commander knows that it
is tl, and that Joe's token of 'The enemy is now within one
hundred yards' thereby expresses the tenseless proposition
62
that the enemy is within one hundred yards at tl, this is
still the proposition expressed. Similarly, I might not know
that Sylvanian is the Armenian ambassador, and thus when you
utter a token of 'The Armenian ambassador is a tiddleywinks
player', I won't know who is being said to be a tiddleywinks
player. Certainly I won't know that the proposition you
express is the proposition <beinq-a-t iddlevwinks-plaver .
Sylvanian>, even if I am well-acquainted with Sylvanian. And
the fact that this piece of information is not conveyed to
me might prove disastrous when I soon launch into a long
philippic degrading that curious game in Sylvanian'
s
presence. Does it follow from this that proper names cannot
be eliminated from our language, to be replaced by definite
descriptions? I don't know.
I think, however, that there is a much more effective,
and much less controversial, response available to the
detenser. He or she need only point out that Joe's token of
'The enemy is now within one hundred yards' is, in addition
to being a token of a tensed sentence type, also a token of
a spatially indexed sentence type. For whether tokens of
this type express something true depends not only on when
they occur, but also on where they occur. But consider the
following thesis.
SLb : For every utterance, u, there is some
non-spat ially indexed sentence type, T, such
that a token of T in the context of u would
have had the same meaning as u.
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This brings up the question, Could Joe have expressed what
he expressed by tokening a non - spat ially indexed sentence
type? Suppose the position of the company is 15 degrees
West, 50 degrees North. The the proponent of SLb will say
that Joe' s utterance expressed the proposition cbeinq-
within-one-hundred-vards-of-15W-50N-at-tl
. the enemy>. This
is a proposition that does not have truth-values at times,
or at places; it just has a truth-value simplici ter.
According to such a person, then, Joe could have expressed
the same proposition, in the same context, by uttering a
token of 'The enemy is within one hundred yards of 15W-50N
at tl' . But of course the commander might not know that his
company' s position is 15W-50N, just as he might not know
that the time is tl. Hence, this alternative utterance by
Joe would be disastrously lacking in informative content.
Now it should be clear that the tenser has failed to
provide the kind of counter-example that would disprove LNP
.
For, although the tenser has succeeded in presenting what
appears to be a counter-example to TLb, the detenser has,
through the use of some parallel reasoning involving SLb,
managed to show that tensed sentence types are exactly on a
par with spatially indexed sentence types, as far as
eliminability and Gale-type counter-examples are concerned
(it could also be shown that personally indexed sentence
types are in the same boat) . That is, tensed sentence types
are neither more nor less eliminable — without loss of
informative content - than spatially indexed (and personally
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indexed) sentence types. What the tenser needed to prove, in
order to have an argument for LP, was that tensed sentence
types are uneliminable in a way that sets them apart from
spatially indexed (and personally indexed) sentence types.
It light of SLb (and its personal analogue)
,
we can see that
this cannot be proven. This fact will be taken by the
detenser to be further evidence for LNP and the tenseless
view of propositions.
The tenser's only response to this will be to say that
there are profound metaphysical differences between time and
space (and matters personal)
,
so that there is a good reason
for allowing time to play a special role in our semantics.
Thus, tensed sentence types play a unique role in our
language, unlike that of their spatial and personal
counterparts, and, hence, LP is true. But now we have once
again reached an impasse. The debate over linguistic
matters, i.e., the debate over LP and LNP, turns on
semantical considerations, and the relevant semantical
views, namely, the tensed and tenseless views of
propositions, on which the tensers and detensers base their
arguments concerning the alleged necessity of time's special
treatment in our ordinary language, can only be supported
with non-circular arguments by raising metaphysical issues.
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2
. 6 Conclusion
In short, the situation regarding language and the
passage of time is this. A person may consistently hold
either of the two views concerning time's special treatment
in our ordinary language, LP and LNP, provided that that
person also holds the appropriate view from among several
semantical views available. Each of these different
semantical views, in turn, can be consistently maintained in
such a way that it is not susceptible to arguments from the
other side, provided that these arguments do not appeal to
metaphysical considerations. But of course advocates of
either The Linguistic Argument For SPT or The Linguistic
Argument Against SPT may not appeal to metaphysical claims
in defense of either LNP or LP, since these allegedly
linguistic theses are to be used in arguments designed to
prove just such metaphysical claims. Moreover, if the
different parties to the dispute between LP and LNP do
appeal to metaphysical considerations, then they may be able
to develop non-circular, non-question-begging arguments for
their respective linguistic theses. What those metaphysical
considerations might be, and what arguments might be
developed from them, are the topics of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: METAPHYSICAL MATTERS
3.1 Introduction
I
?i i
i
In this chapter I turn to a consideration of SPT and
some related metaphysical issues. Following tradition, I
begin with a consideration of the connection between such
two-place relations as earlier-than, on the one hand, and
such apparently monadic properties as pastness
,
on the other
hand. In section 3.2, questions about this connection are
spelled out in terms derived from McTaggart's distinction
betwen the A-series and the B-series. The primary issue to
be considered here is whether the so-called A-properties
(pastness, etc.) can be analysed in terms of the so-called
B-relations (earlier-than, etc.). But it will also be seen
that several other important issues arise here, and these
other issues lead to questions about such matters as the
relations between times, events and things; what we should
take to be the primary sense of the expression 'physical
object'
;
how many dimensions we should take physical objects
to have; and the ontological status of the past and the
future
.
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After spelling out all of these questions in section
3.2, I will propose, in sections 3. 3-3. 7, five distinct ways
of providing answers to these questions. Each such way will
constitute a package made up of several separate but related
metaphysical components. Each of these metaphysical packages
will itself constitute a good reason for holding one of the
three semantical packages discussed in Chapter 2;
consequently, each of the metaphysical packages will
constitute a good reason for holding either LP or LNP
,
the
linguistic theses discussed in Chapter 2. Thus, the
arguments from metaphysical premises to linguistic
conclusions alluded to above will each have the components
of one of the metaphysical packages as its premises, and
either LP or LNP as its conclusion. Four of the metaphysical
packages will provide arguments for LP, and the other will
provide an argument for LNP. The former four metaphysical
packages will constitute four distinct ways of maintaining
that time passes, and the latter metaphysical package will
constitute what I take to be the principal way of
maintaining that time does not pass.
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3.2 The Status of A properties and Related Mptaphvsir^i
Issues
Today is Monday. Super Bowl XXIII was played yesterday.
Prima facie
,
at least, it seems that Super Bowl XXIII is an
event that now has the property pastness . More specifically,
it seems that Super Bowl XXIII now has the property beina-
one-day-past . Likewise it seems that tomorrow Super Bowl
XXIII will have the property beinq-two-davs-past
. that
during a certain time period yesterday it had the property
presentness
, and that before that period it had the property
futurity
. All of these properties appear to be monadic,
temporal properties that may be possessed by events.
It seems that things, too, may be said to possess such
monadic temporal properties. The boat in which Washington
crossed the Delaware, for example, now has the property
pastness , and the first child born in the twenty-first
century now has the property futurity . Similarly for times;
prima facie, at least, the 1920s, the present moment, and
the twenty-fifth century all seem to have monadic temporal
properties of this kind.
Following McTaggart and others, I will refer to the
seemingly monadic temporal properties pastness , presentness ,
and futurity , as A-properties . 1 And I will also refer to any
1 McTaggart, "The Unreality of Time." See also Gale, The
Language of Time.
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property that is the result of adding a number and a time
unit to an A-property (e.g., one-dav-pastness
. or beina-two-
days-past ) as an A-property
.
A properties may, it seems, be distinguished from such
binary temporal relations as earlier—than , later-than and
simultaneous
-with
.
2 Again following McTaggart, I will refer
to these relations, along with their metric variants ( two-
days -ear lie r-than
. etc.) as B-relations
.
3
The question that is traditionally raised in
discussions about time's alleged passage is this: What is
the correct analysis of talk that appears to be about A-
properties? Is such talk to be analyzed in terms of fi-
liations, or is such an analysis impossible? I.e., do
events (and/or things and/or times) possess A-properties in
such a way that the possession of these properties by these
entities can be analyzed solely in terms of B-relations
among the relevant entities, or not? When I say that Super
Bowl XXIII has the property pastness . for example, am I
attributing to Super Bowl XXIII an irreducibly monadic
property, or am I really just saying that Super Bowl XXIII
bears the relation earlier-than to my utterance?
There is a related question that arises concerning the
various verbal tenses that abound in natural languages,
including, especially, such tenses as the simple past and
2 These are interdefinable . See Chapter 1 above.
3 McTaggart, "The Unreality of Time;" Gale, The Language of
Time .
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the simple future. Are these to be taken as primitive, or
are they to be somehow analyzed away? When I say that Johnny
Unitas was the top quarterback in football, for example, is
my use of the past tense to be taken as primitive, or is it
to be understood as a shorthand way of sayinp that occasions
on which Unitas is the top quarterback in the game are
earlier than the occasion of my utterance? I.e., would a tl
token of 'Occasions on which Johnny Unitas is the top
quarterback in football are earlier than this utterance'
express exactly what a tl token of 'Johnny Unitas was the
top quarterback in football' would express? If so, then it
would seem that we can, in an important way, analyze away
the past- and future-tenses; if not, then it would seem that
the past- and future-tenses are somehow primitive.
Notice that what is at issue here is not the same
question that was raised in Chapter 2. There the question
was whether tokens of tensed sentence types could somehow be
eliminated in favor of tokens of tenseless sentence types.
The answer was that whether or not one thinks this can be
done in a way that is relevant to the dispute between LP and
LNP depends on one's semantical views about propositions,
truth and time. One who holds the tensed view of
propositions will say that tokens of tensed sentence types
cannot be eliminated in such a relevant way; one who holds
the tenseless view of propositions will say that they can.
Now, however, the question is whether or not we can somehow
analyze all past- and future-tensed sentences in terms of
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present-tensed sentences, even if the present-tensed
sentences are tokens of tensed sentence types.
There is a good deal of metaphysics lurking behind
these guestions about A—properties and verbal tenses. one' s
answers to these questions will be largely determined by
one's answers to various other questions about various
metaphysical matters. Among these various other questions
are questions about the nature of physical objects and the
manner in which these exist at different times. To begin
with, there is this question: In the most fundamental sense
of the expression 'physical object', how many dimensions do
physical objects have? Three? Or four? I.e., are the things
that will count as physical objects in our ontology, after
all analyses and reductions are completed, three-dimensional
entities or four-dimensional entities?
A related question is this: what exactly does the
persistence through time of a physical object consist in?
Are physical objects three-dimensional things that may exist
at different times in virtue of the fact that they may be
wholly present at more than one time? Or are they four-
dimensional things that may exist at different times in
virtue of the fact that they may have different temporal
parts at different times, even though no single part of any
physical object can be present at two different times ? 4
4 Peter van Inwagen, in "Four-dimensional Objects,"
discusses similar issues.
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An example will perhaps help to shed some light on the
issue raised by these questions about physical objects.
Consider some ordinary, run-of-the-mill object: a chair,
say. How many dimensions does this object have? Well, it
seems clear enough that the chair has at least three
dimensions, namely, the familiar dimensions of space. The
chair has height, it has depth, and it has width. In
addition, we may want to say, the chair has duration in
time; thus altogether it has, in some sense, four
dimensions. Who would deny that?
No one. But now suppose that it is tl and someone uses
the expression 'the chair' . What is referred to? Is it an
object that is wholly present at tl, or is it an object that
is, at tl, merely represented by a temporal part? Suppose we
say the latter. Then the chair is a four-dimensional object;
it has various one-, two-, three- and four-dimensional
parts, including the three- (spatial) -dimensional part that
occupies tl; but all talk about such parts is to be analysed
in terms of the four-dimensional object that is the chair.
Suppose, on the other hand, we say that the thing
referred to at tl is an object that is wholly present at tl.
Then the chair is a three-dimensional object; it has various
one-, two-, and three-dimensional parts, but all of these
parts are spatial parts; the chair has no temporal parts,
and it has no four-dimensional parts. Of course, it exists
at different times. This is because the chair - all of it -
endures through time; it is wholly present at each time at
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which it exists. Thus, talk of the chair's extension in time
is to be analysed in terms of talk of its continued
existence at different times.
David Lewis provides a clear formulation of what is at
issue here.
Let us say that something persists iff,
somehow or other, it exists at various times;
this is the neutral word. Something perdures
iff it persists by having different temporal
parts, or stages, at different times, though
no one part of it is wholly present at more
than one time; whereas it endures iff it
persists by being wholly present at more than
one time. Perdurance corresponds to the way a
road persists through space; part of it is
here, and part of it is there, and no part is
wholly present at two different places.
Endurance corresponds to the way a universal,
if there are such things, would be wholly
present wherever and whenever it is
instantiated. Endurance involves overlap: the
content of two different times has the
enduring thing as a common part. Perdurance
does not. [On the Plurality of Worlds, p.
202
. ]
If the physical objects of our world, in the most
fundamental sense of the expression 'physical object'
,
are
three-dimensional, then they persist in virtue of the fact
that they endure. If the physical objects of our world, in
the most fundamental sense of the expression 'physical
object', are four-dimensional objects, then they persist in
virtue of the fact that they perdure.
The 3D and 4D views may be formulated as follows:
The 3D View (3D)
:
Physical objects endure
through time; they do not have temporal parts.
The 4D View (4D)
:
Physical objects perdure
through time; they have temporal parts.
In addition to the above questions, there are also
questions about how similar time is to the three spatial
dimensions. One important way in which such comparisons can
be made concerns the respective directions of the dimensions
involved. It seems that there is no intrinsic direction to
any dimension of space; space, we want to say, is isotropic.
Yet it at least seems that time is not in the same way
isotropic; it appears that there is a definite direction to
time, since, after all, causes always precede their effects.
Indeed, it seems that the future is the very realm of
possibility, whereas the past is in some important sense
fixed. Does this appearance reflect a genuine difference
between time and the dimensions of space? Or is time in fact
symmetrical in exactly the way space is?
Another question that concerns apparent dissimilarities
between time and space has to do with the apparent
ontological inequities of the dimension of time. It matters
not at all, ontologically speaking, whether a particular
thing be north or south, up or down; but it at least seems
that there are important, objective, ontological
distinctions to be drawn between the different regions of
time - things and events in the present, we want to say,
enjoy a different ontological status from things and events
that are confined to the past; and things and events that
are past, for their part, enjoy some ontological advantage
75
over things and events that are merely future. Is this
appearance veridical? What, indeed, should we say is the
ontological status of the past? Of the future? Should we
countenance talk of objects that are merely past or merely
future as on a par with talk of objects that are present? Or
should we say that there are no non-present objects? Are
there, in fact, objective, ontological distinctions to be
drawn between the different regions of time, or is time like
the dimensions of space in this regard?
Hsre it is useful to draw an analogy with a certain
issue in the metaphysics of modality, namely, the dispute
between modal realists and modal actualists. Roughly
speaking, the modal debate is over the ontological status of
merely possible objects, and merely possible worlds. Modal
realists, such as David Lewis, 5 believe that such things
really exist, in exactly the same sense in which actual
objects and the actual world really exist; they're concrete
objects, with physical properties, taking up space and time
(although not, says Lewis, any space or time that is
reachable from the space and time of the actual world) . As
William Lycan has put it, modal realists believe that other
possible worlds are "blooming, buzzing worlds . " 6 Moreover,
modal realists are willing to quantify directly over merely
possible objects and merely possible worlds; they will
5 It is perhaps a mistake to speak of modal realists; it
appears that Lewis is the only one. He offers a sustained
defense of his view in On the Plurality of Worlds.
6 Lycan, "The Trouble with Possible Worlds," p. 287.
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accept, for example, that the sentence 'There is an x such
that x is a purple cow'
,
where the existential quantifier is
taken in its broadest sense, is true, since there is indeed
a world (no doubt not this one)
,
in which there is a purple
cow
.
More generally, modal realists are willing to allow
that quantifying expressions, when used in their broadest,
most unrestricted senses, range over all of the things in
all of the possible worlds. Thus, in the broadest senses of
the expressions 'every thing' and 'some thing'
,
these
expressions range over all of the things in this world, and
all of the things in every other possible world, too.
Closely related to this component of modal realism is a
certain claim about singular propositions
.
In order to make
this clear, allow me to indulge once again in the practice
of talking about propositions as ordered sets. A singular
proposition, then, is, roughly speaking, a proposition that
has at least one constituent that is a concrete object; a
general proposition, on the other hand, is a proposition
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that has only abstract objects as constituents
.
7 Thus, for
example, the following would be singular propositions;
cbeing-white
. The White House> and
<being-taller-than
. Manute Bol, Spud Webb>;
whereas these would be general propositions;
<beinq-a- color . beinq-white >
.
cbeinq- instantiated
. beinq-white > and
<beinq-universally- instantiated , beinq-made-
of- iello >
.
8
Now, it is a consequence of the modal realist's
ontology that there are some singular propositions with
7 These definitions are actually inadequate as they stand.
Consider the proposition <beinq-believed-bv- someone . cbeinq-
over-six-feet-tall . Ronald Reagan>>. It is an ordered set
with two constituents, each of which is an abstract object.
Thus, on the definitions I have just given, it is a general
proposition. But it should be considered a singular
proposition, because one of its constituents is a singular
proposition. Similarly, the proposition cbeinq-exemplif ied-
bv-Reagan , be inq-over- s i x- feet -tall > is a general
proposition according to the definitions above; but it
should be considered a singular proposition, because one of
its constituents is a property that involves a concrete
object. I think that the following definitions will
adequately capture the intended notions.
x is a constituent of S =df [] (S exists --> x
exists)
.
P is a singular proposition =df Ex[x is a
concrete object & x is a constituent of P]
.
P is a general proposition =df ~Ex[x is a
concrete object & x is a constituent of P]
P is a proposition about x =df x is a
constituent of P.
P is a proposition directly about x =df x is
a member of P.
8 Notice that these are all examples of the kind of
propositions that a proponent of the tensed view of
propositions would accept.
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constituents that are concrete, but merely possible,
objects. Among these propositions are singular propositions
about such merely possible objects as the present king of
France and the eighth Marx brother.
I said above that modal realists are willing to
quantify over all of the things in all of the possible
worlds. Indeed, modal realists are not only willing to
quantify directly over merely possible objects and worlds;
they believe that the correct analysis of modal discourse is
that such discourse really just is disguised quantification
of this kind. 9 I.e., modal realists say that a sentence like
'It's possible that there is a purple cow' just means that
there is a possible world in which there is an object that
is a purple cow.
Modal actualists, 10 on the other hand, believe that
there are no merely possible (i.e., non-actual) objects;
everything that exists, according to them, is in the actual
world. There are, according to modal actualism, no merely
possible cows of any color, nor are there any concrete,
merely possible worlds. According to modal actualism,
sentences like 'There is an x such that x is a purple cow'
9 Cf. Lewis, "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic"
and On the Plurality of Worlds.
10 There are a lot of these. See, for example, Prior, Papers
on Time and Tense, esp. p. 143; Plantinga, "Actualism and
Possibility, " and The Nature of Necessity; Fine, "Prior on
the Construction of Possible Worlds and Instants;" Adams,
"Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity, " and "Actualism
and Thisness;" and Forbes, The Metaphysics of Modality. For
a good general discussion of this issue see Loux,
"Introduction: Modality and Metaphysics."
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and 'There is an x such that x is non-actual', even when the
existential quantifiers therein are taken in their broadest
senses, are false. Still, modal actualists will admit that
we can, in some fashion, talk about merely possible things.
We can talk about possible worlds, in general, because
these, according to the modal actualist, are abstract
objects that exist in the actual world. Here there are some
different ways to go; some modal actualists, for example,
take possible worlds to be maximal, consistent
propositions . 11 Then any modal proposition of the form it's
possible that such-and-such is said to be true just in case
the proposition that such-and-such is entailed by some
possible world. Hence the modal actualist can say that the
proposition that it's possible that there is a purple cow is
true, without ontological commitment to any non-actual
objects; for there are many possible worlds (i.e., maximal,
consistent propositions) that entail the proposition that
there is a purple cow.
According to the modal actualist, then, quantifying
expressions like 'every thing' and 'some thing' , when they
are taken in their broadest, most unrestricted senses, range
over all and only objects in the actual world. Thus, it is a
consequence of the modal actualist's ontology that there are
11 See, for example, Fine, "Prior on the Construction of
Worlds and Instants." We can say that a proposition, p, is
maximal just in case for every proposition, q, either p
entails q or else p entails not-q. We can say that a
proposition, p/ is consistent just in case it is possible
that p be true.
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are
no singular propositions with constituents that
concrete, but merely possible, objects; there are no
singular propositions about such merely possible objects as
the present king of France and the eighth Marx brother.
In addition to this metaphysical component of modal
actualism there is a semantical component. For the correct
analysis of modal discourse, according to the modal
actualist, is not that such discourse is really disguised
quantification over possible worlds and objects, including
various non-actual entities. Rather, such discourse is to be
analysed solely in terms of certain appropriate actual
entities - namely, maximal, consistent propositions - and
things entailed by them.
In short, the dispute between modal realism and modal
actualism is a dispute over the manner in which we are to
analyse modal discourse. There are two main questions here:
(i) Will we allow quantification over, and propositions
about, things that are not actual? and (ii) Will we analyse
away modal notions like the notions of possibility and
necessity? The modal realist answers Yes to both questions;
for he is willing to quantify directly over merely possible
objects and worlds, and he thinks that there are singular
propositions about non-actual objects (I will refer to this
part of the view as the metaphysical thesis of modal
realism) ; 12 and he makes use of such quantification in order
12 It is thus a consequence of the metaphysical thesis of
modal realism that 'M(Ex($x))' entails 'Ex(M(Sx))', where
'M' is the modal operator standing for 'possibly' , 'Ex'
stands for 'there is an x such that' (but not for the
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to analyse away the notions of possibility and necessity in
giving explanations of modal discourse (I will refer to this
part of the view as the semantical thesis of modal realism )
.
The modal actualist, on the other hand, answers No to
b°th guestions. For he or she insists that we can guantify
only over things that exist in the actual world, so that
there are no singular propositions about merely possible
objects (I will call this part of the view the metaphysical
thesis of modal actualism) , 13 This is why, according to the
modal actualist, we must take possible worlds to be entities
like maximal, consistent propositions. And this in turn is
why the modal actualist says that we cannot analyse away the
modal notions (for a notion like consistent cannot be
analysed without appealing to the notion of possible) ; the
modal notions must, according to the modal actualist, be
taken as primitive (I will refer to this part of the view as
the semantical thesis of modal actualism )
.
14
restricted guantifier 'there is in the actual world an x
such that') and '$' is any predicate.
13 But according to the metaphysical thesis of modal
actualism we can guantify indirectly - i.e., within the
scope of a modal operator - over mere possibilia; such
guantificat ion, however, does not entail the existence of
anything actual. So it is a conseguence of the metaphysical
thesis of modal actualism that 'M(Ex($x))' does not entail
'Ex (M ( £x) )
'
(even if the existential guantifier in the
latter sentence is taken in the broadest possible sense)
.
14 There would be nothing inconsistent in taking at least
one of the two middle of the road positions with regard to
modal actualism, namely, allowing guantification over mere
possibilia while taking the modal notions to be primitive;
but it is hard to imagine why anyone would want to take such
a position. If we allow mere possibilia into our ontology,
then we have available the resources for analyzing away the
modal notions in terms of guantification over these
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Corresponding to the dispute between modal realism and
modal actualism is a dispute between two views that I will
call temporal realism and temporal actualism. As with the
modal controversy, the temporal controversy is a dispute
over ontology, and the correct way to analyse a certain
fragment of natural language. Whereas the former controversy
revolves around the ontological status of mere possibilia,
snd the analysis of modal discourse, the latter controversy
revolves around the ontological status of things that are
merely past, or merely future, and the analysis of temporal
discourse
.
Temporal realism is, roughly, the view that merely past
and merely future things really exist, in exactly the same
sense in which present objects really exist. 15 For temporal
realism is the view that there are no ontological
distinctions to be drawn between the different regions of
time. Ontologically speaking, present objects, past objects,
and future objects are all on a par; none of them exists any
more or less than any of the others. As Lycan might put it,
temporal realism is the view that the denizens of other
entities. There would then be no reason not to do so; once
we have paid a price, after all, we might as well get what
we've paid for. The other middle of the road position,
namely, not allowing quantification over mere possibilia but
attempting to analyze away the modal notions, seems
untenable. See, in this regard, Fine, "Postscript," pp. 116-
117 .
15 This is rough because temporal realism is made up of two
components - a metaphysical component and a semantical
component - the former of which may be held independently of
the latter. More will be said about this below.
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times are blooming and buzzing no less vividly than are the
denizens of the present time.
Moreover, temporal realists are willing to quantify
directly over objects that are merely past or merely future;
they will accept, for example, that the sentence 'There is
an x such that x was a Trojan horse' 16 is true, since there
is indeed a time (no doubt not the present one)
,
at which
there is a Trojan horse. 17 More generally, temporal realists
are willing to allow that quantifying expressions, when used
in their broadest, most unrestricted senses, range over all
of the things that have ever, do now, or will ever exist.
Thus, in the broadest senses of the expressions 'every
thing' and 'some thing'
,
these expressions range over all
past, present and future objects. It of course follows that
16 By 'Trojan horse' I mean an enormous, wooden model of a
horse, which model is designed to be filled with soldiers
for the purpose of sacking Troy.
17 This is tricky because, as will be seen in section 3.5
below, it is possible, and even plausible, to hold one of
the middle of the road positions in this dispute, namely,
the position consisting of both the semantical thesis of
temporal actualism and the metaphysical thesis of temporal
realism. Thus, as will be seen in Chapter 4 below, one- who
holds both of the components of temporal realism would
analyze a tl token of 'There is an x such that x was a
Trojan horse' as expressing the same tenseless proposition
as 'There is a thing, x, and there is a time, t, such that x
is a Trojan horse at t and t is earlier than tl', where all
of the verbs in the latter sentence are to be taken as
tenseless (cf. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism, p.
133, and also Quine, Quiddities, pp. 197-198); but one who
holds the metaphysical thesis of temporal realism together
with the semantical thesis of temporal actualism would
analyze this token as expressing the tensed proposition that
would be expressed by a tl token of 'There is a thing, x,
such that it has been the case that x is a Trojan horse',
where the latter is taken to be an irreducibly past-tensed
sentence
.
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temporal realists think that there are, at any given time,
singular propositions about objects that are merely past, as
well as singular propositions about objects that are merely
future, relative to that time.
In fact, temporal realists are not only willing to
quantify directly over merely past and merely future
objects; they believe that the correct analysis of past- and
future-tensed discourse is that such discourse really just
is disguised quantification of this kind. I.e., temporal
realists say that a sentence like 'It has been the case that
there is an x such that x is a Trojan horse' just means the
same thing as 'There is a time, t, and there is a thing, x,
such that t is earlier than the present time and x is at t
and x is a Trojan horse'
.
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Temporal actualism, 18 on the other hand, is the view
that there are no merely past or merely future objects;
everything that exists, in the fundamental sense of the
word, according to this view, exists now. That is, according
to temporal actualism, quantifying expressions like 'every
thing and some thing'
,
when they are taken in their
broadest, most unrestricted senses, range over all and only
objects that exist at the time the expressions are used.
There are, according to temporal actualism, no merely past
horses of any description, nor are there any concrete,
merely past or merely future times. According to temporal
actualism, the sentence 'There is a time, t, and there is a
thing, x, such that t is earlier than the present time and x
is at t and x is a Trojan horse' is simply false. Moreover,
temporal actualists do not allow the existence, ever, of any
18 Cf. Prior, Time and Modality, p. 31, Past, Present and
Future, ch. VIII, "Changes in Events and Changes in Things,"
pp. 12-14, "Time, Existence and Identity," pp . 78-80,
"Quasi-Propositions and Quasi-Individuals," esp. pp. 143ff.,
"The Notion of the Present," and "Tense Logic for Non-
Permanent Existents,
" p. 147; also Lukasiewicz, "On
Determinism;" Stalnaker, "Counterparts and Identity," p.
135; Mellor, Real Time, p. 23 and p. 30; Moore, "Being., Fact
and Existence," and "Necessity;" Ryle, "It Was to Be," p.
27; Adams, "Time and Thisness, " pp . 321-322; and Fine,
"Prior on the Construction of Possible Worlds and Instants,"
pp. 116ff. Prior doesn't seem to have any name for the view;
Fine calls it "tense-logical Actualism" (p. 154) , and Adams
calls it "presentism" (p. 321) . Mellor and Stalnaker call
the view they discuss, which is at least akin to temporal
actualism, "presentism". I prefer "temporal actualism", not
only because it is easier to pronounce than "presentism",
but also because (a) it serves to emphasize the fact that
the view is analogous to modal actualism; and (b) it
provides a simple way of naming the view's rival (neither
Adams, Mellor, nor Stalnaker suggests a name for the view
that rivals "presentism", but "past-, present- and future-
ism" seems unwieldy)
.
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singular propositions about objects that are either merely
past or merely future.
Still
,
temporal actualists will admit that we can, in a
sense, talk about merely past and merely future things. Here
again, as in the case of modal actualism, the actualist has
several different ways to go. In general, he or she will
analyze temporal discourse without ever appealing to the
existence of non-present objects. Such a person might say,
for example, that we can talk about world—states, because
these are abstract objects that exist at every time. For
world-states can be taken by temporal actualists to be
maximal, consistent states of affairs
.
19 Then any tensed
proposition of the form it has been the case that such-and-
such is said to be true just in case the proposition that
such-and-such is entailed by some world-state that has
19 To say that a state of affairs, S, is maximal is to say
that for every state of affairs. S'
,
either S entails S' or
else S entails not-S' . To say that a state of affairs, S, is
consistent is to say that it's possible that S obtains. To
say that a state of affairs, S, entails another state of
affairs, S'
,
is to say that, necessarily, if S obtained then
S' would obtain. To say that a state of affairs, S, entails
a proposition, p, is to say that, necessarily, if S obtained
at a time, then p would be true at that time. (Notice that
all of this assumes the tensed view of propositions, and a
similar view of states of affairs; for the states of affairs
required to make the above definitions work would have to be
what might be termed "momentary states of affairs," i.e.,
states of affairs (consisting of ways for the world to be at
an instant of time) that obtain - or fail to obtain - at
times; and the propositions entailed by such states of
affairs would have to have truth-values at times, as per the
tensed view of propositions.) For a somewhat different
definition, in terms of propositions and tense operators, of
entities that can play the same role as world-states, see
Fine, "Prior on the Construction of Worlds and Instants," p.
154 .
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obtained. Hence the temporal actualist can say that the
proposition that it has been the case that there is a Trojan
horse is true, without ontological commitment to any non-
present objects; for there is a world-state that entails the
proposition that there is a Trojan horse and that has (I am
assuming) obtained.
According to the temporal actualist, the correct
analysis of past- and future-tensed discourse is not that
such discourse is really disguised quantification over past
and future objects. Rather, the tenses involved in such
discourse are to be taken as primitive, and whatever
explications are given of such discourse must be parsed
solely in terms of appropriate present entities - such as,
for example, maximal, consistent states of affairs - and
things entailed by them.
In short, the dispute between temporal realism and
temporal actualism is a dispute over the manner in which we
are to analyse temporal discourse. There are two main
questions here: (i) Will we allow quantification over, and
singular propositions about, things that are non-present?
and (ii) Will we analyse away the past- and future-tenses in
favor of the present-tense? The temporal realist answers Yes
to both questions; for he or she is willing to quantify
directly over, and allow singular propositions about, non-
present objects ; 20 and he or she makes use of such
20 it is thus a consequence of the metaphysical thesis of
temporal realism that 'P(Ex($x))' and 'F(Ex($x))' entail
'Ex (P ( £x) ) ' and 'Ex (F ( $x) ) ' , respectively, where 'P' is the
tense operator standing for 'it has been the case that', 'F'
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quantification and such propositions in order to analyse
away the past- and future-tenses in giving explanations of
temporal discourse.
The temporal actualist, on the other hand, answers No
to both questions. For he or she insists that we can, at any
given time, quantify over, and allow singular propositions
about, only things that are present at that time; so that we
are limited, in giving explanations of temporal discourse,
to whatever present resources are available to us . 21 This is
why, according to the temporal actualist, we cannot analyse
away the past- and future-tenses (for a notion like has
obtained cannot be analysed without our making use of the
past-tense) ; these tenses must, according to the modal
actualist, be taken as primitive . 22
is the tense operator standing for 'it will be the case
that', and '$' is any predicate. Similarly, it is a
consequence of the metaphysical thesis of temporal realism
that 'Pn (Ex ( $x) ) ' and 'Fn (Ex ( Sx) )
'
entail 'Ex (Pn ( £x) ) ' and
'Ex (Fn ( £x) )
'
,
respectively, where 'Pn' and 'Fn' are metric
tense operators standing for 'it has been the case n time
units ago that'
,
and 'it will be the case n time units hence
that', respectively.
21 But according to the metaphysical thesis of temporal
actualism we can quantify indirectly - i.e., within the
scope of a tense operator - over merely past and merely
future objects; such quantification, however, does not
entail the existence of anything present. So it is a
consequence of the metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism
that 'P (Ex ( £x) )
'
does not entail 'Ex(P(£x))', and
'F (Ex ($x) )
'
does not entail 'Ex (F ( Sx) ) ' . Similarly, it is a
consequence of the metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism
that 'Pn (Ex ($x) ) ' does not entail 'Ex (Pn ( -$x) ) ' and
'Fn (Ex ( Sx) )
'
does not entail 'Ex (Fn
(
$x) )
'
.
22 As in the modal dispute, there seems to be nothing
inconsistent with taking at least one of the middle of the
road positions here, namely, adopting both the metaphysical
thesis of temporal realism and the semantical thesis of
temporal actualism. That is, one could allow quantification
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Here, then, are the components of temporal realism and
temporal actualism, respectively.
The semantical thesis of temporal realism(STR)
:
The past and future tenses of ourlanguage are to be analysed away.
The semantical thesis of temporal actualism(STA) The past and future tenses of ourlanguage are, like the present tense, to betreated as primitive.
The metaphysical thesis of temporal realism(MTR) : For any time, t, we can, at t, quantifydirectly over objects that are merely past or
merely future, as well as objects that are
present, relative to t. Also, for any time, t,there are, at t, singular propositions about
objects that are present, relative to t, as
well as singular propositions about objects
that are merely past or merely future,
relative to t.
The metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism
(MTA) : For any time, t, we can, at t, quantify
directly only over objects that are present,
relative to t. Also, for any time, t, there
are, at t, singular propositions about objects
that are present, relative to t, but there are
no singular propositions about objects that
are merely past or merely future, relative to
t
.
There are two respects in which the controversy between
temporal realism and temporal actualism is not analogous to
the controversy between modal realism and actualism. The
over merely past and merely future objects, while at the
same time maintaining that the past- and future-tenses are
primitive. This position will be discussed below. The other
middle of the road position with regard to temporal
actualism, namely, restricting quantification to present
objects while at the same time attempting to analyze away
the past- and future-tenses, seems unworkable; for there
would then not be adequate resources for carrying out the
required analysis.
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first difference between the two controversies is that in
the temporal case, but not in the modal case, there is room
for a weakened version of the metaphysical component of the
actualist view. For it seems quite plausible to maintain
that there is in fact an important ontological distinction
to be drawn along temporal lines, but that the relevant
distinction is between the past and the present, on the one
hand, and the future, on the other hand. Someone who takes
this line will allow, at any given time, quantification
over, and singular propositions about, only objects that are
either past or present, relative to that time; such a person
will not allow, at a time, quantification over, or singular
propositions about, any objects that are merely future,
relative to that time . 23
This modified version of the metaphysical thesis of
temporal actualism can be formulated as follows.
The modified metaphysical thesis of temporal
actualism (MMTA) : For any time, t, we can, at
t, quantify directly only over objects that
are either past or present, relative to t.
Also, for any time, t, there are, at t,
singular propositions about objects that are
past, relative to t, as well as singular
propositions about objects that are present,
relative to t, but there are no singular
propositions about objects that are merely
future, relative to t.
23 Adams endorses this view in his "Time and Thisness;" and
Prior, in a notable departure from his usual endorsement of
the unmodified metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism,
seems to endorse the modified metaphysical thesis of
temporal actualism in his "Identifiable Individuals."
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The second difference between the modal and temporal
actualist/realist controversies is that in the temporal
case, but not in the modal case, there is a plausible middle
of the road position. I noted above that it would not make
sense to allow mere possibilia into one's ontology, and yet
choose not to analyze away the modal operators; for once the
ontological price has been paid, it makes sense to take
advantage of the conceptual reduction thereby made feasible.
I don't think analogous considerations tell, however,
against the position consisting of the metaphysical thesis
of temporal realism and the semantical thesis of temporal
actualism. This is because mere possibilia were originally
conceived solely for the purpose of analyzing modal
discourse; whereas there may be independent, pre-
philosophical reasons for thinking that there are merely
past and merely future objects.
Finally, there are, in addition to the issues mentioned
above, questions about two reductionist controversies that
bear on our controversy over the analysis of A-properties
.
The first of these reductionist controversies revolves
around the two views that I referred to in Chapter 1 as
temporal reductionism and temporal Platonism. Temporal
reductionism says, basically, that temporal items and the
time-series are ontologically dependent on things in time
and the event-series, while temporal Platonism denies this.
If we ask whether temporal items (such as the twenty-first
century) possess A-properties in some way that is not
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analysable solely in terms of B-relations, then we must say
something, in our answer to the question, about the
ontological status of temporal items; for if they are just
constructions out of things in time and the event-series,
then our question is really a question about these latter
entities
.
The second reductionist controversy that bears on the
above issues has to do with the ontological status of events
and the event-series
.
The two views available in response to
this issue may be formulated as follows.
Event Reductionism
:
Events are ontological
constructions out of things; all talk about
events is analysable in terms of talk about
things
.
24
Event Platonism: It's not the case that events
are ontological constructions out of things;
it's not the case that all talk about events
is analysable in terms of talk about things.
If we ask whether events possess A-properties in some
way that is not analysable solely in terms of B-relations,
then we must say something, in giving an answer to this
question, about the ontological status of events; for if
they are just constructions out of things, then our question
is really a question about whether things possess A-
properties in some primitive way.
24 Cf. Prior, Past, Present and Future, p. 18, and Papers on
Time and Tense, pp. 10-11.
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These, then, are some of the questions that must be
addressed by any attempt to give an account of such putative
properties as pastness
,
presentness and futurity:
Ql: Do times possess A-properties in some way
that is not analysable in terms of B-
relations? Do events? Do things?
Q2 : How should we analyse the verbal tenses of
natural languages?
Q3: In the most fundamental sense of the
expression 'physical object'
,
how many
dimensions do physical objects have?
Q4 : How is it that physical objects persist?
Is it that they perdure, or is it that they
endure ?
Q5 : How similar is time to the three
dimensions of space?
Q6: Is time ontologically symmetrical? What is
the ontological status of non-present objects?
Q7 : What should we take to be the domain of
our quantifiers? Only presently existing
objects, or all past, present and future
objects?
Q8: Are there ever any singular propositions
about objects that are merely past? Are there
ever any singular propositions about objects
that are merely future?
Q9: What is the ontological status of events
and the event-series?
In the next five sections I will spell out five
different ways of providing answers to all of these
questions
.
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3.3 The 4D View
It is not difficult to find examples of recent analytic
philosophers who hold the 4D view. Here are some typical
passages
.
What I advocate as the 'doctrine of the
manifold ,
'
I should now more specifically
state, is simply a philosophical acceptance,
as an ultimate literal truth about the way
things are’ in themselves, of the conception
that nature, all there is, was, or will be,
"is" (tenselessly ) spread out in a four-
dimensional scheme of location relations...
[Donald C. Williams, "Physics and Flux:
Comment on Professor Capek's Essay," p. 465.]
The world. . . is a four-dimensional manifold
of events. Time is one dimension of the four,
like the spatial dimensions except that the
prevailing laws of nature discriminate between
time and the others... Enduring things are
timelike streaks: wholes composed of temporal
parts, or stages, located at various times and
places. Change is qualitative difference
between different stages - different temporal
parts - of some enduring thing, just as a
"change" in scenery from east to west is a
qualitative difference between the eastern and
western spatial parts of the landscape. [David
Lewis, "The Paradoxes of Time Travel," pp . 68->
69
. ]
25
an enduring solid is seen as spreading out in
four dimensions: (1) up and down, (2) right
and left, (3) forward and backward, (4) hence
and ago. Change is not thereby repudiated in
favor of an eternal static reality, as some
have supposed. Change is still there, with all
its fresh surprises. It is merely
incorporated. To speak of a body as changing
25 Lewis, were he using, at the time he wrote this passage,
the terminology that he later introduced in On the Plurality
of Worlds, would have said 'perduring' here rather than
'enduring'
.
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is to say that its later stages differ from
its earlier stages, just as its upper parts
differ from its lower parts. Its later shape
need.be no more readily inferred from its
earlier shape than its upper shape from its
lower. [W.V. Quine, Quiddities, p. 197.]
It is perfectly possible to think of things
and processes as four-dimensional space-time
entities. The instantaneous state of such a
four-dimensional space-time solid will be a
three-dimensional 'time slice' of the four-
dimensional solid. Then instead of talking of
things or processes changing or not changing
we can now talk of one time slice of a four-
dimensional entity being different or not
different from some other time slice. (Note
the tenseless participle of the verb 'to be'
in the last sentence.)
When we think four-dimensionally
,
therefore,
we replace the notions of change and staying
the same by the notions of the similarity or
dissimilarity of time slices of four-
dimensional solids. [J.J.C. Smart, Philosophy
and Scientific Realism, p. 133.]
Of course, these writers, and others who have asserted
the 4D view, 26 mean to claim more than just that physical
objects can be thought of, and spoken of, as four-
dimensional entities, with extension in the three dimensions
of space as well as extension in time. They want to say that
physical objects should be thought of, and spoken of, in
this way; indeed, they want to say that this way of thinking
and speaking captures the way physical objects really are.
Williams and Lewis, in the passages quoted above, say this
explicitly, whereas Quine and Smart, somewhat more cagily,
26 Cf. also, for example, Russell, The Principles of
Mathematics; Smart, "The River of Time"; Lewis, On The
Plurality of Worlds ; Heller, "Temporal Parts of Four
Dimensional Objects;" and Grunbaum, "The Meaning of Time."
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merely suggest it. It is clear that they all agree on this
point, however; for they all claim to be saying something
interesting and controversial, and to say merely that
physical objects can be thought of in this way, or that it
is sometimes handy to speak of them so, is hardly
controversial
.
What the 4D view asserts, then, is a combination of 4D
plus MTR. For in order to say that objects perdure, and have
temporal parts, the 4D theorist must be a realist about the
merely past and merely future temporal parts of the world
and of the objects in the world.
Must the 4D theorist also subscribe to STR? I don't
think so; but two points are important here. The first is
that each of the 4D theorists quoted above does subscribe to
STR, so that there is some historical reason for aligning
the 4D view with STR. The second is that, since 4D theorists
must subscribe to MTR, they have available the ontological
resources to analyze away the past- and future-tenses;
hence, there is a philosophical reason for aligning the 4D
view with STR.
As I see it, then, the 4D view implies MTR, which in
turn constitutes a good reason for holding STR. So the 4D
view can properly be thought of as a package containing
these three components.
Now, the 4D theorist can admit that we often talk of
objects as if they were merely three-dimensional entities;
we normally speak of change, for example, in this way. But
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the 4D theorist will insist that all such talk is ultimately
to be analyzed in terms of talk about four-dimensional
entities. As Smart says of the notion of change, this notion
is to be replaced by the notion of dissimilarity between
temporal parts. The idea, then, is that the four-dimensional
way of thinking and speaking enjoys some primacy over the
three-dimensional way. Four-dimensional talk is fundamental,
while three-dimensional talk is derivative. Three-
dimensional talk is for loose speaking; in the end, it is to
be analyzed away in favor of four-dimensional talk.
The 4D view' s answer to Q4 provides an instance of the
manner in which we are to analyze talk about three-
dimensional objects in terms of talk about four-dimensional
entities. According to the 4D view, all talk of objects
persisting, including talk that appears to be about certain
three-dimensional objects enduring, is to be analyzed in
terms of talk of the perdurance of various four-dimensional
entities. Thus, for example, when we say of some chair that
it persists through time, what we are really saying is that
the chair is a four-dimensional entity with different
temporal parts occupying different regions of time.
The next question to consider is Q5. Here there are
different versions of the 4D view. A 4D theorist can say
that time is exactly similar in every way to each dimension
of space, 27 or he or she can allow that there are some
27 Richard Taylor has argued at some length for the thesis
that time is like the dimensions of space in various
respects. See his "Spatial and Temporal Analogies and the
Concept of Identity" and Chapter Seven of his Metaphysics
.
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dissimilarities between time and the dimensions of
Williams remarks that
space
.
The theory of the manifold leaves abundant
room for the sensitive observer to record anydescribable difference he may find, inintrinsic quality, relational texture, or
absolute direction, between the temporaldimension and the spatial ones. He is welcome
to mark it so on the map. ["The Myth of
Passage,
" p. ill .
]
Most proponents of the 4D view seem to take the line that
time is in some, not always specified, ways different from
space to some degree or other. 28 Williams, however, seems to
want to go the other way, for he goes on to say the
following
.
The theory has generally conceded or
emphasized that time is unique in these and
other respects, and I have been assuming that
it was right to do so. In working out this
thesis, however, and in considering the very
lame demurrals which oppose it, I have come a
little uneasily to the surmise that the idea
of an absolute or intrinsic difference of
texture or orientation is superfluous, and
that the four dimensions of the manifold
compose a perfectly homogenous scheme of
location relations, the same in all
directions, and that the oddity of temporal
28 Lewis, for example, says that "time is one dimension of
the four, like the the spatial dimensions except that the
prevailing laws of nature discriminate between time and the
others - or rather, perhaps, between various timelike
dimensions and various spacelike dimensions." ["The
Paradoxes of Time Travel," p. 68.] For more detailed
discussions of this issue see Smart, Philosophy and
Scientific Realism, pp. 142-148; Grunbaum, Philosophical
Problems of Space and Time, Chapters 8 and 9; Reichenbach,
The Direction of Time; Schrodinger, "Irreversibility;" and
Horwich, Asymmetries in Time.
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nCes is altogether a function of featurewhich occupy them - a function of de factopattern like the shape of an arrow, like thedifference between the way in and the way out
°7 a trap, and like the terrestrialdifference between up and down. ["The Mvth ofPassage,
" p . ill .
]
s
Whatever the 4D theorist says about the question of
various other alleged similarities between time and space,
he or she will say that time is perfectly similar to space
in at least one respect: time is, just like space,
ontologically symmetrical. That is, as far as existence is
concerned, past and future objects are exactly on a par with
present objects, just as east and west objects are exactly
on a par, ontologically speaking, with objects that are
right here. So the 4D view's answer to Q6 is Yes; the
ontological status of non-present objects is the same as
that of present objects.
Similarly, the 4D view's answer to Q7 is that we should
take as the domain of our quantifiers all past, present and
future objects. That is, the 4D view includes acceptance of
the metaphysical thesis of temporal realism. The world is a
giant, four-dimensional object, and we may quantify over
anything in it, anywhere. 29 We may quantify over all of the
"timelike streaks" that are the tables, rocks and people of
the world - i.e., the four-dimensional objects, or space-
time worms, of the world - without any restrictions
regarding the locations of those things. And we may quantify
29 See, for example, Quine, Quiddities
, pp. 197-198.
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over all of the different parts of such objects, also
without restrictions regarding the locations of those parts.
Thus, for example, we may say of some chair, 'All of its
legs are wooden'
,
thereby quantifying over some of the
spatial parts of a temporal part (namely, the present one)
of the chair; or we may say of the same chair, 'It has
always been wooden'
,
thereby quantifying over all of the
previous temporal parts of the four-dimensional object that
is the chair.
The 4D view's answer to Q8, then, is that there are
singular propositions about objects that are merely past or
merely future. Thus, right now there are singular
propositions about Socrates, according to the 4D view, and
there are singular propositions about the future denizens of
the world. This, of course, does not commit the 4D theorist
to the claim that people are always in a position to express
singular propositions about merely future objects; depending
on the 4D theorist's views about reference, he or she may
want to say that the only singular propositions we can
express at a time are ones about objects that are past or
present, relative to that time.
I said above that the 4D theorist is willing to
quantify directly over merely past and merely future
objects. Indeed, the 4D view's answer to Q2 is that it is
through the use of such quantification that we must analyze
the verbal tenses of natural languages. A sentence token of
the type 'x was F' is to be analyzed as expressing the
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proposition that some temporal part of the object denoted by
x
'
which part is earlier than the token in question, has
the property denoted by 'F ' . Metric variants are to be
handled in a similar way: a sentence token of the type 'x
was F two days ago' is to be analyzed as expressing the
proposition that the temporal part of the object denoted by
'x
# that is two days earlier than the token in question has
the property denoted by 'F'
.
30 Future-tensed sentences are
to be handled in an analogous way.
In general, according to the 4D view, the past-tense
and the future-tense are to be analyzed away; all sentences
are to be analyzed by purely present-tensed sentences, in
accordance with the semantical thesis of temporal realism.
Some of the resulting present-tensed sentences will ascribe
a property to some four-dimensional object, or some part of
some four-dimensional object. Others will assert of some
four-dimensional objects, or parts of some four-dimensional
objects, that they stand in some relation to one another.
In any case, all of these sentences will express
propositions that can be taken to be tenseless propositions,
in accordance with the tenseless view of propositions
outlined in Chapter 2. For none of them will turn out to be
a proposition that ever could have different truth-values at
30 Some predicates will have to be analyzed in a similar
way. 'x was 500 years old two days ago', for example, will
be taken by a 4D theorist to be equivalent to 'the temporal
part of x that is two days earlier than this token is such
that it is 500 years later than the first temporal part of
x' .
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ffsrent times, even if it did have truth-values at times.
^ ever true that a certain four—dimensional object,
3 certain temporal part of a four—dimensional object, has
a certain property, then it will always be true that that
four-dimensional object, or temporal part of a four-
dimensional object, has that property. Likewise if it is
ever true that some four-dimensional objects, or temporal
parts of some four-dimensional objects, stand in a certain
relation to one another, then it will always be true that
those four-dimensional objects, or temporal parts of four-
dimensional objects, stand in that relation to one another.
What about the 4D view's response to Q9? And what about
the 4D view' s response to the temporal
Platonism/reductionism dispute? Here again there are
different options available to the 4D theorist. The 4D
theorist can say that events are constructions out of
things, or he or she can say that events are ontologically
independent of things. Similarly, the 4D theorist can hold
either temporal Platonism or temporal reductionism . Such
flexibility should, of course, be seen as a virtue of the 4D
view
.
It should be clear by now what the 4D view' s answer to
Q1 will be. There are no genuine A-properties , according to
the 4D view. All talk that appears to be about such
properties is to be analyzed in terms of B— relations. To
say, for example, that Super Bowl XXIII is past is to say
that it stands in the binary relation earlier-than to the
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utterance in question. Similarly for the metric variants of
pastness, as well as futurity and its metric variants. In
general, any sentence, S, that appears to ascribe an A-
property to some entity will be analyzed by a sentence, S',
that instead asserts that that entity stands in some B-
relation to S' (or, perhaps, to the time of S').
These, then, are the 4D view's answers to the nine
questions posed in section 3.2:
The 4D View' s Answers to Q1-Q9
A1 : Neither times, events nor things possess
A-properties in any unanalysable way. All talk
that appears to be about these entities
possessing A-properties is to be analyzed in
terms of B-relations among the relevant
entities
.
A2 : The past- and future-tenses are to be
analyzed away, in favor of the present-tense.
This is to be achieved through the use of
quantified sentences about various four-
dimensional entities and their parts.
Furthermore, all of these present-tensed
sentences express propositions that can be
taken to be tenseless propositions.
A3: In the most fundamental sense of the
expression 'physical object' , physical objects
are four-dimensional entities with spatial as
well as temporal parts. The world is such a
four-dimensional entity; objects in the world
are four-dimensional, "timelike streaks"
through the four-dimensional entity that is
the world; all talk of objects that appears to
be about three-dimensional objects is to be
analyzed in terms of talk about such four-
dimensional entities and their parts.
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A4: A physical object that exists at different
times perdures; i.e., it is a four-dimensional
entity that has different temporal parts at
different times.
A5 : Time is more or less like the dimensions
of space.
A6: Time, like space, is ontologically
symmetrical; there are no objective,
ontological distinctions to be drawn between
the different regions of space-time. The
ontological status of non-present objects is
exactly the same as the ontological status of
present objects.
A7 : We should take the domain of our widest,
most unrestricted quantifiers to be the set of
everything, everywhere, at every time. Of
course, restricted quantification is always
possible
.
A8 : There are, at any given time, singular
propositions about objects that are merely
past, relative to that time, as well as
singular propositions about objects that are
merely future, relative to that time.
A9: The 4D view is neutral with regard to the
question of the ontological status of events
and the event-series.
3 . 4 The 3DRR View
Arthur Prior has been the most notable and resourceful
proponent of the 3D view. Over a period of about fifteen
years, and in the course of three major books and some forty
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papers, he carried out a sustained explication and defense
of the view. Here is a typical passage from Prior:
In a logic with tenses, it is natural to let
[the individual variables] stand for the
'things' of ordinary speech, that is,
'substances' in the old sense, or what w.E.
Johnson calls 'continuants'
,
objects such that
we can say of each of them that once it had
such and such properties and did and suffered
such and such things, that now it - the very
same object - has such and such properties and
does and suffers such and such other things,
and in the future it - the very same object -
will have different properties again, and do
and suffer different things. Tables and chairs
and horses and men are typical 'individuals'
of the sort intended; we may say of such-and-
such a man, for example, that once he was a
boy and now he is grown-up and some day he
will be old, or that yesterday he was ill and
now he is on the mend and tomorrow he will be
quite better. And while in general these
individual objects have parts - men have arms
and legs and so on - and these parts are
themselves objects of a sort, we do not say
that they have temporal parts or phases, in
the way that processes and histories do. My
boyhood, for example, is not a part of me,
though it is a part of my history; and it is
not the case that one part of me was a boy in
New Zealand while another part of me is a man
in England; it is I who was that boy, and I -
the same I - who am the man. ["Time,
Existence, and Identity," pp. 78-79.]
The 3D view's answer to Q3 is that the physical objects
that make up our world are three-dimensional objects; they
do not have temporal parts. And this is to be understood in
combination with the 3D view's answer to Q4. How is it that
physical objects persist through time, according to the 3D
view? Endurance.
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Thus the 3D view is, as Prior points out above, very
close to the way we talk about "things" in ordinary speech.
Whereas the 4D view says that a chair we look at at one time
and a chair we look at at another time cannot really be
identical - they can at most be two different, three-
dimensional slices or stages of a single four-dimensional
object that is a chair - the 3D view says that a chair we
look at at one time and a chair we look at at another time
may really be the same (three-dimensional) object. 31
Where should the 3D theorist stand on the various
controversies between temporal realists and temporal
actualists? I think that there are several different options
available to the 3D theorist in this connection. In order to
discuss these matters, let us adopt the following
abbreviations
:
"3DRR" stands for the 3D view plus the
semantical thesis of temporal realism plus the
metaphysical thesis of temporal realism
;
"3DRMA" stands for the 3D view plus the
semantical thesis of temporal realism plus the
modified metaphysical thesis of temporal
actualism
;
"3DRA" stands for the 3D view plus the
semantical thesis of temporal realism plus the
metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism;
"3DAR" stands for the 3D view plus the
semantical thesis of temporal actualism plus
the metaphysical thesis of temporal realism;
31 In addition to the writings of Prior, statements of the
3D view's answers to Q3 and Q4, and some discussion of
related issues, can be found in van Inwagen, "Four-
Dimensional Objects."
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"3DAMA" stands for the 3D view plus the
semantical thesis of temporal actualism plusthe modified metaphysical thesis of temporal
actualism; and
"3DAA" stands for the 3D view plus the
semantical thesis of temporal actualism plus
the metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism.
These six combinations exhaust the possibilities for
combining the 3D view with the relevant theses from the
rea 1 i s t / actual i s t dispute, but two of the six can be
immediately ruled but as untenable. These two are 3DRMA and
3DRA. For one who holds that the past- and future-tenses are
to be analyzed away in favor of quantification over past and
future objects must have, in his or her ontology, the past
and future resources for carrying out the required analysis.
3DRR, however, is a live option. One who holds this
view will say (i) that the physical objects in the world are
three-dimensional objects that endure; (ii) that the past-
and future-tenses are to be analyzed away; and (iii) that
this analysis can be carried out because it is always
possible to quantify over, and there always exist singular
propositions about, all of the past, present and future
objects that ever did exist, exist now, or will exist. Such
a person will hold, in addition to the three components that
make up 3DRR, the tenseless view of propositions; for it
would be implausible to say both that past- and future-
tensed sentences can be analyzed in terms of present-tensed
sentences and that the resulting present-tensed sentences
express tensed propositions.
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An example will help to clarify this. Consider a tl
token of the sentence type 'Socrates was snub-nosed'
.
According to 3DRR, this token could be translated, at tl, by
a token of the tensed sentence type 'Socrates is snub-nosed
at a time earlier than this token', or by a token of the
tenseless sentence type 'Socrates is snub-nosed at a time
earlier than tl'. Both of these tokens would, according to
3DRR, express the tenseless proposition <beina-snub-nospd-
—
isr—than~ 1 1 , Socrates>, a tenseless, singular
proposition about an individual that is, at tl, merely past.
In general, the 3DRR theorist will take tokens of past-
snd future—tensed sentence types to express propositions
that attribute time— indexed properties — such as beino— snub-
nosed-ear lier-than- tl - to three-dimensional objects.
The 3DRR theorist's answer to Q5 will be that time is
not very similar at all to any dimension of space, for the
simple reason that physical objects endure through time,
whereas they don't do anything of the kind through any
dimension of space.
Meanwhile, the 3DRR theorist will answer Q6-Q8 as
befits one who holds MTR . What about the 3DRR view's
response to Q9? And what about the 3DRR view' s response to
the temporal Platonism/reduct ionism dispute? Here there are
different options available to the 3DRR theorist. The 3DRR
theorist can say that events are constructions out of
things, or he or she can say that events are ontologically
independent of things. Similarly, the 3DRR theorist can
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consistently hold either temporal Platonism or temporal
reductionism. Such flexibility should, of course, be seen as
a virtue of the 3DRR view.
How, finally, will the 3DRR theorist answer Ql? Well,
since the 3DRR theorist believes that past- and future-
tensed sentences can be analyzed in terms of present-tensed
sentences that express tenseless propositions, he or she
will have no truck with A-properties
. A tl token of a
sentence type like 'Socrates is past', for example,
expresses, according to this view, the proposition cbeina-
earlier-than-tl
,
Socrates>. In general, sentences that
appear to ascribe A-properties will be analyzed in this way,
i.e., in terms of B-relations.
Here, then, is how the 3DRR theorist will answer the
nine questions posed in section 3.2 above:
The 3DRR View' s Answers to Q1-Q9
A1 : Times (if there are any), events (if there
are any) and things do not possess A-
properties in some way that is not analyzable
in terms of B-relations. Insofar as there are
true sentence tokens that appear to ascribe A-
properties to times, events or things, these
tokens express tenseless propositions about B-
relations obtaining among the relevant
entities
.
A2 : The past- and future-tenses are to be
analyzed in terms of the present-tense.
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A3: In the most fundamental sense of the
expression 'physical object'
,
physical objects
have three dimensions, and they do not have
temporal parts.
A4 : Physical objects persist in virtue of
their endurance.
A5 : Time is in general not similar to the
three dimensions of space; it is a one-of-a-
kind dimension. The fact that physical objects
endure through time, but do not do any
analogous thing through any dimension of
space, ensures this.
A6 : Time is ontologically symmetrical, because
all past, present and future objects are on
the same ontological footing.
A7 : We should take the set of all past,
present and future objects to be the domain of
our widest, most unrestricted quantifiers.
A8 : There are singular propositions about
objects that are merely past, as well as
singular propositions about objects that are
merely future.
A9: 3DRR is neutral with regard to the issue
of event Platonism/reduct ionism
.
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3
. 5 The 3DAR View
Next consider 3DAR, the combination of the 3D view with
the semantical thesis of temporal actualism and the
metaphysical thesis of temporal realism. One who holds this
view will say (i) that the physical objects in the world are
three-dimensional objects that endure; (ii) that the past-
and future-tenses are primitive; and (iii) that it is always
possible to quantify over, and there always exist singular
propositions about, all of the past, present and future
objects that ever did exist, exist now, or will exist. Such
a person will hold, in addition to the three components that
make up 3DAR, the tensed view of propositions; for anyone
who holds the semantical thesis of temporal actualism must
also hold the view that propositions have truth-values at
times (because otherwise it would be possible to analyze
past- and future-tensed sentences in terms of present-tensed
sentences)
.
If the past- and future-tenses are not to be analyzed
away, then how are they to be treated? Prior has shown that
they can be treated in the manner of such sentential adverbs
and modal operators as 'allegedly' and 'possibly'. 32 Thus,
for example, the sentence type 'Socrates was snub-nosed'
will be treated as equivalent to 'It has been the case that
(Socrates is snub-nosed)'. This is of course a tensed
32 See, for example, Prior, "Changes in Events and Changes
in Things."
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sentence type whose tokens express a tensed proposition,
namely, the proposition <was~t rue . <beincr-snub—nosed .
Socrates>>
.
In general, the 3DAR theorist will take tokens of past-
and future-tensed sentence types to be unanalyzably tensed
tokens that express tensed propositions attributing various
properties (but not necessarily time— indexed properties) to
other tensed propositions and to three-dimensional objects.
The 3DAR theorist's answer to Q5, like the 3DRR
theorist's answer to that question, will be that time is not
very similar at all to any dimension of space, for the
simple reason that physical objects endure through time, but
not through any dimension of space.
Meanwhile, the 3DAR theorist will answer Q6-Q8 as
befits one who holds MTR. What about the 3DAR view's
response to Q9? And what about the 3DAR view' s response to
the temporal Platonism/reductionism dispute? Here, as with
the 4D and 3DRR theorists, there are different options
available to the 3DAR theorist. The 3DAR theorist can say
that events are constructions out of things, or he or she
can say that events are ontologically independent of things.
Similarly, the 3DAR theorist can consistently hold either
temporal Platonism or temporal reduct ionism
.
How, finally, will the 3DAR theorist answer Ql? Well,
since the 3DAR theorist believes that past- and future-
tensed sentences cannot be analyzed in terms of present-
tensed sentences that express tenseless propositions, but,
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rather must be taken to involve primitive tense operators,
and, thus, to express tensed propositions that attribute
properties like was-true to other tensed propositions, the
3DAR theorist is committed to the claim that A-properties
cannot be analyzed in terms of B-relations.
hsre, then, is how the 3DAR theorist will answer the
nine questions posed in section 3.2 above:
The 3DAR View' s Answers to Q1-Q9
A1 : Times (if there are any), events (if there
are any) and things possess A-properties in a
way that is not analyzable in terms of B-
relations. For insofar as there are true
sentence tokens that appear to ascribe A-
properties to times, events or things, these
tokens are best understood as involving
primitive tense operators, and they express
tensed propositions that cannot be analyzed
merely in terms of B-relations obtaining among
the relevant entities.
A2 : The past- and future-tenses cannot be
analyzed in terms of the present-tense.
A3: In the most fundamental sense of the
expression 'physical object'
,
physical objects
have three dimensions, and they do not have
temporal parts.
A4 : Physical objects persist in virtue of
their endurance.
A5 : Time is in general not similar to the
three dimensions of space; it is a one-of-a-
kind dimension. The fact that physical objects
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endure through time, but do not do any
analogous thing through any dimension of
space, ensures this.
A6. Time is ontologically symmetrical, because
all past, present and future objects are onthe same ontological footing.
A? : We should take the set of all past,
present and future objects to be the domain of
our widest, most unrestricted quantifiers.
A8 : There are singular propositions about
objects that are merely past, as well as
singular propositions about objects that are
merely future.
A9: 3DAR is neutral with regard to the issue
of event Platonism/reductionism.
3 . 6 The 3DAMA View
Now consider 3DAMA, the combination of the 3D view with
the semantical thesis of temporal actualism and the modified
metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism. One who holds
this view will say (i) that the physical objects in the
world are three-dimensional objects that endure; (ii) that
the past- and future-tenses are primitive; and (iii) that it
is always possible to quantify over, and there always exist
singular propositions about, all of the past and present
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objects that ever did exist or exist now, but that it is
never possible to quantify over, and there never exist
s i £" propositions about, objects that are merely future.
Such a person will hold, in addition to the three components
that make up 3DAMA, the tensed view of propositions; for, as
I said above, anyone who holds the semantical thesis of
temporal actualism must also hold the view that propositions
have truth-values at times (because otherwise it would be
possible to analyze past- and future-tensed sentences in
terms of present-tensed sentences)
.
In general, the 3DAMA theorist will take tokens of
past- and future-tensed sentence types to be unanalyzably
tensed tokens that express tensed propositions attributing
various properties (but not necessarily time-indexed
properties) to other tensed propositions and to past and
present three-dimensional objects, in something very much
like the manner of the 3DAR theorist.
The 3DAMA theorist's answer to Q5, like the 3DRR and
3DAR theorists' answer to that question, will be that time
is not very similar at all to any dimension of space, for
the simple reason that physical objects endure through time,
but not through any dimension of space. But the 3DAMA
theorist will have an additional reason for saying that time
is not similar to space: time, unlike space, according to to
the 3DAMA theorist, is ontologically asymmetrical. For the
3DAMA theorist will answer Q6-Q8 as befits one who holds the
modified metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism. Hence,
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he or she will hold that there is an enormous difference
between the past and the present, on the one hand, and the
future, on the other hand, whereas there is no analogous
distinction to be drawn between any of the regions of space.
What about the 3DAMA view's response to Q9? And what
about the 3DAMA view' s response to the temporal
Platonism/reductionism dispute? Here, as in the case of the
other views, there are different options available to the
3DAMA theorist. The 3DAMA theorist can say that events are
constructions out of things, or he or she can say that
events are ontologically independent of things. Similarly,
the 3DAMA theorist can consistently hold either temporal
Platonism or temporal reductionism. Notice, however, that
even a 3DAMA theorist who holds both event and temporal
Platonism will have to find some way of analyzing away talk
that appears to be about merely future events and/or times;
for the 3DAMA theorist thinks that there are really no such
entities
.
How, finally, will the 3DAMA theorist answer Ql? In
exactly the manner of the 3DAR theorist. Since the 3DAMA
theorist believes that past- and future-tensed sentences
cannot be analyzed in terms of present-tensed sentences that
express tenseless propositions, but, rather must be taken to
involve primitive tense operators, and, thus, to express
tensed propositions that attribute properties like was -tru e
to other tensed propositions, the 3DAMA theorist is
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committed to the claim that A-properties cannot be analyzed
in terms of B-relations.
Here, then, is how the 3DAMA theorist will answer the
nine questions posed in section 3.2 above:
The 3DAMA View' s Answers to Q1-Q9
A1 : Times (if there are any), events (if there
are any) and things possess A-properties in a
way that is not analyzable in terms of B-
relations. For insofar as there are true
sentence tokens that appear to ascribe A-
properties to times, events or things, these
tokens involve primitive tense operators, and
they express tensed propositions that cannot
be analyzed merely in terms of B-relations
obtaining among the relevant entities.
A2 : The past- and future-tenses cannot be
analyzed in terms of the present-tense.
A3: In the most fundamental sense of the
expression 'physical object'
,
physical objects
have three dimensions, and they do not have
temporal parts.
A4 : Physical objects persist in virtue of
their endurance.
A5 : Time is in general not similar to the
three dimensions of space; it is a one-of-a-
kind dimension. The fact that physical objects
endure through time, but do not do any
analogous thing through any dimension of
space, ensures this. So does the fact that
there are enormous ontological differences
between the past and the present, on the one
hand, and the future, on the other hand.
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A6: Time is ontologically asymmetrical; thepast and the present are real, but the futureis not.
A7 : We should take the set of all past andpresent objects to be the domain of our
widest, most unrestricted quantifiers.
Ad: There are singular propositions about
objects that are merely past, but there are no
singular propositions about objects that are
merely future.
A9: 3DAMA is neutral with regard to the issue
of event Platonism/reductionism.
3.7 The 3DAA View
Finally, consider 3DAA, the combination of the 3D view
with the semantical thesis of temporal actualism and the
metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism. One who holds
this view will say (i) that the physical objects in the
world are three-dimensional objects that endure; (ii) that
the past- and future-tenses are primitive; and (iii) that it
is always possible to quantify over, and there always exist
singular propositions about, all of the present objects that
exist, but that it is never possible to quantify over, and
there never exist singular propositions about, objects that
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are either merely past or merely future. Such a person will
hold, in addition to the three components that make up 3DAA,
the tensed view of propositions; for, as I said above,
anyone who holds the semantical thesis of temporal actualism
must also hold the view that propositions have truth-values
at times (because otherwise it would be possible to analyze
past- and future-tensed sentences in terms of present-tensed
sentences)
.
In general, the 3DAA theorist will take tokens of past-
and future-tensed sentence types to be unanalyzably tensed
tokens that express tensed propositions attributing various
properties (but not necessarily time-indexed properties) to
other tensed propositions and to present three-dimensional
objects, in something very much like the manner of the 3DAMA
theorist (with, of course, the notable difference that the
3DAA theorist will not allow quantification over, or
singular propositions about, merely past objects)
.
The 3DAA theorist's answer to Q5 will be that time is
not very similar at all to any dimension of space, for the
simple reason that physical objects endure through time, but
not through any dimension of space. But the 3DAA theorist,
like the 3DAMA theorist, will have an additional reason for
saying that time is not similar to space. For the 3DAA
theorist will answer Q6-Q8 as befits one who holds the
metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism. Hence, he or she
hold that there is an enormous difference between the
present, on the one hand, and the past and the future, on
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the other hand, whereas there is no analogous distinction to
be drawn between any of the regions of space.
What about the 3DAA view's response to Q9? Here, as in
the case of the other views, there are different options
available to the 3DAA theorist. The 3DAA theorist can say
that events are constructions out of things, or he or she
can say that events are ontologically independent of things.
It is worth noting, however, that Prior, who is the
leading proponent of 3DAA, has made it clear that he prefers
event reductionism
. He says in "Changes in Events and
Changes in Things" that
(3) It is now six years since it was the case
that I am falling out of a punt,
could be re-written as
(4) My falling out of a punt has receded six
years into the past.
He then says that
This suggests that something called an event,
my falling out of a punt, has gone through a
performance called receding into the past, and
moreover has been going through this
performance even after it has ceased to exist,
i.e. after it has stopped happening. But of
course (4) is just a paraphrase of (3), and
like (3) is not about any objects except me
and that punt - there is no reason to believe
in the existence either now or six years ago
of a further object called 'my falling out of
a punt'
.
What I am suggesting is that what looks like
talk about events is really at bottom talk
about things, and what looks like talk about
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changes in events is really just slightly more
complicated talk about changes in things.
["Changes in Events and Changes in Things,"
pp. 10-11.]
In terms of the kind of propositions that I have been
talking about, Prior's position is that the sentences in
question, at the time Prior wrote the passage, both
expressed the proposition <was-t rue- six-years-aao . < fallina-
out-of-a-punt
,
Prior>>, a tensed, singular proposition about
Prior that was, at 'the time, true. They did not, however,
express any proposition like the following cbeino-six-vears-
past , Prior's falling out of a punt>, simply because Prior
doesn't think there really is any such entity as Prior's
falling out of a punt.
Still, although I think that it makes sense for an
advocate of 3DAA to accept event reductionism, and although
I myself am inclined toward both 3DAA and event
reductionism, and although Prior, the most famous proponent
of 3DAA, happened to hold event reductionism, I think that
3DAA is basically neutral with regard to this issue. I. don't
think it can be shown that one who holds 3DAA must, or even
should, accept event reductionism. Similarly, I think that
3DAA is basically neutral with regard to the temporal
Platonism/reductionism controversy. It is worth noting,
however, that even a 3DAA theorist who holds both event and
temporal Platonism will have to find some way of analyzing
away talk that appears to be about merely past or merely
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future events and/or times; for the 3DAA theorist thinks
that there are really no such entities.
How, finally, will the 3DAA theorist answer Ql? in
something very much like the manner of the 3DAMA theorist.
Since the 3DAA theorist believes that past - and future-
tensed sentences cannot be analyzed in terms of present-
tensed sentences that express tenseless propositions, but,
rather must be taken to involve primitive tense operators,
and, thus, to express tensed propositions that attribute
properties like was-true to other tensed propositions, the
3DAA theorist is committed to the claim that A-properties
cannot be analyzed in terms of B-relations.
Here, then, is how the 3DAA theorist will answer the
nine questions posed in section 3.2 above:
The 3DAA View' s Answers to Q1-Q9
A1 : Times (if there are any), events (if there
are any) and things possess A-properties in a
way that is not analyzable in terms of B-
relations. For insofar as there are true
sentence tokens that appear to ascribe A-
properties to times, events or things, these
tokens involve primitive tense operators, and
they express tensed propositions that cannot
be analyzed merely in terms of B-relations
obtaining among the relevant entities.
A2 : The past- and future-tenses cannot be
analyzed in terms of the present-tense.
123
A3: In the most fundamental sense of the
expression 'physical object', physical objects
have three dimensions, and they do not have
temporal parts.
A4 : Physical objects persist in virtue of
their endurance.
A5 : Time is in general not similar to the
three dimensions of space; it is a one-of-a-
kind dimension. The fact that physical objects
endure through time, but do not do any
analogous thing through any dimension of
space, ensures this. So does the fact that
there are enormous ontological differences
between the present, on the one hand, and the
past and the future, on the other hand.
A6 : Time is ontologically symmetrical; the
present is real, but the past and the future
are not
.
A7 : We should take the set of all present
objects to be the domain of our widest, most
unrestricted quantifiers.
A8 : There are singular propositions about
objects that are present, but there are no
singular propositions about objects that are
merely past, or merely future.
A9: 3DAA is neutral with regard to the issue
of event Platonism/reductionism (but we note
that Prior, to name one notable 3DAAist, held
event reduct ionism)
.
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3 . 8 Conclusion
If what I have said above is correct, then there are
five different packages of views that one may hold in
response to the question 'Does time pass?'
. Which of these
five should count as affirmative, and which should count as
negative, answers to this question?
Well, I think it's clear that the 4D view constitutes a
negative answer to the question. One who holds the 4D view
will hold TLVP and LNP . Also, such a person will have good
reasons for maintaining something like SPT. In general, such
a person will have good reasons for saying that there is no
important distinction between time and space in virtue of
which it is true to say that time passes but space does not.
What about 3DRR? Here I must admit to some uncertainty
about how to classify 3DRR. It seems to me that a 3DRR
theorist can justifiably deny SPT, even though he or she
holds TLVP and may or may not hold LNP. After all, one who
holds 3DRR thinks that there is an important difference
between time and space: objects endure through time, but
they do not do the analogous thing through space. Thus, if
rejection of SPT is what characterizes the view that time
passes, then I think it is appropriate for a 3DRR theorist
to maintain that time passes. But as will be seen in Chapter
5 below, there is at least one other way of characterizing
the view that time passes, and according to this other way
125
it is not appropriate for a 3DRR theorist to maintain that
time passes.
The 3DAR theorist can add to the claim about objects
enduring through time the claim that the temporal tenses are
unanalyzable
. Given this latter claim, he or she will also
hold TDVP; so there are, on this view, plenty of differences
between time and space in virtue of which it is true to say
that time passes but space does not.
The 3DAMA and 3DAA theorists will of course have still
more reasons for claiming that time passes.
All told, then, there is one principal way of
maintaining that time does not pass (the 4D view)
,
one view
that may or may not count as a way of maintaining that time
passes (3DRR)
,
and three distinct ways of maintaining that
time does pass (3DAR, 3DAMA and 3DAA)
.
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CHAPTER 4 : FORMAL MATTERS
4 . 1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to consider, in the case of
each of the views formulated above, a formal language and a
semantics that would be suited to that view. I have two main
reasons for wanting to do this. First, doing so will, I
hope, help to make clear what are some of the differences
among the alternative views. And second, I will present my
reasons, in the final chapter, for preferring 3DAA over the
other views, and those reasons will depend upon, among other
things, certain differences between the semantics that I
propose for the language of 3DAA and the semantics that I
propose for the languages of its 3D rivals.
In the case of each of the five views formulated above
I will (a) describe some formal language that would be
suited to that view, (b) give a semantics for that language
that also suits the view, and (c) say something about the
way in which sentences of English would be translated into
the formal language. Each of the formal languages considered
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will be a first order, predicate logic; some will involve
tense operators. But I won't get into questions about axiom
schemata or rules of inference in any case. Moreover, in the
case of each view that I will consider, the language and
semantics that I propose as suitable for that view will be
just one of several such possibilities. 1
Since each of the formal languages I will consider
consists of a predicate logic, each language will
necessarily be meant to correspond to just a fragment of
English; in particular, each of the formal languages
considered will be incapable of capturing our use, in
English, of indexicals such as 'here'
,
'there'
,
'you' and
'I' .
4.2 A Formal Language, with Semantics, for 4D
The 4D theorist's ontology consists of (i) all of the
4D objects and temporal parts of 4D objects in the 4D world;
(ii) all kinds of properties of, and relations obtaining
among, those objects and parts; and (iii) ordered sets
composed of things in the 4D theorist's ontology, some of
which ordered sets will be propositions. In addition, the 4D
theorist may have, in his or her ontology, such entities as
1 Counting an infinite number as several.
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times, depending on his or her view with regard to the
temporal Platonism/reductionism dispute. For our purposes it
will be convenient to assume that the 4D ontology does
indeed contain times, and that the set of times is ordered
by the relation earlier than
,
2 because the prima facie 4D
analyses of many English sentences will involve
quantification over such times. It of course remains open to
the 4D theorist to analyze away this apparent quantification
over times, in favor of quantification over such entities as
events, or temporal parts, which are themselves ordered by
the relation earlier than. The 4D language that I will
propose, then, will have as its domain of discourse the set
consisting all of the things in the 4D theorist's ontology,
including times.
Among the constraints on what the 4D language can be
like are the 4D theorist's commitments to TLVP and STR. The
commitment to STR means that the 4D language will contain no
tense operators, i.e., no special, intensional operators for
the purpose of handling temporal discourse. The commitment
to TLVP means that all of the propositions expressed by the
sentences of the 4D language will be tenseless propositions.
These two factors, plus the absence of indexicals, mean that
the 4D language can be composed exclusively of tenseless
sentence-types, so that each such sentence-type of the
language expresses some tenseless proposition, if it
expresses a proposition at all.
2 See pp. 11-12 above
.
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The 4D language that I will propose will be a simple
predicate calculus with identity, and it will contain
predicates corresponding to virtually all ordinary, common-
sense properties and relations. In addition, translations of
sentences about temporal matters from English into the 4D
language will make use of the following primitive, temporal
predicates (to be understood according to their English
readings )
:
3
T!x (x is a time)
P^xy (x is a temporal part of y)
E^xy (x is (completely) earlier than y)
L 2xy (x is (completely) later than y) .4
Translations from English into the 4D language will also
flasks use of the following temporal predicates defined in
terms of the primitive ones (also to be understood according
to their English readings)
:
C 2xy =df ~Ez { [P 2 zx & (z<y v z>y) ] v
[P 2 zy & (z<x v z>x) ]
}
(x is co-extensive with y)
A2xy =df T!y & C 2xy
(x is at y)
3 I am here adopting what amounts to the temporal analogue
of the method by which David Lewis uses special modal
predicates ( 'x is a possible world'
,
'x is in possible world
y'
,
and 'x is a counterpart of y' ) in order to analyze modal
discourse in his "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal
Logic." An alternative way of doing roughly the same thing
would be to make use of a two-sorted language, with one sort
of variable ranging over things and another ranging over
times
.
4 For the sake of convenience I will adopt the following
notational conventions: 'x=y' will stand for 'I 2xy' (to be
read as 'x is identical to y' )
,
'x<y' will stand for 'E 2xy'
,
and 'x>y' will stand for 'L 2xy' .
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P 3xyz =df P 2xz & A2xy
(x is the y-temporal part of z)
.
5
Each sentence token of English will be translated into
some sentence type of the predicate calculus of the 4D
language; some of the latter sentence types will involve
special temporal predicates, and contants that refer to such
entities as temporal parts and times, but no sentence type
of the 4D language will involve any tense operator. Then in
5 A full-blown logic in which the 4D theorist could handle
temporal discourse would of course involve, in addition to
some typical logical axioms and some special axioms
governing identity, some additional special axioms governing
the temporal predicates of the 4D language. Such a logic
might include the following temporal axioms:
A1 : AxAyAz [ (A2xy & A2xz) --> (y=z) ]
(Nothing is at two times)
A2 : AxAy[P 2xy --> Ez (A2yz) ]
(Whatever has a temporal part is at a time)
A3: AxAyAz [ (A2xy & A2 zy & P 2xz) --> x=z]
(Nothing is a temporal part of anything else at
its time)
A4 : Ax(P 2xx)
(Each thing is a temporal part of itself)
A5 : AxAy {
C
2xy v Ez[P 2 zx & (z<y v z>y) ] v
Ez[P 2 zy & (z<x v z>x) ]
}
(Each pair of things is temporally related
to one another)
A6: Ax(C 2xx)
(Each thing is co-extensive with itself)
,
in addition to axioms that make the relations earlier than
and later than transitive, asymmetrical and irreflexive, as
well as axioms that make the relation co-extensive with
transitive, symmetrical and reflexive.
In keeping with the analogy between this way of
analyzing temporal discourse and the way in which Lewis
analyzes modal discourse, the 4D theorist who holds temporal
reductionism may want to say that, just as possible worlds
are (according to Lewis) maximal mereological sums of
compossible individuals, so times are maximal mereological
sums of co-extensive individuals.
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the semantics for the 4D language, sentence types will be
assigned truth-values simpliciter, as per TLVP
.
There is a possible complication here. When
philosophers do formal semantics in the normal way, they
specify truth-conditions for sentences, not propositions.
Some semant icists
,
no doubt, do not believe in propositions,
and for them it is thus appropriate to give truth-conditions
for sentences rather than propositions. In this essay,
however, I am assuming that there are propositions, and that
they are the primary bearers of truth and falsity. Does this
mean that I should not be doing semantics in the normal way?
I don't think so. I think that it can make sense to talk
about assigning truth-values to sentences, even if we have
agreed that propositions are the primary bearers of truth
and falsity. For we can say that the truth-value assigned to
a sentence is (really) determined by the truth-value of the
proposition expressed by that sentence.
Accordingly, the 4D semantics will be such that in each
4D model, constants of the language will be assigned values
from among the objects in the 4D ontology, while predicates
will be assigned values from among sets constructed out of
the objects in the 4D ontology. Then the truth-values of
sentences will be determined in the normal, set-theoretic
way, i.e., in the manner suggested by Tarski. 6
Note that it will greatly simplify things if we allow
the 4D theorist to assume that there are no vague
6 Tarski, "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages."
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predicates. I think that there i s no harm in so doing; in
any case the 4D theorist's opponents will be happy enough
about granting him or her this assumption, provided that
they are also allowed to make it (they will be, in the
following sections)
.
The 4D language, then, can simply be an old-fashioned,
purely extensional, predicate calculus; and the semantics
for the 4D language can be of the familiar kind suited to
such a language. What follows is such a language and such a
semantics
.
7
THE 4D LANGUAGE
Primitive Vocabulary
(i) Sentential letters: S
x ,
S 2 , ...
(ii) Individual constants: a, b, ..., u, a,, b lf ...,
u lf ...
(iii) Predicate letters: A 1
,
B 1
, ..., A2 , B 2 , ..., A 1 ,,
B 1 !, . . A2 X , B 2 ,, . . .
(iv) Variables: x, y, z, x lf y x , z lt ...
(v) Quantifiers: A, E.
(vi) Logical connectives: ~, &, v, -->, <-->.
(vii) Parentheses: (, ).
Syntax
(i) Each individual constant and each variable is a
term.
(ii) Any finite string of primitive symbols is an
expression .
7 No element of what follows is original. Each element is
pirated; some elements are pirated from Dowty, Wall and
Peters, Introduction to Montague Semantics; some from Mates,
Elementary Logic; and some from lectures by Michael Jubien.
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(iii) Any sentential letter is an atomic formula
,
and
1 A is a predicate letter and t lr ..., t L are terms, thenA (t lr . .., t t ) is an atomic formula.
(iv) If A is an atomic formula, then A is a well-formedformula (wff) .
(v) If A is any wff, then ~ (A) is a wff.
(vi) If A and B are any wff, then (A & B) is a wff.
(v|i) If A and B are any wff, then (A v B) is a wff.
(viii) If A and B are any wff, then (A — > B) is a wff.
(ix) If A and B are any wff, then (A <--> B) is a wff.
(x) If A is any wff, and v is any variable, then Av(A)
and Ev(A) are wffs.
(xi) An expression is a wff only if it can be obtained
by a finite number of applications of steps (iii)-(x) above.
(xii) An occurrence of a variable, v, in a wff, A, is
bound if it is (a) immmediately after an occurrence of a
quantifier, or (b) in a wff of either the form Av(B) or
Ev(B), for some wff B; otherwise v is free.
(xiii) A sentence is a wff in which no variable occurs
free
.
8
Semantics
M is a 4D model =df M is an ordered pair, <D, f>, that
meets the following conditions:
(i) D is a non-empty set; and
(ii) f is a function whose domain is the set of all
sentential letters, constants and predicate letters of the
4D language, and which meets the following conditions:
(a) if S is a sentential letter then f (S) is one
of the truth-values, truth and falsity;
(b) if a is a constant then f(a) is either some
member of D or else nothing; and
(c) if A 1 is a predicate letter then f (A 1 ) is a
subset of D 1 (i.e., the i-nary Cartesian product of D)
.
In order to give truth-conditions for sentences of the
4D language, it is first necessary to define the following
notions
:
Let some model, M, be given. Then g is a value
assignment for M =df g is a function assigning to each
8 Sometimes in what follows I will use square brackets
and/or curly brackets in place of parentheses; also I will
sometimes drop off the outermost pair of parentheses of some
wf f
.
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variable of the 4D language some value from the domain of M.
Further, let g and g' be two value assignments for M, and
let u be some variable. Then g is a u-variant of g' =df g
and g' differ at most in what they assign to u.
Next we define the notion of the semantic value of a
constant, predicate letter or variable of the 4D language,
relative to a model, M, and a value assignment, g, as
follows: (a) if a is a constant then the semantic value of a
relative to M and g is f (a)
;
(b) if A 1 is a predicate
letter then the semantic value of A 1 relative to M and g is
f (A 1 ) ; and (c) if u is a variable then the semantic value of
u relative to M and g is g(u)
.
It will be convenient to adopt the following notational
convention: if M is a model, g a value assignment for M, and
@ a constant, predicate letter, or variable of the 4D
language, then '[@] M,g ' is to be read as 'the semantic value
of (? relative to M and g' .
Now, our goal is to be able to say what is required in
order for some sentence, S, to be true with respect to some
model, M. As an intermediate step along the way toward
specifying such a truth-condition, we must first specify the
conditions for a wff's being true with respect to a model,
M, and a value assignment, g. These intermediate truth-
conditions are as follows:
(i) if S is a sentential letter, then S is true with
respect to M,g if f (S) is truth; otherwise S is false with
respect to M,g;
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(ii) if S is an atomic formula, i.e., if s is AMt
. . • t for some predicate and terms, then S is true with
respect to M,g if
..., [t i ]M.g> i s a member of[A 1 ] otherwise 5 is false with respect to M,g;
(iii) if s is ~A for some sentence, A, then S is true
with respect to M,g if A is not true; otherwise S is false
with respect to M, g;
(iv) if S is A v B for some sentences, A and B, then sis true with respect to M
, g if either A is true or else B is
true; otherwise S is false with respect to M,g;
(v) if S is A & B for some sentences, A and B, then S
is true with respect to M, g if both A and B are true;
otherwise S is false with respect to M,g;
(vi) if S is A — > B for some sentences, A and B, then
S is true with respect to M,g if either A is false or else B
is true; otherwise S is false with respect to M,g;
(vii) if S is A <--> B for some sentences, A and B,
then S is true with respect to M,g if either A and B are
both true or else A and B are both false; otherwise S is
false with respect to M,g;
(viii) if S is Au (A) for some wff, A, and variable, u,
then S is true with respect to M, g if for every g' such that
g' is a u-variant of g, A is true with respect to M, g' ;
otherwise S is false with respect to M,g ; and
(ix) if S is Eu(A) for some wff, A, and variable, u,
then S is true with respect to Mr g if for some g' such that
g' is a u-variant of g, A is true with respect to M, g' ;
otherwise S is false with respect to M,g.
Now, finally, we can specify the truth-condition for a
sentence with respect to a 4D model simpliciter
.
Accordingly, let some 4D model, M, be given. Then for any
sentence, S, S is true with respect to M if for every value
assignment, g, for M, S is true with respect to M, g;
otherwise S is false with respect to M.
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Some examples will help to illustrate a few important
points about the 4D language and its relationship to
English. Consider the following sentence tokens (call the
time of their occurrence "tl")
.
(1) Joe Montana is a quarterback.
(2) Johnny Unitas was a quarterback.
(3) Socrates was wise.
(4) Woody Allen will be president of the U.S.
(5) The president of the U.S. in one hundred
years will be wise.
According to the 4D view, these are to be analyzed in
terms of quantification over times and temporal parts of
objects. In order to see how this will work, consider some
model, Ml, of the 4D language that represents the actual,
four-dimensional world; that is, some model whose first
member (i.e., whose domain) is the set of all of the
concrete, four-dimensional objects of the concrete, four-
dimensional world (and all of the temporal parts of those
objects)
,
together with all of the times of that world, and
whose second member is a function, f, such that for each
actual n-place property or relation, Rn , there is some
predicate letter, $n , such that for any actual objects, x lf
..., x
n ,
<x t , ..., x n> is a member of f($n ) just in case x lf
..., x stand in the relation Rn to one another in the
actual world.
According to the 4D view, (1) expresses the tenseless
proposition that Montana has a tl-temporal part that is a
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quarterback. So (1) can be translated into 4D-style English
as follows:
(la) There is an x such that (x is the tl-
temporal part of Montana and x is a
quarterback)
.
Note that, given what has been said above about 'P 3 ' and Ml,
it follows that Ml assigns to that predicate the three -place
relation that relates a temporal part, p, a time, t, and a
four-dimensional object, o, just in case p is the t-temporal
part of o. Hence (la) can go into the following sentence of
the 4D language,
(la') Ex(P 3xt
x
m & Q 3 x) ,
which will be true relative to Ml provided that Ml makes the
appropriate assignments to 'm' (Montana)
,
't
:
' (tl)
,
and 'Q 1 '
( { <x>
:
x is a quarterback}).
Similarly, (2)
,
according to the 4D view, expresses the
tenseless proposition that Unitas has a temporal part
earlier than tl that is a quarterback. Thus (2) can be
translated into 4D-style English as follows:
(2a) There is an x and there is a y such that
(y is a time earlier than tl and x is the y-
temporal part of Unitas and x is a
quarterback)
.
(2a) can then go into the following sentence of the 4D
language,
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(2a') ExEy (T 1y & y<t x & P 3xyu & QiX ) ,
which will be true relative to Ml provided that Ml also
makes the appropriate assignments to '<' ({<x,y>: x is
earlier than y}) and 'u' (Unitas)
.
(3), according to the 4D view, expresses the tenseless
proposition that Socrates has a temporal part ealier than tl
that is wise; thus it can be translated into 4D-style
English as follows:
(3a) There is an x and there is a y such that
(y is a time earlier than tl and x is the y-
temporal part of Socrates and x is wise)
.
(3a) can then go into the following sentence of the 4D
language.
(3a') ExEy (T 1y & y<t x & P 3xys & W 3x) ,
which will be true relative to Ml provided that Ml also
makes the appropriate assignments to 's' (Socrates) and 'W 1 '
( { <x> : x is wise } )
.
(4) expresses the tenseless proposition that Allen has
a temporal part later than tl that is president, according
to the 4D view; hence it can be translated into 4D-style
English as follows:
(4a) There is an x and there is a y such that
(y is a time later than tl and x is the y-
temporal part of Allen and x is president)
.
139
(4a) can then go into the following sentence of the 4D
language,
(4a') ExEy (T 1y & y>t x & P 3xya & P 3 x) ,
which will be true relative to Ml provided that Ml also
makes the appropriate assignments to '>' ({<x,y>: x is later
than y}), 'a' (Allen) and 'P 1 ' ({<x>: x is president of the
U.S.}).
Finally, (5)
,
according to the 4D view, expresses the
tenseless proposition that the person who is president of
the U.S. one hundred years later than tl is wise; hence (5)
can be translated into 4D-style English as follows:
(5a) The person who is president of the U.S.
one hundred years later than tl is wise.
(5a) can then go into the following sentence of the 4D
language,
( 5a ' ) W 1p^oo •
which will be true relative to Ml provided that Ml also
makes the appropriate assignment to 'p 100 ' (the person who is
president of the U.S. one hundred years later than tj_) .
Note that the propositions expressed by the above
sentences of the 4D language (relative to Ml) are all
singular propositions; for each of those propositions
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entails the existence of some concrete, four-dimensional
object. In general, each meaningful, declarative sentence
token of English expresses some tenseless proposition,
according to the 4D view. And each tenseless proposition
can, acording to that view, be expressed by some sentence
type of the 4D language, which sentence type will then be
true relative to any one of the appropriate class of models
(i.e., those that represent the actual world, and also give
appropriate assignments to the predicate letters and
constants of the sentence type in question)
.
4.3 A Formal Language, with Semantics, for 3DRR
The 3DRR theorist's ontology consists of (i) all of the
3D objects that have ever existed, exist now, or will ever
exist in the 3D world; (ii) all kinds of properties of, and
relations obtaining among, those objects (including many
time-indexed properties and relations) ; and (iii) ordered
sets composed of things in the 3D theorist's ontology, some
of which ordered sets will be propositions. The 3DRR
language that I will propose, then, will have as its domain
of discourse the set consisting all of the things in the
3DRR theorist's ontology.
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Among the constraints on what the 3DRR language can be
like are the 3DRR theorist's commitments to STR and TLVP
.
The commitment to STR means that the 3DRR language will
contain no tense operators, i.e., no special, intensional
operators for the purpose of handling temporal discourse.
The commitment to TLVP means that all of the propositions
expressed by these sentences will be tenseless propositions.
These two factors, plus the absence of indexicals, mean that
the 3DRR language can be composed exclusively of tenseless
sentence-types
,
so that each such sentence—type expresses
some tenseless proposition, if it expresses a proposition at
all
.
The 3DRR language that I will propose will be a simple
predicate calculus, in form and structure exactly like the
4D language. Unlike the 4D language, however, the 3DRR
language will not contain predicates corresponding to most
ordinary, common-sense properties and relations; rather, the
3DRR language will contain predicates corresponding to all
sorts of time-indexed properties and relations. 9 Moreover,
translations of sentences about temporal matters from
English into the 3DRR language will not make use of the
special temporal predicates of the 4D language; rather,
translations of such sentences into the 3DRR language will
make use of predicates corresponding to time-indexed
9 There is no special need for the 3DRR language to contain
a predicate for identity, but no doubt various
considerations unrelated to the issues discussed in this
essay will lead the 3DRR theorist to include such a
predicate in the 3DRR language.
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properties and relations. Then the truth-values of 3DRR
sentence types will be determined in the normal way.
In short, the 3DRR theorist wants a language and
semantics that are, in form, exactly like the language and
semantics of the 4D theorist. The only disagreement between
these two theorists will be over the domains of the models
that they think represent the real world. Whereas the 4D
theorist thinks that each of the models that represents the
real world is one whose first member (i.e., whose domain) is
the set consisting of all of the concrete, four-dimensional
objects of the concrete, four-dimensional world (plus all of
the temporal parts of those objects, and all of the times)
,
together with various common-sense properties and relations,
the 3DRR theorist thinks that each such model is one whose
first member is the set of all of the three-dimensional
objects from throughout history, together with various time-
indexed properties and relations.
Some examples will help to make this clearer. Consider
again ( 1 ) — ( 5
)
above. Let M2 be a model of the 3DRR language
that, according to the 3DRR theorist, represents the actual,
three-dimensional world. According to 3DRR, (1) expresses
the tenseless proposition that Montana has the time-indexed
property beinq-a-auarterback-at-t
1
.
Hence it could be
translated into 3DRR-style English as follows:
(lb) Montana is a t 1-quarterback
.
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(lb) can then go into the following sentence of the 3DRR
language.
(lb') Q 1 1m,
which will be true relative to M2 provided that M2 makes the
appropriate assignments to 'Q 1/ ({<x>: x is a quarterback
at t 1 }
)
and 'm' (Montana)
.
(2)
,
according to the 3DRR view, expresses the
tenseless proposition that Unitas has the time-indexed
property being— a-guart
e
rback
-be fore- t
1
: hence it could be
translated into 3DRR-style English as follows:
(2b) Unitas is a quarterback-before-tl
.
(2b) can then go into the following sentence of the 3DRR
language,
(2b') Q 12u,
which will be true relative to M2 provided that M2 makes the
appropriate assignments to 'Q 1/ ({<x>: x is a quarterback
before t 1 }
)
and 'u' (Unitas).
On the 3DRR view, (3) expresses the tenseless
proposition that Socrates has the time-indexed property
beinq-wise-before-t
1
. So (3) could be translated into 3DRR-
style English as follows:
(3b) Socrates is wise-before-t 1
.
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(3b) can then go into the following sentence of the 3DRR
language,
(3b') W\s,
which will be true relative to M2 provided that M2 makes the
appropriate assignments to 'W 1/ ({<x>: x is wise before
tl}) and 's' (Socrates).
(4), according to the 3DRR view, expresses the
tenseless proposition that Allen has the time-indexed
property beincr-president-after-t
1
; hence (4) could be
translated into 3DRR-style English as follows:
(4b) Allen is president-after-t 1
.
(4b) can then go into the following sentence of the 3DRR
language,
(4b') P 1
1
a,
which will be true relative to M2 provided that M2 makes the
appropriate assignments to 'P 1 1 ' ({<x>: x is a president
after tl}) and 'a' (Allen).
Finally, (5) , according to the 3DRR view, expresses the
tenseless proposition that the person who will be president
in one hundred years has the time-indexed property being-,
gp-a fter-t
1
; so (5) could be translated into 3DRR-style
English as follows:
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(5b) The person who will be president in 2090is wise-after-t 1
.
(5b) can then go into the following sentence of the 3DRR
language,
(5b') W^p,
which will be true relative to M2 provided that M2 makes the
appropriate assignments to 'W 1/ ({<x>: x is wise after tl})
and 'p' (the person who will be president in 2090)
4.4 A Formal Language, with Semantics, for 3DAR
The 3DAR theorist's ontology consists of (i) all of the
3D objects that have ever existed, exist now, or will ever
exist in the 3D world; (ii) all kinds of properties of, and
relations obtaining among, those objects (although, as. will
be seen, the 3DAR theorist does not need to appeal to time-
indexed properties and relations) ; and (iii) ordered sets
composed of things in the 3D theorist's ontology, some of
which ordered sets will be propositions. The 3DAR language
that I will propose will have as its domain of discourse the
set consisting all of the things in the 3DAR theorist's
ontology
.
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Among the constraints on what the 3DAR language can be
like are the 3DAR theorist's commitments to STA and TDVP
.
These two factors entail that the 3DAR theorist's language
will consist of sentences of different tenses, which
sentences express tensed propositions if they express
propositions at all. Thus, the 3DAR language will have to
include tense-operators
,
i.e., special, intensional
operators that stand for the past - and future -tenses
,
and it
will have to be a tense logic, i.e., a language designed to
accomodate the idea that the bearers of truth and falsity
have truth-values at times.
These differences will require several complications in
the 3DAR semantics. For one thing, these new operators,
which, following Prior, 10 can be considered as behaving very
much like the modal sentential operators 'necessarily' and
'possibly', will of course require truth-conditions. Thus,
in addition to truth-conditions for the logical connectives
and quantifiers, the 3DAR semantics will have to include
truth-conditions for whatever tense-operators are
incorporated into the language. Typically, these include
'P'
,
'F'
,
'H'
,
'G'
,
and 'Pn' and 'Fn'
,
for any number, n,
which are to stand for 'it has been the case that', 'it will
be the case that' , 'it has always been the case that' , 'it
will always be the case that' , 'it has been the case n time
units ago that', and 'it will be the case n time units hence
that', respectively.
10 Prior, "Changes in Events and Changes in Things."
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is a further complication made necessary by the
inclusion in the 3DAR language of tense-operators, and that
is that some provision will have to be made for assigning
truth-values to the sentences of the language at times.
There is a standard way of doing this . 11 The easiest and
most intuitive variation of this standard way of doing
semantics for a tense logic, which I will adopt in what
follows, is to specify that each model must include, in
addition to a domain and a function that assigns semantic
values to the constants, predicates and sentential letters
of the language, a line that represents the different points
in time.
Then the function that assigns the semantic values will
be one that takes, as arguments, not just individual
constants, predicates and sentential letters, but, rather,
ordered pairs, each of which is composed of one of those
linguistic entities plus some point on the line. Thus, each
pair consisting of some constant plus some point on the line
will be assigned either nothing or else some member of the
domain (to be thought of as the thing that that constant
refers to at that time) ; each pair composed of some
predicate letter plus some point on the line will be
assigned some ordered set constructed out of the members of
the domain (to be thought of as the extension of that
predicate at that time) ; and each pair composed of some
11 see, for example, Prior, Time and Modality , Chapters II
and III; and Past , Present and Future, Chapters II, III and
VII
.
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sentential letter plus some point on the line will be
assigned a truth-value (the truth-value of that sentence at
that time)
.
Intuitively, the line in any such model represents
time, and each point on the line represents some moment in
history. The idea is that the truth-values of sentence types
that contain tense operators can then be determined, in
truth- functional ways, by the truth-values of sentence types
that do not contain tense operators. For example, if the
line shown in figure 1 is part of a model, then the sentence
'FS
1
/ ('It will be the case that ) is true at tl, because
there is some point to the right of tl at which 'S
x
' is
true; similarly, the sentence 'P2S
1
' ('It was the case two
time units ago that S
1
/
) is true at t5, because ' is true
at the point two time units to the left of t5.
Si
pi p2 p3 p4 p5
Figure 1: A 3DAR Line Segment
The following, then, is a formal language and semantics
that would be well-suited to 3DAR.
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THE 3DAR LANGUAGE
Primitive Vocabulary
The primitive vocabulary will consist of the primitive
vocabulary of the 4D language, plus:
(viii ) Tense operators: P, F, H, G, and Pn and F n, for
any number, n.
Syntax
The syntactical rules will be the same as in the 4D
language, with the’ following addition:
(xiv) If A is any wff and T is any tense operator, then
TA is a wff.
Semantics
M is a 3DAR model =df M is an ordered triple, <L, D,
f,>, that meets the following conditions:
(i) L is a non-branching line;
(ii) D is a non-empty set;
(iii) f is a function whose domain is the set of all
ordered pairs, <p, @>
,
such that p is a point on L and @ is
either a sentential letter, a constant, or a predicate, and
which function meets the following conditions:
(a) for each sentential letter, S, and point, p,
f (<p, S>) is one of the truth-values;
(b) for each constant, a, and point, p, f (<p, a>)
is either nothing or else a member of D; and
(c) for each predicate, A 1
,
and point, p, f (<p,
Ai >) is a subset of D 1-.
In the 3DAR language, truth and falsity are to be
predicated, relative to a particular model, of sentences at
points on L, the line in the model. But, as in the 4D
semantics, to say what is required in order for a sentence
to be true (at a point) with respect to a model, we must
first say what is required in order for a sentence to be
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true (at a point) with respect to a model and a value
assignment for that model, and to do this we shall need to
make use of the notions value assignment, u-variant and
semantic value. Accordingly, let the notions value
assignment and u-variant be defined as before. Then we can
define the notion of the semantic value of a constant,
predicate letter or term of the 3DAR language, relative to a
model, M, value assignment, g, and point, p, as follows:
(a) if a is a constant then the semantic value of
a relative to M, g, and p is f (<p, a >)
;
(k) if A is a predicate letter then the semantic
value of A 1 relative to M, g, and p is f (<p, A*>) ; and
(c) if u is a variable then the semantic value of
u relative to M, g, and p is g(u) .
Now the intermediate truth-conditions for the 3DAR
language relative to a model, M, line, L, such that L is the
first member of M, point, p, such that p is on L, and value
assignment, g, such that g is a value assignment for M, are
as follows:
(i) if 5 is a sentential letter, then S is true at p
with respect to M,g if f (<p, S>) is truth; otherwise it is
false at p with respect to M,g;
(ii) if S is an atomic formula, i.e., if S is Ai (t 1/
. ..t
i )
for some predicate and terms, then S is true at p
with respect to M,g if <[t
1 ]
M
-
<3'P,
..., [t i ] M ' <3-p> is a member
of [A i ] M'9'P; otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g ;
(iii) if S is ~A for some sentence A, then S is true at
p with respect to M,g if A is not true at p with respect to
M, g; otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g;
(iv) if S is A v B for some sentences A and B, then S
is true at p with respect to M,g if either A is true at p
with respect to M, g or else B is true at p with respect to
M, g; otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g;
151
(V) if S i
true at p with
with respect to
to M, g ;
s A & B for some sentences A and B, then 5 is
respect to M,g if both A and B are true at pM,g; otherwise it is false at p with respect
(vi) if S is A --> B for some sentences A and B, then Sis true at p with respect to M, g if either A is false at pwith respect to M, g or else B is true at p with respect to
Mr gt otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g ;
(vii) if S is A <— > B for some sentences A and B, then
5 is true at with respect to M,g if either A and B are both
true at p with respect to M,g or else A and B are both false
at p with respect to M,gi otherwise it is false at p with
respect to M,g ;
(viii ) if S ig Au (A) for some wff, A, and variable, u,
then S is true at p with respect to Mr g if for every g' such
that g' is a u-variant of g, A is true at p with respect to
M,g' ; otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g;
(ix) if S is Eu (A) for some wff, A, and variable, u,
then S is true at p with respect to M,g if for some g' such
that g' is a u-variant of g, A is true at p with respect to
M, g' ; otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g
;
(x) if S is PA for some sentence. A, then S is true at
p with respect to M,g if there is some point, p' , such that
p' is to the left of p on L, and A is true at p' with
respect to Mf g otherwise it is false at p with respect to
M, g ; 12
12 The truth-conditions I've given for the tense operators
of the 3DAR language presuppose that it's not the case that
the reference of any constant ever changes over time. In
this respect the semantics here proposed do not accurately
reflect the semantics for natural languages such as English.
For in English it sometimes happens that a thing has one
name at one time, and another name at another time (the man
now called "Kareem Abdul Jabbar" is an example of such a
thing) ; and it also sometimes happens that a name refers to
one thing at one time, and another thing at another time
(the name 'The Dalai Lama' is an example of such a name)
.
The semantics for the 3DAR language could be formulated
in a way that allows for such changes of reference over
time. To do so would require a distinction between two
different types of tense operators. Grabby tense operators
would have truth-conditions like the following: P gn($a) is
true at a point, p, just in case f (<p, a>) is a member of
f (<p-n, $>) . Searchy tense operators would have truth-
conditions like the following: P sn($a) is true at a point,
p, just in case f(<p-n, a>) is a member of f (p-n, $>)
.
Grabby operators, in effect, tell us to grab the thing named
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(xi) if s is FA for some sentenceP^ith respect to M, g if there is some
p’ is to the right of p on L and A is
respect to M, g; otherwise it is false
M, g;
,
A, then S is true a
point, p'
,
such that
true at p' with
at p with respect to
t
at p
p
'
is
M, g;
(xii) if s is HA for some sentence, A,
with respect to M, g if for every point,
to the left of p on L, A is true at p'
otherwise it is false at p with respect
then S is true
p'
,
such that
with respect to
to M, g;
(xiii) if S is GA for some sentence, A, then S is true
at p with respect to M,g if for every point, p'
,
such that
p is to the right of p on L, A is true at p' with respectto M, g, otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g ;
if S is P nA for some number, n, and sentence, A,then S is true at p with respect to M, g if A is true at' thepoint n units to the left of p with respect to M,g;
otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g ; and
(xv) if S is FnA for some number, n, and sentence, A,
then S' is true at p with respect to M,g if A is true at the
point n units to the right of p with respect to M,g;
otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g.
Now, finally, we can specify the truth-condition for a
sentence at a point with respect to a 3DAR model
simpliciter. Accordingly, let some 3DAR model, M, be given.
Then for any sentence, S, and point, p, such that p is on
the line contained in M, S is true at p with respect to M if
for every value assignment, g, for M, S is true at p with
by a constant at the point of evaluation of the sentence in
question, and then proceed to the relevant point on L to see
if that thing has the relevant property there. Searchy
operators, on the other hand, tell us to go to the relevant
point on L, search for whatever thing is there named by the
constant in question, and then check to see if that thing
has the relevant property there. (I am grateful to Tom
Ryckman for suggesting the incorporation of two kinds of
tense operator into the 3DAR language, and also for
suggesting the terms 'grabby' and 'searchy'.)
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respect to M, gr; otherwise S is false at p with respect to
M.13
in Ch
fPT?f
r 3 above that the 3DAR theorist can hold
? ^ onao
0
??
1 Platonism or temporal reductionism
. Suppose
I am a 3DAR theorist who holds temporal reductionism; howcan I analyze away talk that appears to be about times’ Oneway would be the following. First, I define 'present-tensedproposition' as follow: a
Q is a present-tensed proposition =df for any
number, n, Q does not have Fn ( will-be-true-n-
t
-
ime
—
units-hence
) , P n (was~t rue~ n— t ime~un i t s
~
-^£0 ) / £ (will-be-true^
,
p ( was-t.rup )
,
G (will-
always-be-true
) , or H ( ha s ~
a
1wa v s ~been—
t
rue ^
as a constituent
.
Then I define the present moment, t Q , as follows:
t 0 =df the set of all true, present-tensed
propositions
.
And finally I define all of the other times in terms of the
present time, as follows:
For any positive number, n, t
n
=df the set of
all true propositions whose first member is Fn
and whose second member is a present-tensed
proposition
.
For any positive number, n, t_
n
=df the set of
all true propositions whose first member is Pn
and whose second member is a present-tensed
proposition
The idea here, as usual, is to draw an analogy with
modal actualism. The modal actualist typically has two
actual worlds: the concrete actual world ("@1"), and the
unique maximal, consistent set of propositions that happens
to have only true members ("@2"). Other possible worlds are
of the same kind as 02; i.e., they're maximal, consistent
sets of propositions. (Are they purely qualitative? Are they
perhaps singular, but with only actual concrete objects as
concrete constituents? These are excellent questions that
are beyond the scope of this essay.)
Analogously, the 3DARist has two present times: the
current 3D, concrete world ("3Dw"), and the unique maximal,
consistent set of present-tensed propositions that happens
to have only members that are true right now ("t 0 "). Other
times are of the same kind as t 0 . (Are they purely
qualitative? Are they perhaps singular, but with only
present concrete objects as concrete constituents? These are
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Some examples will help to illustrate a few important
points about the 3DAR language and its relationship to
English. Consider once again the sentence tokens ( l ) — ( 5
)
above. According to the 3DAR view, these cannot be analyzed
in terms of quantification over times and temporal parts of
objects, nor can they be analyzed in terms of the possession
by three-dimensional objects of time-indexed properties.
Rather, (l)-(5) must be analyzed in terms of irreducibly
past-, present- and future-tensed sentence types, and these
can be thought of as attributing common sense properties and
relations to ordinary, three-dimensional objects.
In order to see how this will work, consider some
model, M3, of the 3DAR language that, according to the 3DAR
theorist, represents the actual, three-dimensional world;
that is, some model whose first member, L, is a line such
that for every pair of times, t and t '
,
such that t is
earlier than t ' in the history of the world, there are two
points, p and p ' , such that p is to the left of p' on L, and
whose second member (i.e., whose domain) is the set of all
of the concrete, three-dimensional objects that have ever
existed, exist now, or will ever exist in the concrete,
three-dimensional world, and whose third member is a
function, f, such that for each point p on L and
corresponding time, t' , in the history of the world, and for
^]_50 excellent questions that are beyond the scope of this
essay
.
)
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each actual n-place property or relation, R", there is some
predicate letter, 5", such that for any actual objects, x,,
x„, < Xl , ..., x„> is a member of f«p, >>) j ust in case
X
1 ' ***' Xn stand in the relation Rn to one another at t in
the actual world. Let us further stipulate that pi is the
point on L that corresponds to tl in the history of the
actual world.
According to the 3DAR view, (1) expresses the present-
tensed, singular proposition that Montana is a quarterback.
Hence (1) can be translated into 3DAR-style English as
follows
:
(lc) Montana is a quarterback.
(lc) can then go into the following sentence of the 3DAR
language,
(lc') 0%,
which will be true at pi relative to M3 provided that f(<pi,
'm'>) = Montana, and for any point, p, f (<p, 'Q lr >) = {<x>:
x is a quarterback at p} .
According to the 3DAR view, (2) expresses the past-
tensed, singular proposition that Unitas was a quarterback.
Hence (2) can be translated into 3DAR-style English as
follows
(2c) It has been the case that (Unitas is a
quarterback)
.
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(2c) can then go into the following sentence of the 3DAR
language,
(2c'
)
P(Q 1u),
which will be true at pi relative to M3 provided that, in
addition to the above, f ( <!p 1 , 'u / ^> ) = Unitas.
(3), according to the 3DAR view, expresses the past-
tensed, singular proposition that Socrates was wise; hence
(3) can be translated into 3DAR-style English as follows:
(3c) It has been the case that (Socrates is
wise) .
(3c) can then go into the following sentence of the 3DAR
language,
(3c') P(W x s),
which will be true relative to M3 provided that f(<pl, 's'>)
= Socrates, and for any point, p, f (<p, 'W x, >) = {<x>: x is
wise p}
.
(4)
,
according to the 3DAR view, expresses the future-
tensed, singular proposition that Allen will be president.
So (4) can be translated into 3DAR-style English as follows:
(4c) It will be the case that (Allen is
president)
.
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<40 can then go into the following sentence of the 3DAR
language.
(4c') F(P 1 a),
which will be true relative to M3 provided that f(<pl, 'a'>)
: Allen, and for any point, p, f(<p, 'pi'>) = {< x >: x is
president at p }
.
Finally, (5), according to the 3DAR view, expresses the
future- tensed, singular proposition that the person who will
be president in 2090 will be wise,’ hence (5) can be
translated into 3DAR-style English as follows:
(5c) It will be the case that (the president
in 2090 is wise)
.
(5c) can then go into the following sentence of the 3DAR
language,
(5c') F^p),
which will be true relative to M3 provided that, in addition
to the above, f(<pl, 'p'>) = the person who will be
president in 2090.
In general, according to the 3DAR view, each token of
an English sentence expresses a tensed proposition if it
expresses a proposition at all; and each such token can be
translated by some sentence type of the 3DAR language that
expresses the appropriate tensed proposition at the time of
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that token. Then the truth value of such a sentence type at
a time is determined by the reference of the constants and
the extensions of the predicates of that sentence type at
some relevant time.
4.5 A Formal Language, with Semantics, for 3DAMA
The 3DAMA theorist's ontology, at any given time,
consists of (i) all of the 3D objects that either have
existed or else do exist, as of that time; (ii) all kinds of
properties of, and relations obtaining among, those objects;
and (iii) ordered sets constructed out of things in the
3DAMA theorist's ontology, some of which ordered sets will
be propositions. Accordingly, the 3DAMA language that I will
propose will have as its domain of discourse, at any given
time, the set of all of the things that are either past or
present at that time; and the truth-conditions for the
tensed sentences of the language will be such that, at any
given time, the only things involved in determining the
truth-value of any sentence at that time are things that are
either past or present at that time.
Among the constraints on what the 3DAMA language can be
like are the 3DAMA theorist's commitments to STA and TDVP
.
These two factors, plus the absence of indexicals, mean that
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the 3DAMA language, like the 3DAR language, is to be a
language composed of tensed sentence-types (some of which
tense operators)
,
so that at each time, each such
sentence-type expresses some tensed proposition, if it
expresses a proposition at all. Then, as with the 3DAR
semantics, the 3DAMA semantics will involve ascriptions of
truth-values to sentence-types at times. Thus, the 3DAMA
theorist ' s formal language will be a tense logic just like
the 3DAR language.
Can the 3DAMA semantics be just like the 3DAR
semantics? I don't think so, for two different reasons. The
first is simply that the 3DAMA theorist does not have
available the future objects that are contained in the 3DAR
theorist's ontology. The second reason is that the laws of
nature may be indeterministic. Let me explain.
First, note that the 3DAMA semantics can be just like
the 3DAR semantics as far as sentences about the past and
the present are concerned. For the 3DAMA theorist has
exactly the same past and present 3D objects in his or her
ontology as the 3DAR theorist. Hence the 3DAMA sentences
about these objects can be treated in the same was as the
3DAR sentences about the same objects: a past- or present-
tensed sentence that contains a certain predicate and
certain constants will be true at a time, relative to a
given 3DAMA model, just in case the appropriate ordered set
containing the objects assigned to those constants by the
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model is a member of the extension assigned to that
predicate by the model, at the relevant point in time.
What of future-tensed sentences? Here we must
distinguish between two different kinds of sentence,
singular sentences, i.e., those that contain one or more
constants, and general sentences, i.e., those that contain
no constants. Consider first future-tensed, singular
sentences. These may be of two kinds: future-tensed,
singular sentences that contain at least one constant that
fails to refer to any past or presently existing objects;
and the rest. Consider one of the former variety; it
contains some constant that does not refer to any past or
presently existing object. Then what does that constant
refer to? Well, to say of some constant that it does not
refer to any past or presently existing object is, according
to 3DAMA, to say that it refers to nothing; for there are,
on that view, no merely future objects.
Depending on one's semantical tastes, one ought to
assign to sentences that fail to refer either no truth-value
or else the value falsity. I prefer the latter approach,
which I have adopted in the case of each semantical system
described above. In the semantics provided below for the
3DAMA language, then, future-tensed, singular sentences that
contain some constant that does not refer to any past or
presently existing object, at a particular time, will be
considered false at that time; there will be no true,
future-tensed, singular sentences about merely future
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objects. In this respect, the 3DAMA semantics will differ
from the 3DAR semantics.
What about future-tensed, singular sentences that
contain only constants referring to past or presently
existing objects? And what about future—tensed, general
sentences? Such sentences will require the 3DAMA theorist to
make an even more radical departure from the 3DAR semantics.
Because of the possibility that the laws of nature may be
indeterministic, the 3DAMA semantics will have to allow
3DAMA models that contain lines that branch in the direction
of the future (i.e., toward the right). Here is why.
Suppose that there is a semi-omniscient god, who is so
smart that he never fails to make a valid inference from
premises that he knows, and who also happens to know, at any
given time, everything there is to know about the past and
present states of the world, relative to that time, but
nothing about future states of the world, relative to that
time (except, of course, what he can infer from what he
knows about the past and present states of the world)
.
What is this god able to infer right now about the
future, from his knowledge of the past and present states of
the world? Well, he has a complete knowledge of every aspect
of every thing that either has existed or does exist; so, in
particular, he knows the entire past history, as well as the
current position, velocity, spin, etc., of every particle or
bit of stuff that there is right now. In addition, he knows
all of the laws of nature. Can he figure out from all of
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this just what the future will be like? Only if the laws of
nature are deterministic.
If they are then he can simply consider the way the
world is right now, apply the laws of nature, and infer
exactly how the world will be in the very next moment; then
he can consider how the world will be in the very next
moment, apply the laws of nature, and infer exactly how the
world will be in the following moment; and so on for every
moment in the future.
If the laws of nature are not deterministic, however,
then he is likely to be stuck. Insofar as the laws of nature
do not allow there to be utter chaos, he will be able to
know what is the range of different possibilities for the
very next moment; and it may well be that, because there
happens to be no indeterminateness looming on the horizon,
he will be able to infer exactly what things will be like in
the next moment. But in general he will not always be able
to do this. In general, he will only know, in the case of
any one moment, what are the different possible successors
compatible with the combination of the way things are at
that moment (and have been before it) and the laws of
nature. He will know what are the different possible
futures, but he will not know which one of them will be
actual
.
Does it follow from all this that the 3DAMA semantics
must somehow allow for this kind of indeterminism? Yes, if
the 3DAMA theorist makes one very plausible assumption about
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truth, namely, that a proposition (and thus, derivatively, a
sentence) can only be true at a time if it corresponds in
the appropriate way to past or present things at that time.
An example will make this clearer. Suppose that it is
an indeterministic matter whether it will rain in Baltimore
tomorrow - everything about the way things are right now,
including all of the laws of nature governing our world, is
consistent with its raining tomorrow in Baltimore, and also
consistent with its not raining tomorrow in Baltimore.
Consider the sentence 'It will rain tomorrow in Baltimore'
Its 3DAMA translation is something like this: 'FI (A 1 33b 19 ) '
(where the extension of the predicate is rainy places, and
the constant refers to Baltimore)
. Should this sentence be
true, relative to some appropriate 3DAMA model (i.e., one
that assigns the right semantic values to the predicate and
constant) that represents the real world? Well, the sentence
expresses the proposition <wi 11 -be-true- one-dav-hence .
<beinq-rainv
. Baltimore>>. Can this proposition be true
right now, according to 3DAMA? I don't see how it can be,
given our supposition about the indeterminism of this
matter. What could the proposition correspond to that would
make it true right now? No properties of any merely future
raindrops, since such raindrops don't exist, according to
the 3DAMA theorist. Nor could it correspond to any
properties of presently existing raindrops, or any other
presently existing objects, since our assumption about the
indeterminism of this matter guarantees that no properties
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of any such objects are sufficient to make this proposition
true right now.
In short, the difficulty of finding something for this
proposition to correspond to right now in virtue of which it
could be true is exactly analogous to the difficulty facing
the semi-omniscient god of the example above. Note that for
the 3DAR theorist there is no similar problem. For the 3DAR
theorist can say that, loosely speaking, propositions about
the future are true or false depending on the manner in
which they correspond to the future; but for the 3DAMA
theorist there is no future.
For this reason, the 3DAMA semantics will have to allow
for the possibility of lines that branch as they move from
left to right, i.e., from past to future (although not, of
course, from right to left, i.e., from future to past). 14
From any given point, p, on such a line, the different
branches to the right of p will represent the different
possible futures that are compatible with the way things are
at p. Since it seems appropriate to think of the laws of
nature that govern the world as part of what is true at a
point, it seems appropriate to think that these laws of
14 Various philosophers have considered this kind of
semantics. See, for example, Aristotle, De Interpretations ,
Chapter 9 (where he at least seems to recommend something
like a future-branching semantics, in order to avoid
fatalistic consequences); Richmond Thomason, " Indeterminist
Time and Truth-Value Gaps;” and Prior, Past, Present and
Future, Chapters II, III and VII.
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nature are part of what goes to determine the relevant
futures accessible from that point. 15
Thus, the 3DAMA semantics will allow the line segment
shown in figure 2 to be included in a 3DAMA model, with
truth-values assigned to the sentential letter 'S/ as
indicated
.
Si
Figure 2: A 3DAMA Line Segment
Now there is a choice to be made by the 3DAMA
semanticist. The choice concerns the truth-conditions for
the future-tensed operators. Consider the sentence 'FIS/
Should it be true at pi in a model that contains the above
line segment, with the indicated assignment of truth-values
to 'S/
,
or should it be false?
There are two principal ways of answering this
question. The 3DAMA theorist could, adopting a suggestion
15 Can the laws of nature change over time? If they can,
then how should this affect the 3DAMA semantics for future-
tensed sentences? I don't know the answers to these
questions. For the purposes of this essay, then, I will
simply assume that the answer to the first question is No .
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made by Aristotle in his famous discussion of future
contingents, 16 say that, since 'S/ is true at p2 but false
at p3, 'FIS/ is neither true nor false at pi - its truth-
value at pi is indeterminate, or neutral. This approach
involves rejecting what is sometimes called the principle of
bivalence (hereafter, "BIV"), i.e., the principle that there
are only two truth-values, truth and falsity. If the 3DAMA
theorist adopts this approach then it will be natural for
him or her to say the following: since there are, in the
model represented above, different possible futures relative
to pi (one in which 'S/ is true one time unit later, and
one in which it isn't), 'FIS/ is neither true nor false at
pi; but if it had been the case in every possible future
relative to pi that 'S/ is true one time unit later than
pi, then 'FIS/ would have been true at pi; and if it had
been the case in every possible future relative to pi that
'S/ is false one time unit later than pi, then 'FIS/ would
have been false at pi. 17
The second way of handling such cases, once the 3DAMA
theorist has allowed future-branching models, does not
involve rejecting BIV. On this alternative, the 3DAMA
theorist would say that, since 'S/ is true at p2 but false
at p3 , 'FIS. ' is simply false at pi. Note that if the 3DAMA
theorist adopts this approach then the result is that not
16 Aristotle, De Interpretations , Chapter 9.
n cf. the view Prior calls "Peircean" in Past, Present and
Future, Chapter VII; and the view advocated by Thomason in
" Indeterminist Time and Truth-Value Gaps."
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only is 'FIS/ false at pi, but so is 'F1~S/
. For on this
view it can be false right now that it will be the case one
time unit hence that it is raining in Baltimore, say, and
also false that it will be the case one time unit hence that
it is not raining in Baltimore. This means that '~F1S
1
-->
F1~S/ cannot be a theorem of the 3DAMA theorist's tense
logic. Thus the tense operators will be analogous to modal
operators, and certain other sentential operators, such as
'allegedly', in this respect.
The choice to be made, then, is, roughly speaking,
this: does the 3DAMA theorist want to say that a sentence
about a matter that is both future and contingent, relative
to a point in a 3DAMA model, is false at that point, or does
he or she want to say that it is neither true nor false at
that point?
I think that there is a good reason for keeping BIV: I
think that truth and falsity are best thought of as
contradictories, and not mere contraries, because 'false'
just means not true. The 3DAMA semantics proposed below,
then, as well as the 3DAA semantics proposed in the next
section, will opt for the choice that preserves BIV. But it
should be clear, in each case, how the alternative - i.e.,
rejecting BIV and including a third truth-value - would go.
It might seem that the 3DAMA theorist can generalize on
the truth-conditions suggested above for the model
represented in figure 2. I.e., it might seem that the 3DAMA
theorist can say that, given any 3DAMA model, M, containing
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line, L, if, relative to a point, p, on L, a sentence, S, is
true at every point n time units to the right (or left) of
p, for some number, n, then the sentence that results from
(or P n' ) in front of S is true at p; otherwise
it is false. Unfortunately this fairly simple approach won't
work. To see why, consider again the model repreented in
figure 2. On the approach under consideration, 'P1F1S,'
would be false at p2, where 'S/ itself is true. This result
is undesirable, I think, even for one who holds the 3DAMA
view. For there are things in the world at p2 in virtue of
which 'P1F1S
1
' is true at that point, even according to the
3DAMA view. Specifically, whatever it is that makes 'S.'
true at p2 also suffices to make 'P1F1S
1
' true at p2 . More
generally, it seems clear that, although the 3DAMA theorist
should say that there are never true propositions about
genuinely future, contingent matters, because there is never
anything for such propositions to correspond to, there
nevertheless can be true propositions about present,
contingent matters, for such propositions can correspond to
present states of affairs.
Thus, it seems that it would be desirable for the 3DAMA
theorist to have truth-conditions that ensured that for any
sentence, S, and number, n, if S is true at a point, p, then
PnFnS is also true at p.
There is a more general desideratum relevant here.
Consider a model that contains the line segment shown in
figure 3, with assignments to 'S/ as indicated.
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p3
Figure 3: Another 3DAMA Line Segment
The 3DAMA theorist should want it to work out that 'P2F1S
1
'
is true at p4 with respect to this model. The reason is,
roughly, this. Every point that is two units to the left of
p4 on some route, and then one unit back on the same route -
every point one unit to the left of p4 that is in some
important sense accessible from p4, that is - is such that
'Sj/ is true there. It shouldn't matter that to the truth-
value of 'P2F1S
1
' at p4 that there is a point, p3, two units
to the left of p4 and then one unit back on a different
route - on a branch that is in the same relevant sense
inaccessible from p4 - where '
S
1
' is false. Even a 3DAMA
theorist will agree to this; after all, there are, at p4,
things in the world in virtue of which the state of affairs
represented by p3 will not be realized. 18
In general, a 3DAMA theorist, who wants to allow models
with lines that branch in the direction of the future, will
18 Not, in any case, one time unit later than p2
.
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want to ensure that the only points relevant to determining
the truth-value of a sentence at a point, p, are points that
are accessible to p; and this goes for sentences that are
purely past- (or future-) tensed as well as sentences that
mix both past and future tenses. But the simplified way of
providing truth-conditions suggested above would not ensure
this in the case of sentences that mix past past and future
tenses. That is why it is necessary to complicate the 3DAMA
semantics by introducing the notion of truth-on-a-route
.
What follows, then, is a formal language and semantics
that would be well-suited to 3DAMA
.
THE 3DAMA LANGUAGE
Primitive Vocabulary
The primitive vocabulary will be the same as the
primitive vocabulary of the 3DAR language.
Syntax
The syntactical rules will be the same as the
syntactical rules of the 3DAR language.
Semantics
M is a 3DAMA model =df M is an ordered quadruple, <L,
D, df, f>, that meets the following conditions:
(i) L is a line, through an infinite, two-dimensional
space, that may branch as it moves from left to right but
not from right to left;
(ii) D is a non-empty set;
(iii) df is a function that satisfies the following
conditions
:
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(a) the domain of df is the set of all points on
L
;
(b) the range of df is the set of subsets of D, sothat for each point, p, on L, df (p) = some subset of D; and
(c) for any two points, p and p' , on L, if p is tothe left of p'
,
then df (p) must be a subset of df (p' )
;
and
(iv) f is a function whose domain is the set of all
ordered pairs, <p, @>
,
such that p is a point on L and @ is
either a sentential letter, a constant, or a predicate, and
which function satisfies the following conditions:
(a) for each sentential letter, S, and point, p,
f (<P, S>) is one of the truth-values;
(b) for each constant, a, and point, p, f(<p, a>)
is either nothing or else a member of df (p)
;
and
(c) for each predicate, A 1
,
and point, p, f(<p,
A 1 >) is a subset of df(p)i.
In the 3DAMA language, as in the 3DAR language, truth
and falsity are to be predicated, relative to a particular
model, of sentences at points on L, the line in the model.
Let the notions value assignment
,
u-variant and semantic
value be defined for the 3DAMA semantics as they are for the
3DAR semantics. Once again we will first say what is
required in order for a sentence to be true at a point
relative to a model and a value assignment for that model,
as an intermediate step toward specifying the condition for
a sentence's being true at a point with respect to a model
simpliciter .
These intermediate truth-conditions for the 3DAMA
language differ from the intermediate truth-conditions for
the 3DAR language only with respect to the tense operators.
But in order to state the truth-conditions for the tense
operators of the 3DAMA language, it is necessary to define
the notion of a route in a 3DAMA model. Intuitively, the
idea is that a route is a possible course of history,
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represented by a single, non-branching line that passes
through the (possibly) branching line of the model.
More formally, we can say that r is a route through a
line, L, that is a member of a 3DAMA model =df r is a
continuous, non-branching segment of L.
Next we define the notion of truth-on-a-route
. We will
first define the notion for present—tensed sentences in
terms of the truth—conditions already given for such
sentences, and then we define the notion for past- and
future-tensed sentences of the language. In order to do so,
it is necessary to introduce some new notation. Let $ be
some wff, let t lf ..., t n be terms contained $, and let t x ' ,
..., t
n
' be terms not contained in $. Then $(t l /t 1 ', ...,
t
n
/t n ') is the result of replacing each occurence of each t 1
in $ with an occurence of the corresponding t i ' . Now the
required definitions can be formulated as follows.
For any present-tensed sentence, S, any point, p, and
any route, r, such that p is on r, S is true-on-r at p =df S
is true at p.
For any sentence, S, any point, p, and any route, . r,
such that p is on r, if S is PA for some sentence, A, then S
is true-on-r at p with respect to M,g =df for each constant,
a if ..., a k , such that A contains a if . . .
,
a k , there are some
variables, u
; ,..., u k , such that Ui~u k are not contained in
A, and for every value assignment, g ' , such that g' is a u i -
u k-variant of g and for each a j and Uj in a i -a k and u^Ukf
respectively, g' (u^) = f (<p, a]>) , there is some point, p' ,
such that p' is to the left of p on r, and A(a i /u i , ...,
a
k
/u k ) is true-on-r at p' with respect to M, g' .
For any sentence, S, any point, p, and any route, r,
such that p is on r, if S is FA for some sentence, A, then S
is true-on-r at p with respect to M,g =df for each constant,
a., . . ., a k , such that A contains a it . . . , a k , there are some
variables, u if . . . , u k , such that u t-uk are not contained in
A, and for every value assignment, g'
,
such that g' is a u
L
~
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uk-vari
^
n t- 9 snd for each a^ and in and u ; -u k ,respectively,
.
g' (u^) = f (<p, a.j>)
,
there is some point, p'
,such that p' is to the right of p on r, and A{a. / u if . . , r
a k /u k ) is true-on-r at p' with respect to M, g'
.
For any sentence, S, any point, p, and any route, r,
such that p is on r, if s is HA for some sentence, A, then 5
is true-on-r at p with respect to M,g =df for every point,
p'
,
such that p' is to the left of p on r, and for each
constant, a ir ... r a k , such that A contains a if ..., a k , there
are some variables, u., . .
.
,
uk , such that Ui~uk are not
contained in A, and for every value assignment, g ' , such
that g' is a u
i
-uk-variant of g and for each a
z
and in a 1 -
a k and u^u*, respectively, g' (Uj) = f(<p, a^>) , A{aju if
a k /uk ) is true-on-r at p' with respect to M,g' .
For any sentence, S, any point, p, and any route, r,
such that p is on r, if S is GA for some sentence, A, then 5
is true-on-r at p with respect to M, g =df for every point,
p'
,
such that p' is to the right of p on r, and for each
constant, a
i ,...,
a k , such that A contains a if . . . , a k , there
are some variables, u if . . .
,
uk , such that Ui~u k are not
contained in A, and for every value assignment, g'
,
such
that g' is a u
i
-uk-variant of g and for each a
z
and u
z
in a i -
a k and u t-u k , respectively, g' (Uj) = f (<p, a 3 >)
J
,
A(a i /u i/
a k /u k ) is true-on-r at p' with respect to M, g' .
For any sentence, 5, any point, p, and any route, r,
such that p is on r, if S is PnA for some sentence, A, and
number, n, then S is true-on-r at p with respect to M,g =df
for each constant, a
L ,
. .
.
,
a k , such that A contains a if . . .
,
a k , there are some variables, u if . . .
,
u k , such that Ui~uk are
not contained in A, and for every value assignment, g' , such
that g' is a u^-^-variant of g and for each a z and Uj in a L -
a
k
and Ui-uk , respectively, g' (Uj) = f (<p, aj>) , A{a i /u if
a
k
/uk ) is true-on-r at the point n units to the left of p on
r with respect to M,g' .
For any sentence, S, any point, p, and any route, r,
such that p is on r, if S is FnA for some sentence, A, and
number, n, then S is true-on-r at p with respect to M, g =df
for each constant, a i ,..., a k , such that A contains a ir . . .
,
a k , there are some variables, u it ..., u k , such that Ui-u k are
not contained in A, and for every value assignment, g' , such
that g' is a u i-uk-variant of g and for each a 3 and u 3 in a L
-
a
k
and u^-uy, respectively, g' (Uj) = f (<p, aj>) , A^/ir,
a k /uk ) is true-on-r at the point n units to the right of p
on r with respect to M,g' .
With these definitions in hand, we can give a single
truth-condition that will suffice for all of the tense
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operators of the 3DAMA language relative to a model, M, and
a value assignment, g, for that model. It is as follows:
ji c
if 5
_
is TA for anV sentence, A, and tense operator,T, then S is true at p with respect to M,g if for every
route, r, such that p is on r, TA is true-on-r at p withrespect to M, g; otherwise TA is false at p with respect toM, g
.
Now, finally, we can specify the truth-condition for a
sentence at a point with respect to a 3DAMA model
simplicit er
.
Accordingly, let some 3DAMA model, M, be given
Then for any sentence, S, and point, p, S is true at p with
respect to M if for every value assignment, g, for M, 5 is
true at p with respect to M, g; otherwise S is false at p
with respect to M. 19
As before, some examples will help to illustrate a few
important points about the 3DAMA language and its
relationship to English. Consider once again the sentence
tokens (l)-(5) above. According to the 3DAMA view, these
must be analyzed in terms of irreducibly past-, present- and
future-tensed sentence types, and these can be thought of as
19 I said above in Chapter 3 that the 3DAMAist may hold
either temporal Platonism or temporal reduct ionism . The
3DAMAist who holds temporal Platonism will include all past
times, as well as the present time, in his or her ontology.
Such a theorist may analyze away talk that appears to be
about future times in the manner suggested for doing so in
footnote 12 above. Likewise, the 3DAMAist who holds temporal
reductionism may analyze away talk that appears to be about
any times - past, present or future - in the manner
suggested for doing so in the same foootnote.
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attributing common sense properties and relations to
ordinary, three-dimensional objects.
In order to see how this will work, consider some
model, M4
,
of the 3DAMA language that, according to the
3DAMA theorist, represents the actual, three-dimensional
world, with the point pi corresponding to tl. According to
the 3DAMA view, (l)-(3) can be translated just as they were
above in the discussion of the 3DAR language and semantics,
and the truth of each sentence can be determined in just the
way it was above. For in M4 there is, just as in M3, exactly
one route back into the past from the point that corresponds
to 1 1
.
(4), according to the 3DAMA view, expresses the future-
tensed, singular proposition that Allen will be president.
So (4) can be translated into 3DAMA-style English as
follows
:
(4d) It will be the case that (Allen is
president)
.
(4d) can then go into the following sentence of the 3DAMA
language,
(4d' ) F(P 1 a),
which will be true relative to M4 provided that (i) f(<pl,
'a'>) = Allen, (ii) for any point, p, f (<p, 'P
1;
>) = {<x>: x
is president at p}, and (iii) on every route, r, through pi,
there is some point, p, such that p is to the right of pi on
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r, and <Allen> is a member of f (<p, P 1 >, i.e., provided that
on every route accessible from the present point, there is
some point at which Allen is president.
According to what was said above, then, this sentence
will be true relative to a model like M4, i.e., a model that
represents the actual world and makes appropriate
assignments to constants and predicates, provided that the
matter is, as of the present time, a physically
deterministic matter. If it is, then there are (past and)
present things for the relevant proposition to correspond to
in virtue of which it is true. If not, then the relevant
proposition is false, because there are no such things.
What about (5)
?
This sentence cannot, according to the
3DAMA view, expresses a future-tensed, singular proposition
about the person who will be president in 2090, given the
3DAMA theorist's ontological views. 20 So if the sentence is
translated into some sentence with the same form as (5c'),
then, given our policy of treating sentences with names that
fail to refer as false, that sentence will be false.
(5) could, however, be taken to express the general
proposition that there will be someone in one hundred years
who will be president and who will also be wise. If (5) is
taken to express this proposition, then it can be translated
into 3DAMA-style English as follows:
20 Assuming that there is no person in existence now who
will be president in 2090.
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( 5d) It will be the case one hundred, years
hence that (there is an x such that (x is
president and x is wise) )
.
(5d) can then go into the following sentence of the 3DAMA
language,
(5d' ) F100 [Ex (P xx & wix) ] ,
which will be true relative to M4 provided that on every
route, r, such that pi is on r, the quantified sentence
'Ex (P 1x & Wix)' is true at the point 100 years to the right
of pi on r.
In general, there are two main differences between
3DAMA language and semantics and the 3DAR language and
semantics. The first is that there can be true sentences of
i
the 3DAR language that express singular propositions about
merely future objects, but there cannot be such sentences of
i
the 3DAMA language. The second is that there can be true
I
I
sentences of the 3DAR language that express propositions
about future, physically indeterministic matters, but there
i
cannot be such sentences of the 3DAMA language.
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4 .6 A Formal Language, with Semantics, for 3DAA
At any given time, the 3DAA theorist's ontology
consists of (i) all of the 3D objects that exist at that
time; (ii) all kinds of properties of, and relations
obtaining among, those objects; and (iii) ordered sets
constructed out of things in the 3DAA theorist's ontology,
some of which ordered sets will be propositions.
Accordingly, the 3DAA language that I will propose will have
as its domain of discourse, at any given time, the set of
all of the things in the 3DAA ontology at that time; and the
truth-conditions for the tensed sentences of the language
will be such that, at any given time, the only things
involved in determining the truth-value of any sentence at
that time are things that are present at that time.
Among the constraints on what the 3DAA language can be
like are the 3DAA theorist's commitments to STA and TDVP
.
These two factors mean that the 3DAA language, like the 3DAR
and 3DAMA languages, is to be a language composed of tensed
sentence-types (some of which contain tense operators) , so
that at each time, each such sentence-type expresses some
tensed proposition, if it expresses a proposition at all.
Then, as with the 3DAR and 3DAMA semantics, the 3DAA
semantics will involve ascriptions of truth-values to
sentence-types at times.
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Can the 3DAA semantics be just like the 3DAMA
semantics? No. Virtually all of the considerations involving
the ontological status of the future, according to the 3DAMA
view, that were raised above in order to show that the 3DAMA
semantics have to allow for future-branching lines also
apply to the 3DAA semantics; but exactly analogous
considerations about the ontological status of the past,
according to the 3DAA view, entail that the 3DAA semantics
have to be past- and future-branching, and this will call
for a departure from the traditional, future-branching
semantics proposed above for the 3DAMA view.
The 3DAA semantics, then, will be like the 3DAMA
semantics, except that the 3DAA semantics will allow for
lines that may branch at any point in either direction. For
example, the line segment shown in figure 4 is one that may
be included in a 3DAA model.
Figure 4 ; A 3DAA Line Segment
As with the 3DAMA semantics, the 3DAA semantics should
ensure that from any given point, p, on some line, L,
contained in a 3DAA model, the only points that are relevant
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to determining the truth-value of any sentence at p are
points that are on routes accessible from p. Thus, it would
be desirable for the 3DAA theorist to have truth-conditions
that ensured that for any sentence, S, and number, n, if s
is true at a point, p, then so are all if the following:
5 — > FnPnS; S — > PnFnS; S — > FnPS; S — > PnFS; s — > GPS;
and S — > HFS. 21
What follows is a characterization of a formal language
and semantics that would be well-suited to the 3DAA view.
THE 3DAA LANGUAGE
Primitive Vocabulary
The primitive vocabulary is the same as the primitive
vocabulary of the 3DAR and 3DAMA languages.
Syntax
The syntactical rules are the same as the syntactical
rules of the 3DAR and 3DAMA languages.
21 This means that instances of each of the following
schemas will be theorems of the 3DAA language:
S — > FnPnS;
S — > PnFnS;
S — > FnPS;
S — > PnFS;
S --> GPS; and
S — > HFS.
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Semantics
Everything about the semantics for the 3DAA language
will be as in the semantics for the 3DAMA language, with
just three exceptions: there will be a different condition
placed on the type of line that can be contained in any 3DAA
model (in order to allow for lines that branch in both
directions)
, the definition of a route will have to be
changed in order to accommodate this first difference; and
the third constraint on df (that for any two points, p and
P , on L, if p is to the left of p'
,
then df (p) must be a
subset of df (p' )
)
will be waived.
The first difference, then, will consist in the fact
that the definition of a 3DAA model will be exactly like the
definition of a 3DAMA model except in clause (i)
.
Clause (i)
of the definition of a 3DAA model will be as follows:
(i) L is a system of connected lines through an
infinite, two-dimensional space.
Then the definition of a route through the line
contained in a 3DAA model will be as follows: r is a route
through a line, L, that is a member of a 3DAA model =df r is
a segment of L that is continuous and that occupies, for
each position along the x axis of the two-dimensional space
occupied by L, no more than one point along the y axis of
that space.
The rest of the 3DAA semantics - including the
definitions of truth on a route, and both the intermediate
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truth-conditions for a sentence's being true at a point with
respect to a model and a value assignment for that model, as
well as the final truth-condition for a sentence's being
true at a point with respect to a model simpliciter - will
be exactly as in the 3DAMA semantics. 22
As before, we shall consider the 3DAA theorist's
treatment of sentences ( 1 ) — ( 5 ) above in order to shed some
light on the 3DAA language and its relationship to English.
According to the 3DAA view, these must be analyzed in terms
of irreducibly past-, present- and future-tensed sentence
types, which can be thought of as attributing common sense
properties and relations to ordinary, three-dimensional
objects
.
In order to see how this will work, consider some
model, M5, of the 3DAA language that, according to the 3DAA
theorist, represents the actual, three-dimensional world,
with the point pi corresponding to tl.
According to the 3DAA view, (1) expresses the
proposition that Montana is a quarterback; hence it can be
translated just as it was above in the discussion of the
3DAR language and semantics, and its truth can be determined
in just the way it was in that discussion.
22 I said in Chapter 3 above that the 3DAAist may hold
either temporal Platonism or temporal reduct ionism, but
that, in any case, such a theorist must analyze away talk
that appears to be about merely past or merely future times.
Such a theorist may do so in the manner suggested in
footnote 12 above.
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(2)
,
according to the 3DAA view, expresses the past-
tensed, singular proposition that Unitas was a quarterback,
which is a singular proposition about an object that is
present right now. So this sentence can also be translated
into the 3DAA language in the way it was translated into the
3DAR language. I.e., (2 can be translated into 3DAA as
(2c' ) P (Q xu) .
But the way in which the truth-value of this sentence is
determined, according to the 3DAA theorist, is unlike the
way in which it was determined according to the 3DAR
theorist. (2c'
)
will be true (relative to M5) at pi just in
case for every route, r, such that pi is on r, there is some
point, p ' , such that p' is to the left of p on r and 'Q xu'
is true at p' . If what I said above about indeterminism and
the truth-values of future-tensed sentences in the 3DAMA
language is correct, then it will also apply to the truth-
values of past-tensed sentences of the 3DAA language. Hence
this past-tensed sentence about Unitas will be true at- pi
just in case current conditions and the laws of nature are
sufficient to ensure that the truth-condition described
above is satisfied; i.e., just in case the matter is a
physically deterministic one.
(3)
,
of course, cannot be taken to express any singular
proposition about Socrates, according to 3DAA, for on that
view there are no such propositions. The best the 3DAA
theorist can do here is, in a move parallel to the 3DAMA
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theorist
' s treatment of (5), to say that (3) may be taken to
express the past-tensed, general proposition that there was
a man called "Socrates" who was wise. This proposition could
be translated into 3DAA-style English as follows:
Oe) It has been the case that (there is an x
such that (x is called "Socrates" and x is
wise) ) .
This sentence can then go into the following sentence of the
3DAA language,
(3e' ) P [Ex (S x x & W x x) ] ,
which will be true at pi relative to M5 provided that on
every route accessible to pi there is some point to the left
of pi at which there is such an x; i.e., provided that the
matter is a deterministic one.
Finally, (4) and (5) will be treated, in the 3DAA
language, in exactly the manner in which they were treated
in the 3DAMA. language.
In general, there are two main differences between the
3DAA language and semantics and the 3DAMA language and
semantics. The first is that there can be true sentences of
the 3DAMA language that express singular propositions about
merely past objects, but there cannot be such sentences of
the 3DAA language. The second is that there can be true
sentences of the 3DAMA language that express propositions
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about matters in the past that are not entailed by the
combination of the current state of affairs plus the laws of
nature, but there cannot be such sentences of the 3DAA
language
.
4 . 7 Conclusion
The 4D and 3DRR views can each be accomodated by a
traditional predicate calculus, with the standard kind of
semantics for such a language. Each of the 3DAR, 3DAMA and
3DAA views requires a tense logic, i.e., a formal language
that includes special intensional operators that correspond
to the past- and future-tenses, and whose semantics involve
assigning truth-values to sentences at times. The semantics
for the 3DAR language can be of the traditional kind for
such a tense logic, so that the lines contained in models
for the language will all be non-branching. The semantics
for the 3DAMA language, however, must allow for models with
lines that branch in the direction of the future. Finally,
the semantics for the 3DAA language must allow for models
with lines that branch both in the direction of the future
and in the direction of the past.
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CHAPTER 5: ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PASSAGE VIEWS
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 I considered several different views (each
one consisting of a package of metaphysical components)
about the passage of time. Four of the views constituted
ways of providing a positive answer to the question 'Does
time pass?' . In this chapter I will turn to a consideration
of the main arguments that may be brought against these
passage views. I'll begin by considering two versions of a
well-known argument aimed at passage views, which I will
call "The Rate of Passage Argument." Then I will consider a
version of McTaggart's famous argument that is relevant to
the views in question. I will conclude that none of these
arguments - neither McTaggart's Argument nor the first nor
the second version of The Rate of Passage Argument - is a
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good one. No 3D theorist needs to be especially concerned by
these arguments, because in each one there is some premise
that the 3D theorist can happily reject.
5 • 2—The Rate of Passage Arguments
In this section I will discuss two distinct but closely
related arguments that have been brought against the passage
views. As far as I can tell, these arguments, or arguments
very much like them, were first suggested in the literature
by C.D Broad. 1 But J.J.C. Smart has probably been the most
earnest proponent of The Rate of Passage Arguments, and it
is to him that I will look for a statement of the arguments.
In his famous article, "The River of Time," Smart
argues against the idea that time can properly be thought of
as something that flows like a river.
If time is a flowing river we must think of
events taking time to float down this stream,
and if we say 'time has flowed faster to-day
than yesterday' we are saying that the stream
flowed a greater distance to-day than it did
in the same time yesterday. That is, we are
postulating a second time-scale with respect
to which the flow of events along the first
1 Broad, "Ostensible Temporality," p. 124. See also Smart,
"The River of Time, " pp. 214-216; Smart, Philosophy and
Scientific Realism, p. 136; Prior, "Changes in Events and
Changes in Things;" Schlesinger, "How Time Flies," pp.
5 0 7 f f
.
;
Zwart, About Time, chapter V.
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time-dimension is measured. 'To-day'
,
'to-
morrow'
,
'yesterday'
,
become systematically
ambiguous. They may represent positions in the
first time-dimension, as in 'to-day I played
cricket and to-morrow I shall do so again'
,
or
they may represent positions in the second
time-dimension, as in 'to-day time flowed
faster than it did yesterday'
. Nor will it
help matters to say that time always flows at
the same rate. Furthermore, just as we thought
of the first time-dimension as a stream, so
will we want to think of the second time-
dimension as a stream also; now the speed of
flow of the second stream is a rate of change
with respect to a third time-dimension, and so
we can go on indefinitely postulating fresh
streams without being any better satisfied.
["The River of Time," pp. 214-215.]
As I see it, the argument that Smart is suggesting here
begins with the claim that we can understand the idea of
time's flowing or passing only if we posit some second time-
dimension in terms of which we can explicate the flowing or
passing of normal time. This claim would presumably be
justified by an appeal to some principle about the meaning
of the words 'flow' and 'pass' when applied to time. The
principle might be formulated as follows.
The passage principle: To say that some time-
dimension, T, flows or passes is to say that
there is some other time-dimension, T' , such
that T' is distinct from T, and the flow or
passage of events in T is to be measured with
respect to T'
.
The argument also involves the claim that if time flows
or passes, then in order for any time-dimension to be a
legitimate time-dimension, it must flow or pass. This claim
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would presumably be defended by appeal to a principle that
could be formulated as follows.
The essentiality principle: If flowing or
passing is a characteristic of time, then
flowing or passing must be an essential
characteristic of any time-dimension.
More is needed, however, in order to ensure that, as
Smart says, "we can go on indefinitely." It must also be
claimed that the passage of any time-dimension is to be
measured only with respect to some previously unmentioned
time-dimension. This principle might be formulated as
follows
.
The uniqueness principle: For any series of
time-dimensions, Tl, ..., Tn, such that the
passage of each member of the series is to be
measured with respect to the next member of
the series, the passage of Tn must be measured
with respect to some time-dimension, Tm, such
that Tm is distinct from each member of the
series Tl-Tn.
Now the argument can be formulated as follows.
The First Rate of Passage Argument
(1) If time flows or passes, then there is
some second time-dimension with respect to
which the passage of normal time is to be
measured
.
(2) If there is some second time-dimension
with respect to which the passage of normal
time is to be measured, then the second time-
dimension must flow or pass.
(3) If the second time-dimension flows or
passes, then there must be some third time-
dimension with respect to which the passage of
the second time-dimension is to be measured,
and, hence, some fourth time-dimension with
respect to which the passage of the third
time-dimension is to be measured, and so on
indefinitely
.
(4) It's not the case that there is some third
time-dimension with respect to which the
passage of the second time-dimension is to be
measured, and, hence, some fourth time-
dimension with respect to which the passage of
the third time-dimension is to be measured,
and so on indefinitely.
5
It's not the case that time flows or
passes
.
Whatever plausibility this argument has is due to
premises (2) -(4). If any of the 3D views entailed some kind
of infinite series of time-dimensions in order to explicate
fully the claim that time passes, then that view would
surely be untenabe to any but the most wildly free-spending
of ontologists . But no 3D theorist needs to accept premise
(1) of this argument.
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Let us first consider how 3DAR, 3DAMA and 3DAA
theorists should respond to this argument. In his lecture
"Changes in Events and Changes in Things," Prior shows how
one who holds the 3D view plus the semantical thesis of
temporal actualism can account for the truth in saying that
time passes, without thereby becoming committed to an
infinite series of time-dimensions. The explanation begins
with a consideration of the primitive tenses accepted by
such a theorist. I mentioned in Chapter 3 that these tenses
are to be understood as sentential operators, akin to
'allegedly', 'possibly', and 'it's not the case that'; they
make sentences out of sentences. Now, Prior points out that
talk about time' s flowing or passing can be understood as
talk about a special kind of change.
To say that a change has occurred is to say
at least this much: that something which was
the case formerly is not the case now. That
is, it is at least to say that for some
sentence p we have
It was the case that p, and it
is not the case that p.
This sentence p can be as complicated as you
like, and can itself contain tense-adverbs, so
that one example of our formula would be
It was the case 5 months ago that
(it was the case only 47 years ago
that (I am being born) )
,
and it is
not now the case that (it was the
case only 47 years ago that (I am
being born) )
,
that is, I am not as young as I used to be.
This last change, of course, is a case of
precisely that recession of events into the
past that we are really talking about when we
say that time flows or passes, and the piling
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of time-references on top of one another, with
no suggestion that time-words must be used in
3- different sense at each level, simply
reflects the fact that tense—adverbs are
adverbs, not verbs. ["Changes in Events and
Changes in Things," p. 9.]
The point here is that to say that time flows or
passes, as the 3DAR, 3DAMA and 3DAA theorists say it does,
is simply to say that many instances of the form "It has
been the case that p and it is not the case that p" are
true. As Prior remarks at the end of the same lecture,
this formula continues to express what is
common to the flow of a literal river on the
one hand (where it was the case that such-and-
such drops were at a certain place, and this
is the case no longer) and the flow of time on
the other. ["Changes in Events and Changes in
Things,
" p . 14 .
]
To say that time passes, in this sense, does not
require different time-dimensions. It does, however, require
the tensed view of propositions, and the claim that
different sentences or propositions are true at different
times. 3DAR, 3DAMA and 3DAA theorists can thus respond to
the above argument by denying premise (1)
.
They can maintain
that the special sense in which it is correct to say that
time flows or passes is a metaphorical sense; it does not
require an additional time-dimension in which to measure the
rate of time's flow, because the views in question do not
involve saying that time literally flows. 2
2 Does this mean that the 3D theorist cannot say that time
literally flows or passes, even if he or she wants to, on
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What about the 3DRR theorist? I said in section 3.8,
somewhat hesitantly, that it seemed reasonable to call 3DRR
a passage view, because on this view there is an important
difference between space and time, insofar as physical
objects endure through time but do not do anything analogous
through space. Hence 3DRR entials that SPT is false.
The reason I hesitated to call 3DRR a passage view,
however, is that 3DRR does not entail that time passes in
the sense suggested by Prior in the passages quoted above.
For according to 3DRR, there are no true sentences of the
form "It was the case that p, and it is not the case that
p." Thus, if saying that time passes means denying SPT, then
3DRR is one way of saying that time passes; but if saying
that time passes also means saying that there are some true
instances of Prior's formula, then 3DRR is not a way of
saying that time passes.
In any case, I don't see any reason for a 3DRR theorist
to accept premise (1) of The First Rate of Passage Argument.
Insofar as it is true to say that time passes, according to
3DRR, i.e., insofar as SPT is false, it certainly does not
follow that there is some second time-dimension with respect
to which the passage of normal time is to be measured.
Immediately after the passage quoted above from "The
River of Time," Smart goes on to say some things that
pain of succumbing to The First Rate of Passage Argument?
This question will be addressed below; I will argue that the
correct answer to it is No.
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suggest yet another argument against the claim that time
passes
.
A connected point is this: with respect to
motion in space it is always possible to ask
'how fast is it?' An express train, for
example, may be moving at 88 feet per second.
The question, 'How fast is it moving?' is a
sensible question with a definite answer: '88
feet per second' . We may not in fact know the
answer, but we do at any rate know what sort
of answer is required. Contrast the pseudo-
question 'How fast am I advancing through
time?' or 'How fast did time flow yesterday?'
We do not know how we ought to set about
answering it. What sort of measurements ought
we to make? We do not even know the sort of
units in which our answer should be expressed.
'I am advancing through time at how many
seconds per ?' we might begin, and then we
should have to stop. What could possibly fill
in the blank? Not 'seconds' surely. In that
case the most we could hope for would be the
not very illuminating remark that there is
just one second in every second. ["The River
of Time ,
" p . 215 . ]
The argument suggested here, it seems to me, is based
not on the claim that we shall need an infinite series of
time-dimensions in order to explain, or measure, the passage
of our original time-dimension, but, rather, on the claim
that to say that time flows is to raise a question that
cannot be coherently answered. The question is 'How fast
does time flow?'
.
That this question arises from the claim that time
flows would presumably be defended by an appeal to something
like the following principle.
The principle of change: For any thing, x, if
x changes, then x changes at some rate.
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the question 'How fast does time flow?' cannot be
coherently answered would presumably be defended in part by
an appeal to a definition like the following.
R is a rate =df there is some parameter, P,
and number, n, such that R = n units of P per
unit of time.
To this definition would be added two further claims: (i)
the claim that the ' first parameter involved in the rate of
the flow of time would have to be time, so that the rate of
the flow of time would be something of the form "n units of
time per unit of time”; and (ii) a claim to the effect that
something of the form "n units of time per unit of time"
does not express a coherent rate. The definition of 'rate',
then, together with these two claims, would justify the
premise that the question 'How fast does time flow?' cannot
be coherently answered.
Finally, the argument also depends on a principle about
coherency, such as the following.
The principle of coherency
:
For any thing, x,
if x flows, then it is possible to state
coherently the rate at which x flows.
This second rate of passage argument can now be
formulated as follows.
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The Second Rate of Passage Argument
(1) If it makes sense to say that time flows,
then it makes sense to ask 'How fast does time
flow?'
.
(2) If it makes sense to ask 'How fast does
time flow?', then it's possible for there to
be a coherent answer to this question.
(3) It's not possible for there to be a
coherent answer to this question.
(4)
It doesn't make sense to say that time
flows
.
This, it seems to me, is a very interesting argument,
and one that raises several important issues about the ways
in which we talk about the passage of time, in particular,
and rates in general. But I also think that once these
issues are spelled out, it can be shown that there are at
least four distinct, adequate responses to the argument
available to the 3D theorist.
In order to explain this it will first be necessary to
say some things about rates. As a paradigm case involving
the rate of some process, let us suppose that it is 1964 and
we are watching Abebe Bikela run in the Olympic marathon in
Tokyo. For the sake of simplicity we will suppose that
Bikela' s rate is constant throughout the race. How exactly
can we determine what that rate is? I.e., what is the
procedure that we would go through in order to find out how
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fast Bikela is running? Well, it might be something like
this: we first check Bikela' s position on the course by
noting that he is passing a certain mile-marker, and, at
roughly the same time, we check the time; then we note when
Bikela passes the next mile-marker, and again check the
time; if we find that five minutes have passed while Bikela
has run one mile then we will know that he is running at the
rate of one mile per five minutes, or twelve miles per hour.
But how exactly do we check the time at the appropriate
moments during this procedure? Well, we simply consult a
clock. Thus, our investigation reveals that while Bikela'
s
position on the course changed by one mile, the position of
the hands on the clock changed by the amount that marks off
five minutes. Since we assume that the rate of Bikela'
s
change in position is constant, and also that the rate of
the change in position of the hands on the clock is
constant, we are in effect comparing the rates of these two
changes to one another. But, of course, we really have no
special interest in the rate of the change in position of
the hands on that particular clock; our interest in the
clock is only due to the fact that we take it to be so
calibrated that it changes at a constant rate; a rate, that
is, that by convention we use to measure periods of time.
This conventional rate is, of course, not just any old rate;
5 supposed to be the rate at which the sun changes its
position in the sky. Really, then, the clock is a stand-in
for the sun; and what we have really done in carrying out
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our procedure is to compare the rate of Bikela' s change of
position to the rate of the sun's change of position. Our
investigation has revealed that while Bikela' s position on
the course changed by one mile, the sun's position in the
sky changed by roughly one and one-quarter degrees.
These are the logistical facts of the matter, and they
capture the mechanics of our talk about the rates of such
physical processes as Bikela' s motion. It may seem, however,
that there is something deeper going on when we make the
appropriate investigations and find out that Bikela is
traveling at the rate of twelve miles per hour. While we
have in practice merely compared the rate of one physical
change to the rate of another, it seems that we have at
least attempted to do something quite different. For just as
we are not really interested in the rate of the change of
position of the hands on our clock, so we are not, it seems,
really interested in the rate of the change of position of
the sun; the latter change is also meant to be a stand-in
for a more important change, namely the passage of time
itself. Indeed, it seems that our assumption that the sun's
position changes at a constant rate amounts to the
assumption that the sun's position changes at the rate of
fifteen degrees per hour, i.e., that every time the sun
moves fifteen degrees across the sky, one hour of time
passes. So it at least appears that what we are after in
trying to determine the rates of various physical processes,
such as Bikela' s running of the marathon, are the rates at
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which those processes occur in comparison to the rate of the
passage of time.
Here, it seems to me, a very interesting issue arises.
The issue is, roughly, whether there is in fact some special
sort of change that always occurs while other changes are
occurring: a change that is entailed by any other change
whatsoever, but one that does not itself entail any other
change. Let us agree to call this putative kind of change
"the pure passage of time". 3 We can define it as follows:
x is the pure passage of time =df x is a
change and for any y, if y is a change then,
necessarily, if y occurs then x occurs; but it
is not the case that there is some change, z,
such that z is distinct from x and,
necessarily, if x occurs then z occurs.
Then we can define what might be called "normal" or "run of
the mill" changes as follows:
x is a normal change =df x is a change and
it's possible that there is some y such that y
is a change and it's not the case that,
necessarily, if y occurs then x occurs.
It may seem that the change in the position of the sun
is merely a stand-in for the pure passage of time. I.e., it
may seem that when we compare the rate of the marathoner to
the rate of the change in the sun' s position, what we are
really doing, or attempting to do, is comparing the rate of
3 It is sometimes called "pure becoming" . See, for example,
Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, pp. 73ff.
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the marathoner to the rate of the pure passage of time, so
that a statement to the effect that Bikela' s rate is twelve
miles per hour means that he runs a mile during every hour
of the pure passage of time.
On the other hand, it may seem that there is no such
change as the pure passage of time, in the sense defined
above. I.e., it may seem that it's false that there is some
underlying change that is entailed by every other change in
the world but that itself entails no other change. In what
follows I will call the thesis that there is such a thing as
the pure passage of time "PPT"
,
and I will refer to the
denial of this thesis as "NPPT"
.
What reasons are there for asserting PPT? I can think
of two main reasons. The first is that this claim fits the
way we ordinarily speak about time. We talk as if there is
more to the concept of an hour than merely a change of
fifteen degrees in the sun's position in the sky. As far as
I can tell, our ordinary modes of speaking suggest that talk
about the change in the position of the sun is really just a
stand-in for talk about real hours, which are units of time
quite independent of the sun's motion in the sky. If this
kind of talk is to be taken seriously then we must commit
ourselves to the pure passage of time.
The second reason I can think of for asserting PPT is
the close connection between this claim and the view that I
have been calling temporal Platonism. I don't know whether
PPT should properly be thought of as a component of temporal
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Platonism, or, instead, as a separate view. But it seems
clear that at the very least PPT and temporal Platonism
entail one another. For if the ontological thesis of
temporal Platonism is true then it is possible for there to
be a period of empty time, i.e., a period of time during
which nothing happens except that time passes; thus the only
change that would be occurring would be the kind of change
that fits the definition of the pure passage of time. It
would be very implausible to maintain that this kind of
change is possible, but that it does not actually occur. And
if PPT is true, so that there is a special kind of change
that underlies every other change but does not entail any
other change, then this change could no doubt occur all by
itself; i.e., there could be a period of empty time. So
anyone who is inclined to accept temporal Platonism should
also accept PPT, and vice versa.
This should make it plain, of course, that there is an
equally good reason for asserting NPPT, namely, the view
that I have been calling temporal reductionism . As with
temporal Platonism and PPT, it is not obvious whether NPPT
should be seen as a component of temporal reductionism or as
something distinct; but in any case it seems clear that NPPT
and temporal reductionism entail one another. For if the
ontological thesis of temporal reductionism is true then
there can be no such thing as a period of empty time, i.e.,
a period during which the only change that occurs is the
pure passage of time. And, similarly, if there is no such
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thing as this kind of change, then it is not possible for
there to be a period of empty time. So anyone who is
inclined to accept temporal reductionism should also acccept
NPPT, and vice versa.
In addition to its connection with temporal
reductionism, there is another plausible reason for
accepting NPPT: the pure passage of time, if there were such
a thing, would be an utterly mysterious change that would
render our claims about the rates of run of the mill changes
relative to the rate of the pure passage of time in
principle unverifiable . The pure passage of time would be
mysterious because it would not be something that we could
ever observe directly - our only evidence for it would be
the fact that other changes occur, together with whatever
theoretical considerations lead us to posit the pure passage
of time. And the pure passage of time would render claims
about the rates of other changes relative to the rate of the
pure passage of time unverifiable because, for all we would
be able to tell, it might be that on some days all of the
other changes in the world speed up to a thousand times
their normal rates, relative to the pure passage of time,
and that on other days they slow down just as drastically.
Such a thing is not possible according to NPPT. For
suppose that NPPT is true. Then what is meant by 'Bikela is
running at the rate of twelve miles per hour' ? The sentence
cannot mean that Bikela runs twelve miles in each hour of
pure time; rather, it must mean something like this: Bikela
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runs twelve miles each time the sun's position changes by
fifteen degrees. This latter change would then be simply a
standard, chosen by convention, for comparing rates and
lengths of various changes. But the standard wouldn't stand
for anything else - it would not serve as a marker for
approximating the pure passage of time. And if it should
turn out one day that the motion of the sun in the sky
appears to speed up drastically relative to other, familiar
changes, then we should say, not that the motion of the sun
has sped up drastically relative to the pure passage of
time, while every other change has maintained its rate, but,
rather, simply that the sun's motion has sped up relative to
the other normal changes. We may then want to choose another
standard for comparing the rates and lengths of changes,
especially if the speed of the sun seems to have become
erratic. In so choosing we would no doubt want to select a
change that occurs periodically and that seems relatively
constant
.
So if NPPT is true, then all of our talk about the
rates of different changes must be understood as talk that
is meant to compare the rate of one ordinary change to the
rate of another; a question such as 'How fast does x
change?' must be a question about the speed of the change in
x relative to the speed of some other change (s). It just so
happens that in answering such questions we generally select
the change in the position of the sun as the second change,
to which the first one is compared. Thus the standard way of
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answering such a question is to: (i) pick some unit for
measuring the change in x (e.g., for the change in Bikela'
s
position we pick miles) ; (ii) pick some other change
(preferably a cyclical one, such as the apparent rotation of
the sun around the earth) ; (iii) pick some unit for
measuring this other change (e.g., l/ 24th of a full
revolution, also known as an hour) ; and (iv) compare the
rate of the change in x to the rate of this other change by
comparing the number of units by which x changes to the
number of units by which this other thing changes
concurrently (getting an answer like 'Twelve miles per
hour' )
.
If PPT is true, on the other hand, then talk about
rates can be understood in either of several ways. We could
still say that such talk simply consists of comparisons
between the rates of different changes, sometimes including
the pure passage of time; or we could say that talk about
rates essentially involves comparisons between the rates of
different changes and the rate of the pure passage of time.
If this is the case, then whenever we select some observable
change (such as the change in the position of the sun, or
the change in the position of the hands on a clock) for the
purpose of measuring a particular change whose rate we are
interested in, that observable change is merely a stand-in
for the pure passage of time.
Two main questions arise, then, concerning our talk
about rates: Is there really such a thing as the pure
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passage of time? And even if there is such a thing, what is
essential about rate talk - the comparison of any two
changes, or the comparison of one change to the pure passage
of time?
All of this is relevant to The Second Rate of Passage
Argument
. The 3D theorist is free to give either a positive
or a negative answer to the first question. Suppose he or
she says that there is no such thing as the pure passage of
time. Then what does he or she mean by 'Time flows'? Well,
as I have indicated above, for a 3DAR, 3DAMA or 3DAA
theorist, this kind of talk is simply metaphorical talk
meaning, roughly, that many instances of "It has been the
case that p and it is not the case that p" are true. The
3DAR, 3DAMA or 3DAA theorist can quite reasonably say this
without at the same time admitting that it makes sense to
ask 'How fast does time flow?' . After all, it certainly
doesn't make sense to ask 'How fast is it the case that many
instances of "It has been the case that p and it is not the
case that p" are true?'
.
Similarly, for a 3DRR theorist, 'Time flows' , if true,
means, roughly, that SPT is false. Such a theorist can
reasonably assert this without at the same time admitting
that it makes sense to ask 'How fast does time flow?' . After
all, it certainly doesn't make sense to ask 'How fast is it
the case that SPT is false?'
.
Thus, any 3D theorist who thinks that there is no such
thing as the pure passage of time will reject premise (1) of
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The Second Rate of Passage Argument, but will still be able
to maintain that 'Time passes' is true when understood in
the appropriate way.
What about 3D theorists who do accept that there is
such a thing as the pure passage of time? Well, it seems
clear that such people will admit that 'Time flows' is
literally true, so that they will not want to reject premise
(1) of The Second Rate of Passage Argument. But they will
then have a choice about how to answer the second question
about rate talk. Suppose a 3D theorist who accepts PPT
believes that talk about any rate essentially involves a
comparison between two different changes, but that it need
not be the case that one of the changes compared is the pure
passage of time. (Such a person might support his or her
position by pointing out that in at least some instances we
speak of a certain rate without appearing to make any
reference to time. For example, I might say that during the
1970 World Series, Brooks Robinson's batting average
increased at the rate of 30 points per game.) Then the 3D
theorist will think that any time one gives the rate of some
change in terms of some second change, one has likewise
given the rate of the second change. If, for example, I tell
you that Robinson's batting average increased at the rate of
30 points per game, then I have also told you that the games
progressed at the rate of one game per 30 points of
Robinson's batting average. Hence, whenever one gives the
rate of some normal change in what is admittedly the
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standard way, i.e., in terms of the pure passage of time,
then one has likewise given the rate of the pure passage of
time in terms of the first change. If I tell you that Bikela
is running at the rate of twelve miles per hour of the pure
passage of time, for example, then I have also told you that
the pure passage of time is flowing at the rate of one hour
for every mile run by Bikela. The 3D theorist who takes this
line can thus reject premise (3) of The Second Rate of
Passage Argument, while still insisting that it is literally
true that time flows. For he or she will think that it is
possible to state coherently the rate at which time flows,
and that this information is in fact given each time the
rate of some normal change is described in terms of the pure
passage of time.
Suppose that a 3D theorist who accepts PPT believes
that all talk about rates is essentially talk comparing some
change to the pure passage of time; there is still, it seems
to me, an important choice for such a person to make with
regard to how we are to understand rate talk. For he or she
might believe that there are no restrictions on what kind of
changes can be sensibly compared to the pure passage of
time; in particular, it may be sensible to compare the pure
passage of time to itself. According to this view, the
question 'How fast does time flow?' is a sensible question
with a sensible answer: time flows at the rate of one hour
per hour. One who takes this line will be able to reject
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premise (3) of The Second Rate of Passage Argument and still
maintain that it is literally true that time flows.
Finally, a 3D theorist who accepts PPT may choose to
say that what is essential about rate talk is that it
compare (a) some normal change to (b) the pure passage of
time. According to this view, it does not make sense to ask
about the rate of the flow of time, for to do so is to make
a category mistake: the answer would have to involve a
comparison between the pure passage of time and the pure
passage of time. Such an answer would not make sense because
the pure passage of time has a unique status among changes -
it is the one to which other, normal changes are to be
compared. It is the paradigm, and, as such, it alone among
changes cannot be measured. 4 One who takes this line will
thus accept premise (3) of The Second Rate of Passage
Argument, but he or she will be able to reject premise (1)
of the argument, without thereby being compelled to deny
that time literally flows.
To summarize the situation with regard to The Second
Rate of Passage Argument: if what I have said above is
correct then there are at least four adequate responses to
that argument available to the 3D theorist. Each of these
4 Wittgenstein makes analogous remarks about the standard
meter: "There is one thing of which one can say neither that
it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and
that is the standard metre in Paris. -- But this is, of
course, not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but
only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of
measuring with a metre-rule." [Philosophical Investigations,
50. ]
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different responses involves giving an answer to the
question about the pure passage of time, and also giving
answers to the questions about rate talk. The four responses
are: ( 1 ) deny that there is such a thing as the pure passage
of time, say that 'Time flows' is just shorthand for either
'Many instances of "It has been the case that p and it is
not the case that p" are true' or else 'SPT is false'
,
and
say that rate talk just involves a comparison between any
two normal changes, thereby rejecting premise (1) of the
argument, (ii) admit that there is such a thing as the pure
passage of time, say that 'Time flows' is literally true,
but say that rate talk can involve a comparison between any
two changes, thereby rejecting premise (3) of the argument;
( iii ) admit that there is such a thing as the pure passage
of time, say that 'Time flows' is literally true, and say
that rate talk always involves a comparison in which some
change (either a normal change or else the pure passage of
time) is compared to the pure passage of time, thereby
rejecting premise (3) of the argument; and (iv) admit that
there is such a thing as the pure passage of time, say that
'Time flows' is literally true, and say that rate talk
essentially involves making a comparison between some normal
change and the pure passage of time, so that it doesn't make
sense to ask 'How fast does time flow?'
,
thereby rejecting
premise (1) of the argument.
The reader will perhaps have noticed that any 3D
theorist who opts for PPT and, consequently, any one of
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responses (ii)
,
(iii) or (iv) to The Second Rate of Passage
Argument will no longer be able to offer the response that I
suggested above to The First Rate of Passage Argument. For
that response is inconsistent with maintaining that there is
such a thing as the pure passage of time. What then will the
3D theorist who wishes to maintain PPT be able to say about
The First Rate of Passage Argument?
Well, he or she will not be able to reject premise (1)
of that argument on the grounds that time does not literally
flow or pass. But he or she should, it seems to me, still
deny that premise. He or she should say that PPT does not
entail that there is some second time-dimension with respect
to which the passage of normal time is to be measured. In
order to see how this move is to be made, let us go back and
follow the dialectic of the discussion. Suppose I agree that
PPT is true, and accept all the other parts of one of the 3D
packages. This is my reason for saying that time flows or
passes. Now I can rightfully ask: why is this supposed to
commit me to saying that there is some second time-dimension
with respect to which the flowing of normal time is to be
measured? I.e.,, why should I accept premise (1) of The
First Rate of Passage Argument? Well, there was this so-
called principle:
The passage principle: To say that some time-
dimension, T, flows or passes is to say that
there is some other time-dimension, T' , such
that T' is distinct from T, and the flow or
passage of events in T is to be measured with
respect to T'
.
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And why should I consent to the passage principle?
Presumably Smart's justification will be that we have
adopted a certain standard way of talking about flowing or
passage, and this standard way forces us into saying that if
time flows or passes then there is this other time-
dimension, etc.
But before we go any further, notice that what I mean
by 'Time flows or passes' is the combination of PPT plus the
various components of the 3D view to which I subscribe. This
actually has little in common with what we normally mean
when we say of something (a river, say, or some gas in a
chamber) that it flows or passes. So it's not at all clear
that talk about time' s flowing or passage must be treated in
a fashion parallel to talk of other kinds of flowing or
passage. Hence the argument based on an appeal to some
parallel between talk of ordinary flowing and talk of time'
s
flowing won't be very impressive. I see no reason why I
should accept the passage principle or premise (1)
.
So I accept PPT, the different components of my 3D
view, and I assent to 'Time flows or passes'
,
but I reject
both the passage principle and premise (1) of The First Rate
of Passage Argument. Now, in a move designed to force me
into speaking of a second time-dimension, Smart questions me
on the subject of the pure passage of time: How fast does it
occur? How are we to measure its rate?
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But here, of course, we are back to discussing the
issues raised by The Second Rate of Passage Argument, so
that what I've said above about the latter argument is
relevant. It seems to me that I have thus successfully
challenged The First Rate of Passage Argument by calling
into question one of its premises, thereby forcing Smart to
resort to The Second Rate of Passage Argument in an attempt
to justify the undefended premise in question (namely,
premise (1) of The First Rate of Passage Argument); but I
already know what to say about The Second Rate of Passage
Argument. I simply make one of the responses to that
argument described above. I conclude that Smart's arguments
will not convince any 3D theorist.
5.3 McTaqqart ' s Argument Against the 3D Views
McTaggart's Argument first appeared in 1908. 5 Since
then it has been reformulated, criticized and defended
dozens of times each. 6 The reader who is interested in the
5 "The Unreality of Time," pp. 457-474. See also his The
Nature of Existence, chapter 33.
6 See, for example, Dummett, "A Defense of McTaggart's Proof
of the Unreality of Time;" Gale, Introduction to section II
of The Philosophy of Time, and also The Language of Time;
Mellor, Real Time; Prior, Past, Present and Future;
Schlesinger, Aspects of Time; and Woolf, McTaggart , Dummett
,
and Time.
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historical details of this discussion is advised to consult
the works referred to in the last footnote. I will not here
attempt to give a faithful survey of the argument's history.
Instead, I will formulate what I take to be the most
plausible version of the argument that may be directed at
the passage views under consideration, in order to see
whether those views can in fact be refuted by a variation of
McTaggart's Argument.
In its original form, as presented by McTaggart, the
argument was meant to prove that time is unreal. It's not
clear to me exactly what that conclusion would mean. The
strategy with which McTaggart set out to prove his
conclusion, however, is fairly clear. He first attempted to
show that each event and each moment of time must possess
all of the various A-properties . Then he attempted to show
that the possession of the various A-properties by all of
these events and moments of time would lead to numerous
contradictions. Finally, he considered what he took to be an
inevitable reply that would be made on behalf of the view
that the entities in question possess the different A-
properties; and he concluded that this reply would generate
an infinite regress of contradictions.
We have seen that the question of whether events and
moments of time possess genuine A-properties is a
controversial question. According to the 3DAR, 3DAMA and
3DAA views they do, 7 but according to the 3DRR and 4D views
7 It will be convenient, for the sake of considering
McTaggart's argument, to assume that the 3D theorist does
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they do not. So the first stage of the reasoning employed by
McTaggart consists of an attempt to show something that is a
tenet of three of the different versions of the 3D view. For
our purposes, the details of this first stage of McTaggart'
s
reasoning are unimportant, since that stage aims to show
something that is already accepted by the views in question,
namely, 3DAR, 3DAMA and 3DAA. In this section I will simply
consider the second stage of McTaggart' s reasoning, taken as
a reductio argument against the claim that each event and
each moment of time possesses the various A-propert ies
.
That each event and each moment of time possesses the
various A-propert ies
,
then, is to be assumed for the
purposes of the reductio . McTaggart argues as follows.
Past, present, and future are incompatible
determinations. Every event must be one or the
other, but no event can be more than one. If I
say that any event is past, that implies that
it is neither present nor future, and so with
the others . .
.
The characteristics, therefore, are
incompatible. But every event has them all. If
M is past, it has been present and future. If
it is future, it will be present and past. If
it is present, it has been future and will be
•
past. Thus all the three characteristics
belong to each event. How is this consistent
with their being incompatible?
It may seem that this can easily be
explained. Indeed, it has been impossible to
state the difficulty without almost giving the
explanation, since our language has verb-forms
for the past, present, and future, but no form
that is common to all three. It is never true,
the answer will run, that M is present, past,
not wish to analyze away talk about A-properties in terms of
primitive tenses, even though, as was seen in Chapter 3,
some versions of the 3D view may call for this kind of
analysis
.
215
and future. It is present, will be past, andhas been future. Or it is past, and has been
future and present, or again is future, and
will be present and past. The characteristics
are only incompatible when they are
simultaneous, and there is no contradiction to
this in the fact that each term has all of
them successively.
But what is meant by "has been" and "will
be"? And what is meant by "is," when, as here,
it is used with a temporal meaning, and not
simply for predication? When we say that X has
been Y, we are asserting X to be Y at a moment
of past time. When we say that X will be Y, we
are asserting X to be Y at a moment of future
time. When we say that X is Y (in the temporal
sense of "is"), we are asserting X to be Y at
a moment of present time.
Thus our first statement about M - that it is
present, will be past, and has been future -
means that M is present at a moment of present
time, past at some moment of future time, and
future at some moment of past time. But every
moment, like every event, is both past,
present, and future. And so a similar
difficulty arises. If M is present, there is
no moment of past time at which it is past.
But the moments of future time, in which it is
past, are equally moments of past time, in
which it cannot be past. Again, that M is
future and will be present and past means that
M is future at a moment of present time, and
present and past at different moments of
future time. In that case it cannot be present
or past at any moments of past time. But all
the moments of future time, in which M will be
present or past, are equally moments of past
time.
And thus again we get a contradiction, since
the moments at which M has any one of the
three determinations of the A series are also
moments at which it cannot have that
determination. If we try to avoid this by
saying of these moments what had been
previously said of M itself - that some
moment, for example, is future, and will be
present and past - then "is" and "will be"
have the same meaning as before. Our
statement, then, means that the moment in
question is future at a present moment, and
will be present and past at different moments
of future time. This, of course, is the same
difficulty over again. And so on infinitely.
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Such an infinity is vicious. The attribution
of the characteristics past, present, and
future to the terms of any series leads to a
contradiction, unless it is specified that
they have them successively. This means, as we
have seen, that they have them in relation to
terms specified as past, present, and future.
And, since this continues infinitely, the
first set of terms never escapes from
contradiction at all. ["Time,” pp . 94-96.]
I have quoted McTaggart at such great length so that
the reader may judge whether my formulation and criticism of
McTaggart' s Argument does it justice. Notice that the way
McTaggart presents the problem, we start with the assumption
that each event possesses the different A-properties
,
which
seem to be mutually incompatible. This leads us to say that
each event possesses the different A-properties at different
times, in order to resolve the prima facie contradictions.
But then we are faced with the problem of having to admit
that these different times must themselves possess the A-
properties, which still seem to be mutually incompatible.
Hence we make the inevitable reply, saying that the
different times we have mentioned themselves possess the
dreaded A-properties at still other times; and the regress
has begun.
It seems odd to me that McTaggart should start with
events, regress to times, and then continue to regress to
more and more times. Why bother with the events at all? Why
not cut straight to the chase, since, as he sees it, all
that is really needed to generate an infinite and vicious
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regress is the claim that each time possesses the different
A-properties?
Well, one reason for this roundabout procedure might be
to impress people who are happy about having events in their
ontologies but somewhat reluctant about also including
times. Perhaps McTaggart doesn't want to scare off such
people prematurely; so he begins with the relatively
innoccuous assumption about events, shows that the
incompatibility of the different A-properties will require
the move to times, and then proceeds with his argument.
But it was seen in Chapter 3 that events are themselves
not above controversy. In particular, there are 3D
theorists, such as Prior, who think that talk about events
is to be analysed in terms of talk about things. McTaggart,
of course, could not have anticipated such a development.
But I don't think his argument suffers because he failed to
do so; it is fairly obvious that whatever argument McTaggart
has can be reformulated so as to apply to reductionists
(about time, that is) and event-reductionists alike. In what
follows, then, I will, for the sake of simplicity, consider
the argument as an argument against those versions of the 3D
view that include ontological commitment to both events and
times. I leave it to the reader to see how the argument
could be reformulated so as to apply to 3D reductionists of
the different possible sorts.
In any case it is, for our purposes, sufficient and
acceptable to begin with the assumption that each time
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possesses all of the different A-properties
. Sufficient,
because McTaggart thinks that the infinite regress of
contradictions can be generated from this assumption;
acceptable, because the assumption is one that is not here
in question - that each time possesses all of the different
A-properties is already accepted by the versions of the 3D
view in question.
Our first premise, then, will be the assumption that
each moment of time possesses the different A-properties.
Next will be a premise to the effect that these different A-
properties are mutually incompatible. The rationale for this
will be McTaggart' s claim that "If I say that any event is
past, that implies that it is neither present nor future,
and so with the others..." The third premise of the argument
will be designed simply to point out a consequence of the
second: if these different A-properties are incompatible,
then any ascription to a single time of more than one of
them is contradictory. Finally, the fourth premise will
state that it follows from this that our assumption - i.e.,
premise (1) - entails many contradictions.
As I see it, then, the argument may be perspicuously
formulated as an argument against 3DAR, 3DAMA and 3DAA as
follows
.
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McTaggart's Argument Against 3DAR, 3DAMA and 3DAA
(A Reduct io)
(1) Each moment of time possesses all of the
different A-properties
.
[Assumption.]
(2) The different A-properties are mutually
incompatible
.
(3) If (2)
,
then any ascription of different
A-properties to a single time is
contradictory
.
(4) If any ascription of different A-
properties to a single time is contradictory,
then (1) entails many contradictions.
(5)
It's not the case that each moment of time
possesses all of the different A-properties.
Before offering my criticism of this argument I should
be quick to point out that I am not confident that this is
the argument, or even part of the argument, that McTaggart
had in mind when writing the above passage. The reader may
judge for him- or herself whether I have faithfully
interpreted McTaggart; but other writers have certainly
interpreted McTaggart in many different ways. 8
I do feel confident, however, that the above argument
will do for our purposes. For I am sure that I have
correctly interpreted McTaggart at least as far as the
beginnning goes; it seems clear that his argument is based
on premises relevantly like (1), (2) and (3). However else
this stage of McTaggart's Argument is interpreted, it must
8 See the works cited in footnote 5 above.
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be taken to begin with the assumption that each moment of
time possesses all of the different A-properties
,
and to
proceed with the claim that these different A-properties are
mutually incompatible, so that the assumption leads to
certain contradictions. Following this beginning are some
complicated sections concerned with showing that these
contradictions cannot be resolved, and exactly how these
sections of the argument ought to be spelled out is very
difficult to determine from the text; but the details of the
beginning itself are, I take it, uncontroversial
. The
criticism of McTaggart's Argument that I offer below on
behalf of the 3D views in question is aimed only at this
uncontroversial beginning; hence the above version of the
argument is as good as any for the present purposes.
The problem with the argument, as I see it, is with
premise (3)
.
But in order to explain why the 3D theorist 9
would reject that premise, I shall first have to say a good
deal about premises (1) and (2)
.
To begin with, it is important to recall some of the
tenets of the relevant 3D view. One of those tenets, shared
by 3DAR, 3DAMA and 3DAA alike, is that the bearers of truth
and falsity are to be ascribed truth-values at times. (For
the sake of convenience, I will write in what follows as if
the 3D theorist takes sentences to be the bearers of the
9 For the remainder of this chapter I will use '3D view' to
refer collectively to the three versions of the 3D view in
question, namely, 3DAR, 3DAMA and 3DAA; and I will use '3D
theorist' to refer to one who holds any one of these
versions of the 3D view.
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truth-values. But what I say could also be said in terms of
propositions.) Another is the view that the various past,
present, and future tenses of natural languages are to be
taken as primitive. By accepting these two tenets, the 3D
theorist in effect accepts an object-language made up of
tensed sentences about the three-dimensional objects in the
3D ontology, together with a meta-language consisting of
tensed sentences ascribing truth—values at times to the
sentences of this object-language. Thus, he or she agrees to
talk using such object-language sentences as
It has been the case that I am falling out of
a punt,
and such meta-language sentences as
'It has been the case that I am falling out of
a punt' was true in 1957.
It is not necessary for the present purposes to spell
out all of the characteristics of the kind of object-
language that would be accepted by the 3D theorist. But two
further points need to be noted: a) since we are considering
that version of the 3D view that involves ontological
commitment to both events and times, we can assume that the
3D theorist allows quantification over both of these kinds
of entities in his or her object-language; and b) since we
are assuming that our 3D theorist is happy talking about A-
properties without attempting to analyze them away in terms
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of primitive tenses, we can also assume that the 3D theorist
allows talk about, and quantification over, A-properties in
his or her object-language.
Now, there are different things that might be meant by
premise (1) of McTaggart's argument. On some possible
interpretations, (1) is to be taken as a statement in the
object-language, and on some possible interpretations it is
to be taken as a statement in the meta-language. One of the
former interpretations would make (1) equivalent to the
object-language thesis
(OL/la) For every time, t, t is past, present
and future,
which is false, even given all of the different components
of any relevant version of the 3D view. For there is,
according to any such version, with its primitive tenses, no
time that is past, present, and future. 10 Another reading
would make (1) equivalent to the object-language thesis
(OL/lb) For every time, t, and A-property, $, •
either it has been the case that t is $, or
else it is the case that t is $, or else it
will be the case that t is $,
10 We will agree to follow McTaggart in talking about times
as if all of these are instantaneous moments; that he wishes
to make this assumption is evident from the fact that he
wants to say that the different A-properties are mutually
incompatible
.
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which is true, given the components of any relevant version
of the 3D view. 11
There are two corresponding meta-linguistic meanings
that may be attached to (1) . The first would make (1)
equivalent to the meta-linguistic thesis
(ML/ la ) For every time, t, there is some time,
t'
,
such that 't is past', 't is present', and
't is future' all are, were, or will be true
at t',
which is false, according to the 3D theorist. The second
would make (1) equivalent to the meta-linguistic thesis
(ML/ lb) For every time, t, there are some
times, t' and t"
,
such that 't is past' will
be true at t'
,
't is present' is, was, or will
be true at t, and 't is future' was true at
t",
which is true, given the components of any relevant version
of the 3D view. 12
Meanwhile, there are different things that might be
meant by premise (2) of the argument. (2) might be taken to
be equivalent to the object-language thesis
(0L/2a) For any time, t, and distinct A-
properties, $ and #, if t is $, then it is not
the case that either t is #, or it has been
the case that t is #, or it will be the case
that t is #,
11 And also, it should be added, given the assumption that
time is unbounded. Cf. McTaggart, p. 95n.
12 See previous footnote.
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which is false, according to the 3D theorist. But (2) may
also be taken to be equivalent to the object-language thesis
(0L/2b) For any time, t, and distinct A-
properties, $ and #, if t is $, then t is not
#,
which, on any of the relevant versions of the 3D view, is
true. Alternatively, (2) can be taken to be equivalent to
the meta-linguistic thesis
(ML /2a) For any times, t, t' and t' '
,
and
predicates, '$' and '#', such that '$' and '#'
refer to distinct A-properties, if 't is $'
is, was, or will be true at t'
,
then 't is #'
is, was, or will be false at t' '
,
which is false according to any 3D theorist. But (2) could
also be taken to be equivalent to the meta-linguistic thesis
(ML/2b) For any times, t and t'
,
and
predicates, '$' and '#'
,
such that '$' and '#'
refer to distinct A-properties, if 't is $' is
true at t'
,
then 't is #' is false at t' ; if
't is $' was true at t' , then 't is #' was
false at t' ; and if 't is $' will be true at
t' then 't is #' will be false at t',
which is true, given the tenets of any relevant version of
the 3D view, and is also, by the way, entailed by (0L/2b)
.
Here, then, are the versions of (1) and (2) that the
relevant type of 3D theorist accepts:
(OL/lb) For every time, t, and A-property, $,
either it has been the case that t is $, or
else it is the case that t is $, or else it
will be the case that t is $.
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(0L/2b) For any time, t, and distinct A-
properties, $ and #, if t is $, then t is not
#.
(ML/lb) For every time, t, there are some
times, t' and t' '
,
such that 't is past' will
be true at t'
,
't is present' is, was, or will
be true at t, and 't is future' was true at
t' ' .
(ML/ 2b) For any times, t and t'
,
and
predicates, '$' and '#'
,
such that '$' and '#'
refer to distinct A-properties
,
if 't is $' is
true at t'
,
then 't is #' is false at t' ; if
't is $' was true at t'
,
then 't is #' was
false at t' ; and if 't is $' will be true at
t' then 't' is #' will be false at t' .
Now, what about premise (3)
?
I think that the truth of
(0L/2b) and (ML/2b) make it clear that some ascriptions of
different A-properties to a single time are contradictory.
For example, if we let 't 0 ' be a proper name for the first
moment of the year 1961, it follows from (0L/2b) that the
following object-language sentence,
(a) tQ is past and tg is future,
is contradictory. Similarly, it follows from (ML/2b) that
the following meta-language sentence,
(b) 'tg is past' is true in 1989, and 'tQ is
future' is true in 1989,
is contradictory.
But I also think that the falsity of (0L/2a) and
(ML /2a) make it clear that not all ascriptions of different
A-properties to a single time are contradictory. Indeed, to
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say that (0L/2a) is false is to assert the following object-
language thesis:
(7 OIj /2a) There is some time, t, and some
distinct ^-properties, $ and #, such that t is
$, and either t is #, or it has been the case
that t is #, or it will be the case that t is
The truth of this thesis is easy enough to prove; the thesis
is derivable in the 3D theorist's object-language by
existential generalization from such a true sentence as
(c) to is past, and it has been the case that
tQ is present.
Now, (c) is certainly a sort of an ascription of
different A-properties to a single time, and it is just as
certainly non-contradictory (given the 3D assumptions,
including the tensed view of semantics (that is, the 3D
theorist's claim that the bearers of truth and falsity have
these truth-values at times) ) . Similarly, to say that
(ML/2a) is false is to assert this meta-linguist ic thesis:
(~ML/2a) There are some times, t, t' and t' '
,
and some predicates, '$' and '#', such that
'$' and '#' refer to distinct A-properties, 't
is $' is, was, or will be true at t' , and '
t
is #' is, was, or will be true at t' '
.
The latter thesis can be derived from any true meta-
linguistic sentence like the following:
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(d) 't 0 is past' is true in 1989, and 't n isfuture' was true in 1949.
And (d)
,
it seems to me, is, like (c)
,
a sort of an
ascription of different A-properties to a particular time.
The 3D theorist, then, ought to reject premise (3) of
the argument. For he or she thinks that in either of the
true senses of premise (2), namely, (0L/2b) and (ML/2b)
, (2)
does not entail that every ascription of different A-
properties to a sihgle time is contradictory. In particular,
the ascriptions of different A-properties to individual
times that are instances of either of the two true versions
of (1), namely, (OL/lb) and (ML/lb)
,
are non-contradictory.
There is supposed to be a rejoinder for McTaggart to
make to responses to his argument. It may seem that this
rejoinder should apply to what I have just said. Let us see
if it does.
McTaggart says, in effect, that the contradiction
generated by ascribing different A-properties to a single
entity resurfaces even when it is allegedly explained away.
Thus our first statement about M - that it is
present, will be past, and has been future -
means that M is present at a moment of present
time, past at some moment of future time, and
future at some moment of past time. But every
moment, like every event, is both past,
present, and future. And so a similar
difficulty arises. If M is present, there is
no moment of past time at which it is past.
But the moments of future time, in which it is
past, are equally moments of past time, in
which it cannot be past... [Pp. 95-96.]
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This is mere sophistry, however. For one thing, the 3D
theorist has not agreed that there ever was a contradiction
to begin with. He or she has explained the apparent truth of
(1) by rephrasing it as either (OL/lb) or (ML/ lb)
,
and he or
she has also explained the apparent truth of (2) by
rephrasing it as either (0L/2b) or (ML/2b) ; and the
combination of all of these is consistent. The 3D theorist
has then denied that the consequent of (3) follows from
either of the true versions of (2) , thus leaving no
contradictions to be resolved.
For another thing, the reasoning in the passage quoted
immediately above is faulty. In order to see this, consider
the present moment; call it "t*". In accordance with
(OL/lb)
,
the 3D theorist is admittedly compelled to say that
the following are all true right now:
(e) t* is present.
(f) It has been the case that t* is future.
(g) It will be the case that t* is past.
Now we are supposed to agree that the following two
things are inconsistent:
(i) There is no moment of past time at which
t* is past.
(ii) The moments of future time, at which t*
is past, are equally moments of past time.
How can the 3D theorist make sense of (i)
?
Here we must
again be careful to distinguish between tensed, object-
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language sentences (in this case about t*)
,
on the one hand,
and met a- language sentences about such object-language
sentences, on the other hand. The 3D theorist will certainly
not want to accept the object-language sentence
(OL/ia) It's not the case that it has been the
case that it will be the case that t* is past,
for this is false now, according to the 3D view. Nor will he
or she want to accept the meta-language sentence
(ML/ia) There is no time earlier than t* at
which the sentence 'It will be the case that
t* is past' was true.
For according to the 3D view, every past time is such a
time
.
But (i) can be reformulated in such a way that the 3D
theorist will accept it. In fact, there are two main ways in
which this can be done: through the use of an object-
language sentence, or through the use of a meta-language
sentence. Thus we get two different versions of (i) that the
3D theorist will accept:
(OL/ib) It's not the case that it has been the
case that t* is past.
(ML/ib) There is no time, t, such that t is
earlier than t* and 't* is past' was true at
t
.
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And how is the 3D theorist to understand (ii) ? Well, it
is obvious that he or she will not accept as true now the
following object-language sentence:
(OL/iia) For any time, t, such that it will be
the case at t that t* is past, t is past.
Nor will the 3D theorist accept the following meta-language
sentence
:
(ML/iia) For any time, t, such that 't* is
past' will be true at t, 't is past' is true
at t * .
But, as with (i)
,
there are two main ways in which (ii)
can be reformulated so that the 3D theorist will accept it.
These are as follows:
(OL/iib) For any time, t, such that it will be
the case at t that t* is past, there is some
time, t'
,
such that it will be the case at t'
that t is past.
(ML/iib) For every time, t, such that 't* is
past' will be true at t, there is a time, t'
,
such that 't is past' will be true at t' .
Are (OL/ib) and (OL/iib) inconsistent? Not at all,
according to the 3D view. Are (ML/ib) and (ML/iib)
inconsistent? No. Is any combination of versions of these
claims that the 3D theorist will accept inconsistent? No.
In short, the 3D theorist can maintain that the
different A-properties are to be treated in the manner of
other groups of incompatible properties, such as redness and
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non-redness. Sentences are to be ascribed truth-values at
times, in accordance with the tensed view of semantics, and
two sentences that, taken together, attribute incompatible
properties to a thing can never both be true at the same
time
.
So in the sense in which the A-properties are mutually
incompatible, no time possesses all of them; right now we
can say truthfully of a given time only that it possesses
such-and-such mutually compatible A-properties, did possess
such-and-such other mutually compatible A-properties, and
will possess such-and-such further mutually compatible A-
propert ies
.
In general, there are a whole bunch of sentences about
the A-properties of different times that are all true right
now and that are all consistent with one another. For any
time, there is such a bunch; but for different times the
bunches are not the same. Indeed, for each time, t, there is
a unique and consistent set, S, of sentences about A-
properties such that every sentence in S is true at t. This
generates no contradiction and, hence, no regress of
contradictions
.
The moral to be drawn from McTaggart's Argument is
this: as long as the 3D theorist insists that he or she
subscribes to the tensed view of semantics, takes tenses as
primitive, and is careful not to allow object-language/meta-
language confusions, there is no sound argument based on
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premises like (1)
,
(2) and (3) that can be brought against
3DAR, 3DAMA or 3DAA
.
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CHAPTER SIX: ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE 4D VIEW
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will turn to a consideration of some
arguments that have been brought against the 4D view, i.e.,
the view that time does not pass. I'll begin by considering
two arguments based on the claim that the 4D view somehow
goes against what we in fact experience, so that the view is
incompatible with empirical data. Then I will consider two
arguments that have to do with the 4D view and our different
attitudes toward the past and the future. The first of these
arguments, which is suggested by a passage from Derek
Parfit, is based on the claim that it is a consequence of
the 4D view that we are all irrational because we tend to be
biased toward the future. The second of these arguments is
based on the claim, made by George Schlesinger, that
according to to the 4D view it is incoherent for a person to
wish to be ten years younger. Finally, I will consider an
argument, often suggested in conversation by people who are
told of the 4D view and find it very strange, that appeals
to the counter-intuitiveness of the 4D view. I will conclude
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that none of these arguments is a good one; all can be
safely rejected by the 4D theorist without too much trouble.
6.2 The Argument from Ex.perienrp
One kind of argument that has been suggested against
the 4D view is based on an appeal to that view' s alleged
incompat ibilty with the way in which we experience the
world. The argument is, roughly, that thinking of time as
not passing is so contrary to what we in fact perceive that
the 4D view is untenable. Perhaps the most insistent
proponent of this line of argument has been George
Schlesinger. In his paper, "How Time Flies," he points out
that even 4D theorists (he calls them "Russellians " ) admit
that it feels to them that time flows or passes; as an
example he quotes J.J.C. Smart. "Certainly," writes Smart,
"we feel that time flows, but I want to say... that this
feeling arises out of a metaphysical confusion." ["Time and
Becoming," p. 3.] Schlesinger himself goes on to emphasize
that this feeling is very much with us.
It might also be added that this feeling is
not some insignificant part of our experience
but rather a central one which is with us all
the time. Our thoughts are constantly occupied
with questions of what the future is going to
bring us about opportunities passing us by and
about time flying too fast. Can such a crucial
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feature of experience be dismissed? Is it not
an important rule that our account of the
universe should be based as much as possible
on experience? ["How Time Flies," p. 515.]
There are two main claims here. The first, which
Schlesinger seems to think 4D theorists will assent to (and
which, indeed, Smart, for one, seems to grant), is that
there is some prima facie incompatibility between the 4D
view and the way in which we experience time. The difficulty
here seems to be that acceptance of the 4D view compells one
to reject an important datum from our everyday experience,
namely, the perception of time as something that flows or
passes. The second main claim suggested by the above
passage, which is implied by the two questions at the end of
the paragraph, is meant to be some sort of general
empiricist principle to the effect that it is bad for a
theory to contravene empirical data.
These two claims may be used in the following argument
against the 4D view.
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The Argument from Experience
(Version I)
(1) The 4D view is prima facie incompatible
with an important datum from everyday
experience, namely, the perception we all
share of time as being something that flows or
passes
.
(2) As a general rule, if a theory, T, is
prima facie incompatible with some important
datum from everyday experience, then T is
false
.
(3) If (1) and (2)
,
then the 4D view is false.
(4)
The 4D view is false.
In his next paragraph Schlesinger generously offers on
behalf of the 4D theorists a reply to this argument. The
reply consists, in effect, of showing that the prima facie
incompatibility of a theory with everyday experience should
not always be taken as fatal to that theory.
Russellians may reply that there are many
examples where common sense impressions have
to yield to whatever experts in a given field
tell us to be really the case. They may remind
me that my impressions of the desk I am
writing on is that it is a continuous solid
body at complete rest. Physicists will tell me
however that it is actually a swarming
collection of particles rapidly moving in all
directions with very large gaps separating
them, so that the solid body I am talking
about contains a much higher volume of empty
space than matter. If I am a sensible person
then I shall admit that the physicist, whose
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description of the desk is very different from
my own, but who is an aknowledged expert on
the properties of matter, must be right. Thus
a common sense interpretation of experience
has to give way to the account of those who
are authorities on a given subject, [p. 515.]
The 4D move proposed by Schlesinger, as I see it, is to
reject premise (2) of the above argument. And I think that
Schlesinger has indeed shown that that premise is false. The
empiricist principle according to which any theory that is
P-^'ama -facie incompatible with some datum from everyday
experience is false is not a good principle, as the desk
example illustrates. But Schlesinger goes on to say the
following
:
After some reflection it becomes evident that
nothing can be inferred from this example that
would be relevant to the problem of time. It
was not at all correct to describe the case of
the desk as one in which common sense and
professional opinion clash. It is very much
part of common sense to realize that in order
to determine the ultimate structure of solid
bodies we need the technically advanced
methods of modern science. When I am told the
facts by a physicist who discovered elementary
particles that are obviously inaccessible to .
any of my senses I do not feel at all that his
results clash with my own impressions.
Provided it is explained to me clearly what he
is saying, I am bound to realize that he is
not claiming that reality is very different
from appearances. After all, he is referring
to happenings in the domain of such magnitudes
as are far beyond the limits of appearances,
in a domain of which I will acknowledge that I
have formed no impressions.
No such thing has happened in the context of
our feeling that time moves. Philosophers who
have denied the movement of time have not
shown us that our impressions are due merely
to our unthinkingly extrapolating from our
experiences in a domain to which we have
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access into a domain beyond our reach. Theyhave not shown that their thesis and whatdistinctly appears to us to be directly
experienced do not really clash. The denial of
temporal becoming continues to strike us as a
total rejection of what we feel to be a
central feature of our temporal existence.
["How Time Flies," pp . 515-516.]
As I understand the above passage, Schlesinger is there
saying that there is an important difference between the two
cases in question. The case of the desk that appears solid
but is actually a swarming mass of particles separated by
large spaces constitutes a case in which the incompatibility
of a scientific theory with common sense is merely prima
facie. In fact the particle theory of the desk can be shown
to be compatible with the common sense perception of the
desk. The reason for this is that the two are not concerned
with the same phenomena; the one is concerned with
microscopic phenomena, the other with macroscopic phenomena.
Thus the prima facie incompatibility between the two can be
easily resolved. In the case of the 4D view of time versus
our everyday experience of time, on the other hand, there
is, according to Schlesinger, a genuine incompatiblity . And
there is a good empiricist principle taking us from such an
incompat ibilty between a theory and what we in fact
experience to the conclusion that the theory is false. It's
one thing for a theory to appear to clash with some
empirical datum, but it's quite another thing for a theory
really to clash with some empirical datum.
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If we take into account the distinction between mere
prima facie incompatibility between theory and datum and
genuine incompatibility between theory and datum, then we
can formulate what I think is the argument Schlesinger means
to be advancing against the 4D view, it goes like this:
The Argument from Experience
(Version II)
(1) The 4D view is genuinely incompatible with
an important datum from everyday experience,
namely, the perception we all share of time as
being something that flows or passes.
(2) As a general rule, if a theory, T, is
genuinely incompatible with some important
datum from everyday experience, then T is
false
.
(3) If (1) and (2), then the 4D view is false.
(4)
The 4D view is false.
Schlesinger does not provide a response for the 4D
theorist to make to this argument; he thinks that it is a
good argument against the 4D view. My own view, however, is
that it can be shown that the argument is unsound. The
problem is with premise (1)
.
In order to appreciate what is
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wrong with this premise, it is necessary to consider what is
the 4D account of the relevant empirical datum.
As Smart admits, the 4D theorists, like the rest of us,
have the feeling that time flows. But what exactly is this
feeling
,
and who exactly has it? The last part of this
question may sound odd, but it raises a very important
point. The 4D theorists think that people are four-
dimensional objects made up of temporal parts or stages.
Thus, they think that for a person, P, to have the feeling
that time flows during a period of time, t, is for the t-
temporal stage of P to have that feeling. Smart's having, at
tl, the feeling that time flows, for example, consists in
the tl-temporal stage of the four-dimensional object that is
Smart having the feeling that time flows. No doubt this can
be at least partially understood in terms of the sentences
to which the tl-temporal stage of Smart is inclined to
assent. These might include such classics as 'How time
flies', 'Is it tea-time already?' and 'Ridiculous the waste
sad time stretching before and after' . But nothing very
interesting about the nature of time can be inferred from
the mere fact that a temporal stage is inclined to assent to
such sentences. 1
Now consider the phenomenological facts of the case.
Take some arbitrary temporal slice of the four-dimensional
i By 'stage' I do not mean temporal slice, but, rather,
something with some duration. Thus a temporal stage of Smart
is a four-dimensional part of Smart. Otherwise it would not
make sense to speak of a stage's assenting to a sentence.
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object that is Smart; call it "i". Here are some of the
relevant facts about the sensations felt by i: (a) i has the
impression that t (i) (i.e., the time of i) enjoys the
special status of being present; (b) i has the impression
that its immediate predecessor, h, is such that t (h) is the
most recent of past times; 2 (c) i has the impression that
its immediate successor, j, is such that t(j) is the least
future of future times; (d) and so on for i's impressions of
the apparent A-properties of all other times; (e) i has more
or less vivid memory impressions of being, one instant ago,
in the state h was in; 3 (f) i keenly anticipates being, one
instant later, in roughly the state j will be in; (g) i has
more or less vivid memory impressions of, one instant ago,
keenly anticipating being, one instant later, in roughly the
state i is in; (h) i keenly anticipates having, one instant
later, more or less vivid memory impressions of being, one
instant ago, in roughly the sate i is in; (i) i has more or
less vivid memory impressions of being, two instants ago, in
the state g was in; (j) and so on for other memory
impressions and anticipations.
2 It might be objected that there are Zenonian problems
facing the notion of the immediate predecessor of a temporal
slice of a four-dimensional object. Perhaps there are; but
in any case, whatever problems there are facing the 4D
view's account of these matters will translate into
corresponding problems facing the 3D view' s account of the
same matters. My own view is that in both cases the problems
are soluble. See, in this regard, Grunbaum, Modern Science
and Zeno's Paradoxes
.
3 Of course i wasn't really in any state one instant ago; i
is an instant-bound individual, confined to t(i). But this
doesn't mean that i can't have memory sensations.
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What else? No doubt it is fair to add the following:
(k) i has the impression that it is a three-dimensional
object that endures through time;'1 and (1) i has the general
impression that time is flowing, and that time has flowed so
far right up to t(i), and will continue to flow into the
future
.
The reader may wonder why I am so certain of (a)-(j),
and why I say that it is "no doubt fair to add" (k) and (1) .
The reason is simple. Consider the 3D view's account of
Smart and the impressions that he has. On that account,
Smart is a three-dimensional object that endures through
time, and that has various impressions at various times, so
that various instances of "Smart feels sensation X" are true
at various times. Well, in general, for any time, t, and
momentary sensation, X, such that on the 3D view's account,
'Smart feels X' is true at t, there is, on the 4D view's
account, a t-slice, i, of Smart such that 'i feels X' is
true simplici ter. So if, according to the 3D view's account
of things, for every time, t, 'Smart feels that t is the
present moment' is true at t, then, according to the 4D
view's account, for every time, t, 'The t-slice of Smart
feels that t is the present moment' is true simpliciter . And
if, according to the 3D view's account, 'Smart has the
impression that time is flowing merrily along' is true at
times tl-tn, then, according to the 4D view's account of
4 i is in fact a three-dimensional object, but not one that
endures through time.
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things, The tl tn slices of Smart all have the impression
that time is flowing merrily along' is true simplicitBr
.
In short, the 3D view and the 4D view can agree on all
of the momentary, phenomenological facts about Smart. Their
disagreement is over the correct description of these facts;
does this description involve talk about a three-dimensional
object that experiences the relevant sensations at different
times, or does it involve talk about a four-dimensional
object whose stages and slices have the relevant experiences
simpliciter ? Really, then, this controversy is just the
3D/4D controversy all over again.
So the appropriate 4D response to The Argument from
Experience (Version II) is to reject premise (1)
.
Anyone who
would advance this argument just hasn't understood the 4D
view. Indeed, it would have been quite suprising if that
view had turned out to be incompatible with the empirical
data. As it is, the 4D view is neither more nor less
compatible with the empirical data than the 3D view.
6.3 An Argument about the 4D view and Rationality
Another kind of argument that may be suggested against
the 4D view concerns the alleged fact that certain kinds of
commonplace attitudes toward past and future events turn out
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to be, according to the 4D view, irrational. The claim here
is not that the 4D view fails to fit the empirical data but,
rather, that the view entails that some wishes, preferences
and desires that it seems rational to have are in fact
irrational. Since we don't want to give up the idea that
these attitudes can be rational - for to do so would be
highly counter-intuitive - we must conclude that the 4D view
is false.
The best example of this kind of argument that I know
of is suggested by a disussion in Derek Parfit' s book,
Reasons and Persons
.
5 Parfit does a great many things in his
book that I do not follow, and presents a number of
arguments that I do not understand. In particular, the book
is rife with fascinating examples that I feel certain
establish interesting points, even though I cannot tell what
those points are. One such example seems to me to be
relevant to the controversy between the 3D and 4D views. I
can't tell whether Parfit meant it this way or not, but the
example appears to suggest an argument against the 4D view.
The example goes like this:
I am in some hospital, to have some kind of
surgery. Since this is completely safe, and
always successful, I have no fears about the
effects. The surgery may be brief, or it may
instead take a long time. Because I have to
co-operate with the surgeon, I cannot have
anaesthetics. I have had this surgery once
before, and I can remember how painful it is.
Under a new policy, because the operation is
so painful, patients are now afterwards made
5 Chapter 8, esp. p. 179.
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to forget it. Some drug removes their memories
of the last few hours.
I have just woken up. I cannot remember going
to sleep. I ask my nurse if it has been
decided when my operation is to be, and how
long it must take. She says that she knows the
facts about both me and another patient, but
that she cannot remember which facts apply to
whom. She can tell me only that the following
is true. I may be the patient who had his
operation yesterday. In that case, my
operation was the longest ever performed,
lasting ten hours. I may instead be the
patient who is to have a short operation later
today. It is either true that I did suffer for
ten hours, or true that I shall suffer for one
hour
.
I ask the nurse to find out which is true.
While she is away, it is clear to me which I
prefer to be true. If I learn that the first
is true, I shall be greatly relieved. [Reasons
and Persons, pp. 165-166.]
Why should this example pose any problem for the 4D
view? Well, according to that view, each event in Parfit'
s
life has the same ontological status as each other event in
his life. His future is no less real than his past or his
present. All the temporal parts of Parfit are equally real
parts of a single, four-dimensional, space-time worm. As a
rational being Parfit should of course prefer that none of
those parts feels extensive and excruciating pain. But,
given that some of them will, and given the ontological
equality of the different parts of his life, it seems that
future pains of a certain degree and duration should be no
more disagreeable to Parfit than past pains of the same
degree and duration. But if this is true, then it seems to
follow that Parfit should prefer to have a life with less
p^lii overall, even if some of it is to be in the future,
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rather than a life with more pain overall, but most of it in
the past. If, that is, the past and the future are really on
equal footing.
So it seems to be a consequence of the 4D view that it
is irrational for Parfit, lying in his hospital bed waiting
for the nurse to return with the news, to prefer ten hours
of past pain over one hour of future pain. But of course we
would all feel the same way Parfit does.
More generally, it seems fair to say that we all have a
pronounced bias toward the future over the past, in cases
like Parfit' s as well as in cases where it is past and
future pleasures that are at stake. But it seems to be a
consequence of the 4D view that we all should have the same
attitude toward the future as we do toward the past; i.e.,
that it is irrational to be biased toward the future. Hence
it seems to be a consequence of the 4D view that we are all
basically irrational. Rather than give up our strong
intuition that a bias toward the future is a rational one,
then, we must reject the 4D view. Here is the argument
spelled out: 6
6 For another example of a writer who seems to want to give
the same argument against the 4D view, see Schlesinger, How
Time Flies," pp. 510-512.
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The Rationality Argument Against the 4D View
(Version I)
(1) If the 4D view is correct, then it isirrational to have dissimilar attitudes towardthe past and the future.
(2) It is rational to have dissimilar
attitudes toward the past and the future.
(3)
The 4D view is incorrect.
I think that there are two main points that the 4D
theorist must make in response to this argument. The first
has to do with the explanation for the fact that, as it
happens, we tend to be biased toward the future; the second
has to do with the claim that it is a consequence of the 4D
view that this bias is irrational. In the end, I think, the
4D theorist will have little trouble denying premise (1) of
the argument
.
Consider the 4D theorist's interpretation of the theory
of evolution. It will no doubt entail, among other things,
some principle like the following (although not in such a
grossly oversimplified form) ; as a general rule, for any
species, S, the four-dimensional objects that are members of
later generations of S tend to have more characteristics
that enhance their chances of successful reproduction than
the four-dimensional objects that are members of earlier
generations of S. Now consider what seems to be a brute fact
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about causation: causes generally precede their effects.
This means that for any two object-stages, x and y, if x
precedes y, then actions of x can have a causal effect on y,
but not vice versa. This in turn means that, in general, for
any four-dimensional object, o, a stage of o that attempts
to act so as to benefit later stages of o may act
successfully, but a stage of o that attempts to act so as to
benefit earlier stages of o will be wasting its time. Thus,
creatures that tend to be biased toward the future have a
characteristic that enhances their chances of successful
reproduction, since they tend not to waste their time trying
to affect the past. All of this explains the fact that later
parts of the world tend to be filled with four-dimensional
creatures that have stages that are biased toward the
future. So the fact that we (i.e., people nowadays) tend to
have this bias is easily explained.
But, one might ask, is it rational to have this bias?
That looks like it depends a lot on what you mean by
'rational' . But it may be possible to say something
instructive about this matter without having to give a
definition of the word.
A person-stage is a stage. It has its preferences and
predilections. In general, there is no easy way of telling
what it will care about. But it is safe to say that most of
them care a great deal about themselves, and this seems
rational, whatever 'rational' means. Some care a lot about
simultaneous stages of other people, and that may be
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rational too. Some person-stages care about past and future
stages of other people. Many person-stages, as it happens,
care a great deal about future stages of the person they are
a part of (and the explanation for this is sugested above)
.
And so on.
What stages of what people a particular person-stage
cares about will help to determine what actions we think
would be rational for that stage to attempt to perform.
Other factors are involved too, and these are not easy to
specify, since our notion of rationality is a little fuzzy.
But among these other factors is this one: in general, as
noted above, no stage can act so as to have a causal effect
on an earlier stage, but some stages can act so as to have a
causal effect on some later stages.
This, it seems to me, partially explains our thinking
that it is irrational to try to act so as to have a causal
effect on some earlier stage, and it also partially explains
our thinking that it can be rational to try to act so as to
have a causal effect on some later stage.
But Parfit's point has nothing to do with trying to
act. His point is that it seems rational for a stage to
prefer it to be true that earlier stages of the person it is
a part of had ten hours of suffering rather than true that
later stages of the same person will have one hour of
suffering, even if nothing can be done in either case to
prevent the suffering; and the 4D view, it seems, entails
that this is irrational.
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Does the 4D view really entail this? Consider George.
He likes ice cream and dislikes yogurt, even though he knows
the facts about which is more healthful. Is it rational for
George to like ice cream and dislike yogurt? That seems like
a s -'-Hy question; he likes what he likes, and dislikes what
he dislikes. The question of rationality doesn't enter into
matters of taste. But now we can ask, Given his tastes, is
it rational for George to prefer it to be true that there is
ice cream rather than yogurt in the icebox, even though
there is nothing he can do about it now? This, it seems to
me, is a reasonable question, with an easy answer; Yes.
Person-stages are similar to George, in relevant
respects, when it comes to preferences and rationality. Most
of them, I have suggested, have a general predilection for
caring more about the future than the past, as a result, I
have suggested, of evolution together with the fact that
they can't influence the past. (Whether or not this is the
right explanation is, of course, really beside the point.)
Now we ask, Is it rational for person-stages to have this
general predilection for caring more about the future than
the past? This is another silly question. Each stage just
has the predilections it has; it makes no more sense to ask,
about a given stage, whether it is rational for it to have
the preferences it has than it does to ask, of George,
whether it is rational for him to like ice cream rather than
yogurt. But here is another question: Given the way stages
are, i.e., given their bias toward the future, is it
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rational for a stage to prefer it to be true that earlier
stages of the person it is a part of had ten hours of
suffering rather than true that later stages of the same
person will have one hour of suffering, even if nothing can
be done in either case to prevent the suffering? This, it
seems to me, is a reasonable guestion, with an easy answer:
Yes
.
So the appropriate move for the 4D theorist to make is
to reject premise (1) of the above argument. Like George, a
stage cannot control the tastes that it has. It is no more
irrational for a stage to care more about the future than it
is for George to like ice cream more than yogurt. And like
George, it is rational for a stage to have preferences that
conform to its predilections. Thus, it is rational for a
stage to have preferences that conform to its bias toward
the future.
There is a similar kind of argument that has been
suggested against the 4D view; this one concerns certain
kinds of wishes that, it is alleged, are incoherent
according to the 4D view. Here is another quote from
Schlesinger
:
Suppose a person P says on 1 January 1982
which is his fiftieth birthday, 'How I wish I
was ten years younger' , and explicitly denies
that what he means is that he wishes that he
had been born ten years later so that in 1982
he would be only forty years old. No, he does
not wish to change the date of his birth and
is fully satisfied to be fifty years old in
1982... P is also aware that one well-known
Russellian translation of the statement 'Now
it is New Year 1972' is 'New Year 1972 is
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simultaneous with this utterance' but he would
emphatically re ject the suggestion that allthat he is wishing is that some utterance be
simultaneous with New Year 1972. What P is
concerned with is his aging self; he would
very much like to be ten years younger. On
McTaggart's view [i.e., roughly, the 3D view]
P s wish makes full sense and the fact that ithas no chance of being fulfilled does not make
it less so. On Russell's view however it makes
no sense at all. This seems to create a
difficulty for the latter, especially so when
it is pointed out that we are not dealing here
with some fancy too ludicrous to be given a
second thought
. This kind of wish is expressed
by millions of people every day and I should
suspect by Russellians no less than by others.
["How Time' Flies," pp. 512-513.]
The argument that Schlesinger means to be advancing
here is fairly easy to see. It goes roughly like this:
The Rationality Argument Against the 4D View
(Version II)
(1) If the 4D view is correct, then it cannot
make sense to wish to be ten years younger.
(2) It can make sense to wish to be ten years
younger
.
(3)
The 4D view is incorrect.
This argument, however, suffers from the
The Argument from Rationality (Version I) ; it
same defect as
is based on a
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false claim about what is entailed by the 4D view. Let me
explain
.
Consider this question: What is P wishing when he
wishes to be ten years younger? p, after all, is a person-
stage. Or at any rate, the one who does the wishing is a
person-stage (it may even make sense to speak of the whole
person having such a wish, if all of its stages have the
wish)
. Let us refer to this wisher as "P/t", shorthand for
'the t-stage of p'
.
So P/t makes this wish, i.e., utters the sentence 'How
I wish I was ten years younger'
. What does P/t mean by this?
Here are some different possibilities:
a. P/t could mean that he wishes that he were
identical with P/t-10 (i.e., the stage of P that is ten
years younger than P/t)
.
This may be a coherent wish or it
may not. Note, in any case, that it cannot come true, for
the following is a good principle:
(NI) For any stages x and y, if ~ (x=y)
,
then,
necessarily, ~ (x=y)
.
Everything is, as we all know, what it is, and not another
thing. But not much should be made of this. I could
coherently wish that the number 7 were an even number, after
all, and that is something that is necessarily false. In any
case, whether the necessary falsity of the proposition that
P/t is identical to P/t-10 entails that P/t's wish is an
incoherent one or not, I think it does entail that this is
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not what P/t has in mind. For P/t knows - or could be made
to know - that it's necessary that he is not identical to
P/t-10, so I don't think he would say that that is what he's
wishing (assuming that he would say that what he's wishing
is something that is not necessarily false)
.
b. P/t could mean that he wishes that in the next
instant he would suddenly change into a stage that is
qualitatively identical to P/t-10. But what could be meant
here by 'change into'? Well, perhaps to say that P/t wishes
that he would suddenly change into a stage that is
qualitatively identical to P/t-10 means that P/t wishes that
the P-stage immediately following him (i.e., his successor)
would be qualitatively identical to P/t-10. (But does P/t
want his successor to remember being P/t only an instant
ago? If so then it cannot be qualitatively identical to P/t-
10
. )
c. Or P/t could be wishing that his successor
would find himself in the situation that P/t-10 was in.
d. Or both b and c. (As far as I can tell from the
above passage, this is pretty much what Schlesinger has in
mind.
)
e. Or P/t could want his successor to be in the
situation that P/t-10 was in, with the outward
characteristics of P/t-10, but with the mental
characteristics of P/t.
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f. Or P/t could want his successor to be in the
roughly the situation P/t is in, with all of the outward and
inward characteristics of P/t-10.
g. Or P/t could want his successor to be in
roughly the situation P/t is in, with the outward
characteristics of P/t-10, and the inward characteristics of
P/t.
There are more possibilities. But the point is this: b-
g are all coherent. P/t could sensibly wish for any of these
things to come true. The fact that there are, according to
the 4D view, so many different possible interpretations of
P/t's wish that are all sensible should of course be
considered a virtue of that view. 7 In short, the correct 4D
response to the Rationality Argument Against the 4D View
(Version II) is to reject premise (1) of that argument.
7 Here is a strange twist on things: it is one of the 3D
views, namely 3DAA, that actually has a problem with P's
wish. The 4D view can understand P's wish in one of the ways
described above. 3DRR, 3DAR and 3DAMA can understand it in
some way like this: P wishes that suddenly everything would
go back to being the way it was in 1972; this means that
things that exist in 1982 but didn't exist in 1972 will stop
existing, things that don't exist in 1982 but did exist in
1972 will come back into existence as they were in 1972, and
things that exist in 1982 and also existed in 1972 will
suddenly go back to being the way they were in 1972. 3DAA,
on the other hand, cannot simply understand P's wish in this
way, for nothing can be said in 1982 about the things that
existed in 1972 but have since ceased to exist; i.e., no
singular propositions about such things can be expressed in
1982. So the proponent of 3DAA will have to settle for this:
P wishes that all of the general propositions that were true
in 1972 would be true again in 1982, and also that all of
the singular propositions that were true in 1972 and that
still exist in 1982 would also be true again in 1982. This
of course leaves out the singular propositions about objects
that existed in 1972 but no longer exist in 1982. (I don't
think anyone would think that this is fatal for 3DAA .
)
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6 • 4—The Argument from the Counter-intuitiveness of the 4D
View
Still, it may seem that the 4D view suffers from just
being plain counter-intuitive; so much so, in fact, that it
is unacceptable. The proponent of the 3D view may argue that
we all learned at our mothers' knees to view the world as a
three-dimensional world, full of three-dimensional objects
that persist through time in virtue of the fact that they
endure. Now Russell and his friends are asking us to reject
this way of viewing the world, in favor of an alternative
way that often leaves even 4D theorists in a state of
counter-intuitive bewilderment. It is asking too much; we
cannot do it. For this reason, the 4D view is simply
untenable. The argument that suggests itself here is the
following
.
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The Argument from the Counter-intuitiveness of the
4D View
(1) The 4D view is extremely counter-
intuitive
.
(2) If a view is as counter-intuitive as the
4D view is, then it is untenable.
(3)
The 4D view is untenable.
It is sometimes difficult to know exactly what
philosophers mean by 'counter-intuitive'
,
but I think that
the 4D theorist more or less has to accept premise (1) of
this argument. The view is a strange one; it does seem to go
against our pre-philosophical intuitions. But is this enough
to render the view untenable? I don't think so. As long as a
view doesn't contravene some empirical datum, it seems to
me, counter-intuitiveness is not enough to make it
untenable. Here Schlesinger' s desk example is relevant, as
are a host of other examples from the sciences. It is just a
fact about theorizing that if we do it well, then we must
sometimes end up embracing views that seem, in some sense,
downright strange. Still, we often do this, and in many
cases, at least, it is the right thing to do. Furthermore,
if we attempted to spell out the principle that premise (2)
of the above argument is based on, specifying to what degree
^ view may be counter-intuitive before it must be dropped,
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and making this principle strong enough to rule out the 4D
view, then we would end up with too strong a principle,
i.e., one that rules out views that we don't wish to rule
out. But perhaps the easiest way to see that such a
principle would be a bad one, in any case, is simply to note
that our intuitions tend to change over time.
So the 4D theorist should reject premise (2) of this
argument. In so doing, the 4D theorist should admit, he or
she is no doubt biting a bullet. But it is not a large
bullet, such a person can claim, nor is it an explosive one.
All is well in 4D-land.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
7.1 Mv Reasons for Preferring 3DAA
I spent the last two chapters defending the five
different views formulated in Chapters 2-4 against various
traditional arguments that could be brought against them. My
overall claim has been that none of these five can be
successfully refuted. Nevertheless, I myself have a
preference for one of the five. I prefer 3DAA over its
rivals. In this section I will explain my reasons for that
preference
.
To begin with, I note that if what I have said in
Chapters 5 and 6 above is correct, then each of the views in
question is consistent. So there would be nothing
contradictory about holding any one of them. In particular,
then, there is nothing contradictory about holding any of
the 3D views, in spite of the traditional attempts by non-
passage theorists to show that their opponents' views are in
some way contradictory. So the considerations that have
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traditionally been taken to count against the 3D views
should, in fact, not count against them.
Next I note that my pre-philosophical intuitions favor
the 3D view of physical objects over the 4D view. That is, I
have this peculiarity: I am just naturally inclined to think
of the physical objects in the world as three-dimensional
objects that endure through time rather than as four-
dimensional space-time worms that perdure. Hence, because
the 3D views are open to me (i.e., because they cannot be
shown to be inconsistent)
,
I reject the 4D view.
Next I note a curious fact about the relationship among
the 4D view, 3DRR and 3DAR: these three are, in an important
sense, extensionally equivalent. By this I mean two things:
(i) every sentence-token of English that is not time-
theoretical (i.e., sentence-tokens other than ones that are
of types like 'Time passes'
,
'The White House endures'
,
etc.) is such that, if it is true according to one of these
three views, then it is true according to the other two
views; and (ii) for each of the three views there is a
mapping from the elements of any model that, according to
that view, represents the real world to elements of any of
the models that, according to the other two views, represent
the real world.
Point (i) is perhaps easier to see than point (ii)
.
For
the reader who is skeptical about (i) and wishes to test
whether it is true, I recommend beginning with a
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reconsideration of the sentence-tokens (l)-(5) that were
discussed in Chapter 4 above.
Point (ii) is a little more complicated. For one thing,
it cannot be literally true, because it cannot be the case
that models of all three of the views in question exist. For
two of the putative models are each supposed to have as a
member a domain consisting of all of the three-dimensional
physical objects in the world, and the other putative model
is supposed to have as one of its members a domain
consisting of all of the four-dimensional physical objects
in the world; but clearly it's not true that each of these
domains exists, for the objects in the world are either all
three-dimensional or else all four-dimensional (i.e., either
they all endure, or else they all perdure)
.
Point (ii) can be more accurately phrased as follows:
for each of the three views, there is a mapping from the
putative elements of any putative model that, according to
that view, represents the real world to putative elements of
any of the putative models that, according to the other two
views, represent the real world. Consider, first, the
putative 4D model, Ml, and the putative 3DRR model, M2,
described in Chapter 4 above. Pretend that both are real.
Then for each member of the domain of Ml (e.g., the four-
dimensional Montana) , there is a corresponding member of the
domain of M2 (the three-dimensional Montana) ; and for each
pair consisting of a member of the domain of Ml and a
predicate of Ml such that the extension of that predicate
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contains that member of the domain (e.g., the four-
dimensional Montana and the 4D predicate that has as its
extension all and only objects with tl temporal parts that
are quarterbacks)
,
there is a corresponding pair consisting
of a member of the domain of M2 and a predicate of M2 such
that the extension of that predicate contains that member of
the domain (the three-dimensional Montana and the 3DRR
predicate that has as its extension all and only objects
that are quarterbacks at tl)
.
Similar remarks apply to the relationship between M2
and M3, the putative 3DAR model described in Chapter 4. That
is, for each member of the domain of M2 (e.g., the three-
dimensional Montana)
,
there is a corresponding member of the
domain of M3 (the three-dimensional Montana) ; and for each
pair consisting of a member of the domain of M2 and a
predicate of M2 such that the extension of that predicate
contains that member of the domain (e.g., the three-
dimensional Montana and the 3DRR predicate that has as its
extension all and only objects that are quarterbacks at tl) ,
there is a corresponding triple consisting of a member of
the domain of M3, a point on the line contained in M3, and a
predicate of M3, such that the extension of that predicate
at that point contains that member of the domain (the three-
dimensional Montana, the point pi, and the predicate that
has as its extension at any time all and only objects that
are quarterbacks at that time)
.
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In a certain important sense, then, the 4D, 3DRR and
3DAR views agree with one another on all non-time-
theoretical issues. They represent different ways of
systematically saying the same thing; they are different,
but equivalent, linguistic frameworks, in the terminology of
Carnap
.
1
I consider this a reason for rejecting 3DRR and 3DAR
.
After all, I have said that I choose to reject the 4D view,
and now I am saying that these other two views are merely
different versions of the view I choose to reject; hence I
should reject them too. 2
That leaves me with two different views to choose from.
Now, I can't find any good empirical or theoretical reason
to make time ontologically asymmetrical; it seems to me that
we ought to treat the past and the future alike. If the
future is unreal, then so is the past. So that rules out
3DAMA, leaving only 3DAA.
1 Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology."
2 Of course, this equivalence business works two ways.
Another reaction would be, Oh, then I guess the 4D view
isn't so bad.
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7.2 Apparent Problems Facing 3n aa
In this section I will briefly consider some apparent
problems facing 3DAA. Each of these problems involves what
seems to be a counter-intuitive result about 3DAA'
s
treatment of the past; each, I will argue, is a merely
apparent problem.
One result of 3DAA that was made explicit in Chapter 4
is that, according to 3DAA, there are now no singular
propositions about Socrates. Thus, there are now no true
sentences of the form "PSs", where the term in place of '$'
is some predicate and 's' is a name that refers to Socrates.
Given the treatment of sentences that fail to refer for
which I opted in Chapter 4 (namely, they're all false), it
follows that there are now no true sentences about Socrates.
Some may find this troubling.
I don't find it troubling, however, because, temporal
actualist that I am, I don't think there can be a
proposition that contains some constituent that doesn't
exist, any more than there can be any other set that
contains a member that doesn't exist. Besides, the intuition
that there ought to be some true sentences about Socrates
can be satisfied, even according to 3DAA, in terms of
general propositions about the way things used to be. These
general propositions can be expressed by such general
sentences as
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P (Ex (S 1x & Wx) ) ,
i.e., it has been the case that there is an x such that x is
called "Socrates" and x is wise; and
P (Ex (
S
1 x & Ey (P 1y & T 2xy) ) ) ,
i.e., it has been the case that there is an x such that x is
called "Socrates" and there is a y such that y is called
"Plato" and x is the teacher of y.
Of course, it may well be that all of the general
sentences about the putative past existence of a person who
was called "Socrates", and did and suffered such-and-such
things, are false, due to the indeterminacy of the matter.
That is, it may well be that in the 3DAA models that
represent the actual world, there are some routes to the
left of the point corresponding to the present time on which
there never was such a person. If so, then so be it. If such
general sentences about the past existence of a man called
"Socrates" are not true in virtue of the way things are now,
then, temporal actualist that I am, I don't see how they
could be true.
A second apparent problem for 3DAA can be formulated as
follows. It's one thing to say that there are now no
singular facts about Socrates, who doesn't exist these days;
but it is very implausible to admit that there may be a lack
of facts about the past doings of presently existing
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individuals. Yet it is a consequence of 3DAA that if there
are now no physically deterministic traces of what Cranston,
a presently existing person with a fallible memory, had for
lunch exactly fifteen years ago, then there is currently no
fact of the matter about Cranston' s luncheon menu on that
day. I.e., it may be the case that there's no true
proposition to the effect that Cranston had such-and-such
for lunch fifteen years ago.
Indeed, the problem can be made even more immediate.
Suppose that some current particle, p, is such that it is
now a physically indeterministic matter whether p was in one
location, 1, or another location, 1', a second ago. Then it
is a consequence of 3DAA that there is no fact of the matter
about where p was a second ago. Moreover, the proposition
that p was at 1 one second ago is false, as is the
proposition that p was at 1' one second ago. In general, it
is a consequence of 3DAA, at least as I have spelled out the
view above, that there can be an utter lack of facts about
even the least past of past matters.
I think that the correct 3DAA response to this
objection is to say that this is a desirable result. After
all, a proposition can be true only if it corresponds to the
world in the appropriate way; and since there are only
present objects in the world, a proposition can be true only
if it corresponds to present objects in the world in the
appropriate way.
267
Another apparent problem facing 3DAA is that, according
to 3DAA, we cannot talk about relations between things at a
time when one or more of the relata aren't present, but
there are cases in which it seems that we should be able to
do just this. We want to say, for example, that I am related
to my paternal grandfather, even though he no longer exists.
Yet it is a consequence of 3DAA that there are now no
singular propositions about my paternal grandfather.
In response to this, the 3DAA theorist can point out
that there is a sense in which we can talk about the
relation between my grandfather and me, even though we won't
thereby express any singular propositions about my
grandfather. For there is the 3DAA sentence
P (Ex (F 2
2
xn) ) ,
i.e., it has been the case that there is a x such that x is
the paternal grandfather of Ned. This sentence can be true
because I exist now, and there was a time when my
grandfather and I both existed.
The situation is not so simple, however, when we want
to talk about relations between things that never co-
existed. We would like, for example, to be able to say that
my great-great-grandfather stood in the great-great-
grandfather relation to me; but this seems problematic,
since there was never a time when he and I both existed. The
3DAA solution to this apparent problem is to point out that
there are such 3DAA sentences as
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F 2
1
dn & P (Ex (F 2
1
xd & P (Ey (F 2 yx &
P (Ez (F 2 lZ y) ))))),
i.e., my father is my father, and it has been the case that
(there is a x such that (x is the father of my father and it
has been the case that (there is a y such that (y is the
father of x and it has been the case that (there is a z such
that (z is the father of y) ) ) ) ) )
.
Similarly, we can say that
Napoleon was smaller than Hercules, because there are such
3DAA sentences as
P (ExEy (N xx & S 2
x
yx & P (EzEu (H!z & S 2 1 uz &
S 2 2yu) ) ) ) ,
i.e., it has been the case that (there are an x and a y such
that (x is called "Napoleon" and y is the size of x and it
has been the case that (there are a z and a u such that (z
is called "Hercules" and u is the size of z and y is smaller
than u) ) ) )
.
7.3 Conclusion
I began by considering the question 'Does time pass?'
.
In Chapters 2-3 I showed that there are at least five
different views that should each count as an answer to this
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question. In Chapter 4 I considered the type of formal
language, with semantics, that would be suited to each of
those views. Then in Chapters 5 and 6 I argued that there
are no good arguments against any of the five views.
Finally, in this chapter I have expressed my reasons for
preferring 3DAA, and I have considered some possible
objections to that view, attempting to show, in the case of
each such objection, that the objection can be met
successfully by a 3DAA theorist.
270
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams, Robert Merrihew, "Actualism and Thisness,"
Synthese 49 (1981), pp. 3-41.
Adams, Robert Merrihew, "Primitive Thisness and
Primitive Identity,” Journal of Philosophy LXXVI, no. 1
(1979), pp. 5-25.
Adams, Robert Merrihew, "Theories of Actuality," Nous 8
(1974), pp. 211-231. Reprinted in Loux (ed.) The Possible
and the Actual.
Adams, Robert Merrihew, "Time and Thisness," French,
Uehling and Wettstein (editors)
,
Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, Volume XI.
Almog, Joseph, Perry, John and Wettstein, Howard
(editors)
,
Themes from Kaplan (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 198 9) .
Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by
Jonathan Barnes (Princeton University Press, Princeton,
1984) .
Augustine, Confessions
,
translated by E.B. Pusey (Henry
Regnery Co., Chicago, 1948).
Baker, Lynne Rudder, "On the Mind-Dependence of
Temporal Becoming, " Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
39 (1979), pp. 341-357.
Bouwsma, O.K., "The Mystery of Time," collected in
Bouwsma, Philosophical Papers, (University of Nebraska
Press, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1967)
.
Broad, C.D., "Ostensible Temporality," from Volume II,
Part I of An Examination of McTaggart' s Philosophy
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1938). Reprinted in
Gale, The Philosophy of Time.
Cahn, Steven M., Fate, Logic and Time (Yale University
Press, New Haven, 1967)
.
Carnap, Rudolf, "Empiricism, Semantics _ and Ontology
,
”
in Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, second edition (University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956)
.
271
American. 7
Casteneda, "Indicators and Quasi-indicators,"
Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1967), pp . 85-100.
p
C
j}
apma
^'
T
-' Time: A Philosophical Analysis (D. ReidelPublishing Co., Dordrecht, 1982)
i
Chisholm, Roderick, The First Person (University ofMinnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1981)
Christensen, Ferrel, "The Source of the River of Time "Ratio XVIII (1976), pp . 131-144.
Cockburn, David, "The Problem of the Past,"
Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1987), pp. 54-60.
Devitt, Michael and Sterelny, Kim, Language and Reality(Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, MA,
1987 ) .
Dowty
,
David R.
,
Wall, Robert E., and Peters, Stanley,
Introduction to Montague Semantics (D. Reidel Publishing
Co., Dordrecht, 1985).
Dummett, Michael, "A Defense of McTaggart's Proof of
the Unreality of Time," Philosophical Review 69 (1960), pp
.
497-504.
Dummett, Michael, Frege: Philosophy of Language
(Duckworth, London, 1973)
.
Findlay, J.N., "Time: A Treatment of Some Puzzles,"
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 19 (1941) . Reprinted in
Gale, The Philosophy of Time.
Fine, Kit, "Prior on the Construction of Possible
Worlds and Instants, " in Prior and Fine, Worlds
,
Times and
Selves, pp. 116-161.
Forbes, Graeme, The Metaphysics of Modality (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1983)
.
Freeman, Eugene, and Sellars, Wilfrid, Basic Issues in
the Philosophy of Time (The Open Court Publishing Co., La
Salle, IL, 1971)
.
Frege, "On Sense and Meaning, " in Philosophical
Writings of Gottlob Frege, third edition, edited by Peter
Geach and Max Black (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980)
.
French, Peter A., Uehling, Theodore E. and Wettstein,
Howard K. (editors)
,
Contemporary Perspectives in the
Philosophy of Language (University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis, 1979)
.
272
French, Peter A., Uehling, Theodore E. and Wettstein,
Howard (editors)
,
Midwest Studies in Philosophy
,
Volume XI(University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1986) .
Gale, Richard, "'Here' and 'Now'," Freeman and Sellars,
Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Time
,
pp. 72-85.
Gale, Richard, The Language of Time (Routledge & Kegan
Paul, London, 1968)
.
Gale, Richard (ed.), The Philosophy of Time (Humanities
Press, New Jersey, 1968)
.
Garrett, Brian, "'Thank Goodness That's Over'
Revisited," Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1987), pp . 201-205.
Geach, P.T., "Some Problems about Time," in Geach,
Logic Matters (University of California Press, Berkely,
1972) .
Goodman, Nelson, The Structure of Appearance (Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1951)
.
Grunbaum, Adolf, "The Meaning of Time, " in Nicholas
Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel (D. Reidel
Publishing Co., Dordrecht, 1970), pp. 147-177.
Grunbaum, Adolf, Modern Science and Zeno's Paradoxes
(Wesleyan University Press, Middleton, CT, 1967)
.
Grunbaum, Adolf, Philosophical Problems of Space and
Time, 2nd edition (D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht,
1973)
.
Grunbaum, Adolf, "Time, Irreversible Processes, and the
Physical Status of Becoming," Smart (ed.), Problems of Space
and Time.
Heller, Mark, "Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional
Objects," Philosophical Studies 46, no. 3 (1984), pp. 323-
334 .
Herbert, R.T., "The Relativity of Simultaneity,"
Philosophy 62 (1987), pp. 455-471.
Hestevold, H. Scott, "Passage and the Presence of
Experience," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50
(1990)
,
pp. 537-552 .
Horwich, Paul, Asymmetries in Time (Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987)
.
Kaplan, David, Demonstratives , in Almog, Perry and
Wettstein (editors), Themes from Kaplan.
273
Kaplan, David, "Dthat, " in French, Uehling and
Wettstein, Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of
Language .
Kaplan, David, "On the Logic of Demonstratives," in
French,. Uehling and Wettstein, Contemporary Perspectives in
the Philosophy of Language
.
Kripke, Saul, "A Puzzle About Belief," in Meaning and
Use, edited by Avishai Margalit (D. Reidel Publishing Co.,
Dordrecht, 1979), pp. 239-283.
Leibniz, G.W., The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence,
translated by H.G. Alexander (Manchester University Press,
Manchester, 1956) .
Levison, Arnold, "Events and Time's Flow," Mind XCVI
(1987), pp. 341-353.
Lewis, David, "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal
Logic," in Lewis, Philosophical Papers, Volume I, pp . 26-39
Lewis, David, "General Semantics," in Lewis,
Philosophical Papers, Volume I, pp . 189-229.
Lewis, David, On the Plurality of Worlds (Basil
Blackwell, London, 1986) .
Lewis, David, "The Paradoxes of Time Travel," in Lewis
Philosophical Papers, Volume II, pp. 67-80.
Lewis, David, Philosophical Papers, Volume I (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1983)
.
Lewis, David, Philosophical Papers, Volume II (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1986) .
Lewis, David, "Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to
Lowe," Analysis 48 (1988), pp. 65-72.
Loux, Michael J., "Introduction: Modality and
Metaphysics," in Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual.
Loux, Michael J. (ed.), The Possible and the Actual
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1979) .
Lowe, E.J., "Lewis on Perdurance Versus Endurance,"
Analysis 47 (1987), pp. 152-154.
Lowe, E.J., "The Problems of Intrinsic Change:
Rejoinder to Lewis," Analysis 48 (1988), pp. 72-77.
274
Lukasiewicz, Jan, "On Determinism," in Storrs McCall
(ed.) Polish Logic 1920-1939 (Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1967), pp. 19-39.
Lycan, William, "The Trouble with Possible Worlds, " in
Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual.
McCall, Storrs, "Temporal Flux," American Philosophical
Quarterly 3 (1966), pp. 270-281.
McTaggart
,
John M.E., The Nature of Existence
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1927)
.
McTaggart, John M.E., "Time," (Chapter 33 of Book V of
McTaggart, The Nature of Existence)
. Reprinted in Gale, The
Philosophy of Time.
McTaggart, John M.E., "The Unreality of Time," Mind 17
(1908)
,
pp. 457-474 .
Massey, Gerald, "Tense Logic! Why Bother?" Nous III
(1969), pp. 17-32.
Massey, Gerald, Understanding Symbolic Logic (Harper &
Row, New York, 1970)
.
Mates, Benson, Elementary Logic, second edition (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1972)
.
Meiland, J.W., "Temporal Parts and Spatio-Temporal
Analogies," American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1966), pp.
64-70.
Mellor, D.H., Real Time (Cambridg University Press,
Cambridge, 1981)
.
Mellor, D. H., "Tense's Tenseless Truth Conditions,"
Analysis 46 (1986), pp . 167-172.
Mellor, D.H., "'Thank Goodness That's Over'," Ratio
XXIII (1981), pp. 20-30.
Minkowski, H., "Space and Time," Smart (ed.), Problems
of Space and Time.
Moore, G.E., "Being, Fact and Existence," in Moore,
Some Main Problems of Philosophy (Allen and Unwin, London,
1953)
,
pp . 288-307 .
Moore, G.E., "Necessity" in Moore, Lectures on
Philosophy (Allen and Unwin, London, 1966)
,
PP- 129 131.
275
Myro, George, "Time and
Wettstein (editors)
, Midwest
XI.
Essence," French, Uehling and
Studies in Philosophy
,
Volume
Newton Smith, W.H., The Structure of Time (Routledge &
Kegan Paul, London, 1980)
.
Oaklander, L. Nathan, Temporal Relations and Temporal
Becoming (University Press of America, New York, 1984)
.
Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1894)
.
Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers (Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1934)
.
Perry, John, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical,
"
Nous 13 (1979), pp-. 3-21.
Plantinga, Alvin, "Actualism and Possible Worlds,
"
Theoria 42 (1976) . Reprinted in Loux (ed.), The Possible and
the Actual, pp . 253-273.
Plantinga, Alvin, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1974)
.
Plato, Timaeus, collected in Plato, The Collected
Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington
Cairns (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1961)
.
Plecha, James, "Tenselessness and the Absolute
Present," Philosophy 59, no. 230 (1984).
Plotinus, "Time and Eternity, " from The Six Enneads,
translated by Stephen Mackenna, third edition revised by
B.S. Page (Pantheon Books, New York, 1962). Reprinted in
Gale, The Philosophy of Time.
Plumer, Gilbert, "Expressions of Passage,"
Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1987), pp. 341-354.
Priest, Graham, "Tense and Truth Conditions," Analysis
46 (1986)
,
pp. 162-166.
Priest, Graham, "Tense, Tense and TENSE," Analysis 4~
(1987), pp. 184-187.
Prior, Arthur N., "Changes in Events and Changes in
Things," in Prior, Papers on Time and Tense, pp. 1-14.
Prior, Arthur N., The Doctrine of Proprosit ions and
Terms (Duckworth, London, 1976)
.
276
Prior, Arthur N., "Identifiable Individuals," in PriorPapers on Time and Tense
,
pp. 66-77.
Prior, Arthur N., "The Notion of the Present," StadiumGenerale 23 (1970) .
Prior, Arthur N., Objects of Thought (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1971).
Prior, Arthur N., Papers in Logic and Ethics
(Duckworth, London, 1976)
.
Prior, Arthur N., Papers on Time and Tense (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1968)
.
Prior, Arthur N., Past, Present and Future (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1967)
Prior, Arthur N., "Postulates for Tense-Logic,"
American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1966), pp. 153-161.
Prior, Arthur N., "Quasi-Propositions and Quasi-
Individuals," in Prior, Papers on Time and Tense, pp. 135-
144 .
Prior, Arthur N., "Recent Advances in Tense Logic,"
Freeman and Sellars, Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Time,
pp . 1-15.
Prior, Arthur N., "Tense Logic for Non-Permanent
Existents," in Prior, Papers on Time and Tense, pp. 145-160.
Prior, Arthur, N., "Thank Goodness That's Over," in
Prior, Papers in Logic and Ethics, pp. 78-84.
Prior, Arthur N., Time and Modality (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1957)
.
Prior, Arthur N., "Time, Existence, and Identity," in
Prior, Papers on Time and Tense, pp. 78-87.
Prior, Arthur N., and Fine, Kit, Worlds, Times and
Selves (University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, MA,
1977) .
Putnam, Hilary, "Time and Physical Geometry, " Journal
of Philosophy LXIV, no. 8 (1967) . Reprinted in Putnam,
Hilary, Mathematics, Matter and Method (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1975)
.
Quine, W.V., Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
(Columbia University Press, New York, 1969)
.
277
Quine, W.V., Philosophy of Logic (Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986)
.
Quine, W.V., Quiddities (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1987)
.
Quine, W.V., Theories and Things (Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981)
.
Quine, W.V., and Ullian, J.S., The Web of Belief
,
second edition (Random House, New York, 1978)
.
Quine, W.V., Word and Object (Massachusetts Institute
of Technology Press, Cambridge, MA, 1960)
.
Reichenbach, Hans, The Direction of Time (University of
California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1956)
.
Reichenbach, Hans, The Philosophy of Space and Time,
translated by Maria Reichenbach and John Freund (Dover, New
York, 1958)
.
Russell, Bertrand, The Principles of Mathematics
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1903) .
Ryckman, Thomas C., "Belief, Linguistic Behavior, and
Propositional Content, " Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research XLVII, no. 2 (1986), pp. 277-287.
Ryle, Gilbert, "It Was To Be, " in Ryle, Dilemmas
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1954), pp. 15-35.
Salmon, Nathan, Frege's Puzzle (Massachusetts Institute
of Technology Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986)
.
Salmon, Nathan, "Tense and Singular Propositions, " in
Almog, Perry and Wettstein (editors)
,
Themes from Kaplan.
Schlesinger, George, Aspects of Time (Hackett
Publishing Co., Indianapolis, 1980).
Schlesinger, George, "How Time Flies, " Mind XCI (1982)
,
pp. 501-523.
Schlesinger, George, "The Two Notions of the Passage of
Time," Nous III (1969), pp. 1-16.
Schlick, Moritz, "The Four-Dimensional World," in Smart
(ed.), Problems of Space and Time.
Schrodinger, "Irreversibility," Proceedings of the
Royal Irish Academy, Volume 53 (1950)
.
278
Schuster, M.M., "Is the Flow of Time Subjective?"
Review of Metaphysics 39 (1986), pp . 695-714.
Shoemaker, Sidney, "Time without Change," Journal of
Philosophy LXVI, no. 12 (1969), pp . 363-381.
Smart, J.J.C., Philosophy and Scientific Realism
(Rout ledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1963) .
Smart, J.J.C. (ed.), Problems of Space and Time
(Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, 1964).
Smart, J.J.C.
,
"The River of Time," Mind 58 (1949).
Reprinted in Flew, Antony (ed.) Essays in Conceptual
Analysis (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1966).
Smart, J.J.C., "Spatialising Time," Mind 64 (1955).
Reprinted in Gale, ' The Philosophy of Time.
Smart, J.J.C., "Time and Becoming," in van Inwagen
(ed.), Time and Cause.
Smith, Quentin, "Problems with the New Tenseless Theory
of Time," Philosophical Studies 52, no. 3 (1987), pp . 371-
392 .
Smith, Quentin, "Sentences About Time," Philosophical
Quarterly 37 (1987), pp. 37-53.
Sosa, Ernest, "The Status of Temporal Becoming: What is
Happening Now?" Journal of Philosophy LXXVI, no. 1 (1979),
pp . 26-42.
Stalnaker
,
Robert, "Counterparts and Identity, " in
French, Uehling and Wettstein, Midwest Studies In Philosophy
XI, pp. 121-140.
Stein, Howard, "On Einstein-Minkowski Space-Time,-"
Journal of Philosophy LXV (1968), pp. 5-23.
Suppes, Patrick, Probabilistic Metaphysics (Basil
Blackwell, Oxford, 1984)
.
Swinburne, Richard (ed.), Space, Time and Causality (D.
Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, 1983).
Tarski, Alfred, "The Concept of Truth in Formalized
Languages, " in Tarski (ed. ) , Logic, Semantics and
Mathematics (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1935)
.
Taylor, Richard, Metaphysics, 3rd edition (Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1983)
.
279
Taylor, Richard, "Spatial and Temporal Analogies and
the Concept of Identity," in Smart (ed.), Problems of Space
and Time.
Thomason, Richmond, " Indeterminist Time and Truth-Value
Gaps," Theoria 3 (1970), pp . 264-281.
van Benthem, J.F.A.K., The Logic of Time (D. Reidel
Publishing Co., Dordrecht, 1983).
van Fraassen, Bas C., An Introduction to the Philosophy
of Space and Time (Random House, New York, 1970)
.
van Inwagen, Peter, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1983)
.
van Inwagen, Peter, "Four-Dimensional Objects," Nous
XXIV (1990), pp. 245-256.
van Inwagen, Peter (ed.), Time and Cause (D. Reidel
Publishing Co., Dordrecht, 1980).
Waismann, Friedrich, "Analytic-Synthetic, " Analysis 2
and 3 (December 1950 and January 1951) . Reprinted in Gale,
The Philosophy of Time.
Waismann, Friedrich, Introduction to Mathematical
Thinking (Harper and Row, New York, 1959)
.
Waterlow, Sarah, Passage and Possibility (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1982)
.
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Merriam Webster,
Springfield, MA, 1975)
.
Wetzel, Linda, "Expressions Versus Numbers,"
manuscript
.
Wiggins, David, "On Being in the Same Place at the Same
Time," Philosophical Review LXXVII, no. 1 (1968), pp. 90-95.
Williams, Donald C., "The Myth of Passage," Journal of
Philosophy 48 (1951) . Reprinted in Gale, The Philosophy of
Time, pp. 98-116.
Williams, Donald C., "Physics and Flux: Comment on
Professor Capek's Essay."
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, The Blue and Brown Books (Basil
Blackwell, Oxford, 1958)
.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations ,
translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, third edition (Macmillan
Publishing Company, New York, 1968)
.
280
Woods, Michael, "Existence and Tense," in Evans,
Gareth, and McDowell, John (editors)
,
Truth and Meaning(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1976)
.
Woolf, Carl, McTaggart
, Dummett , and Time, doctoral
dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1985.
Zwart
,
P.J., About Time (North Holland Publishing Co.,
Amsterdam, 1976)
.
281


